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AD HOC DIPLOMATS 
RYAN M. SCOVILLE† 
ABSTRACT 
  Article II of the Constitution grants the president power to appoint 
“Ambassadors” and “other public Ministers” with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. By all accounts, this language requires Senate 
confirmation for the appointment of resident ambassadors and other 
diplomats of similar rank and tenure. Yet these are hardly the only 
agents of U.S. foreign relations. Ad hoc diplomats—individuals chosen 
exclusively by the president to complete limited and temporary 
assignments—play a comparably significant role in addressing 
international crises, negotiating treaties, and otherwise executing 
foreign policy. 
  This Article critically examines the appointments process for such 
irregular agents. An orthodox view holds it permissible for the 
president to dispatch any ad hoc diplomat without Senate confirmation, 
but this view does not accord with the original meaning of Article II. 
Scrutinizing text and an extensive collection of original historical 
sources, I show that, under a formalist reading of the Constitution, the 
appointment of most ad hoc diplomats requires the advice and consent 
of the Senate because these agents are typically “public Ministers” and 
“Officers of the United States” under the Appointments Clause. 
  The analysis makes several contributions. First, it provides the first 
thorough account of the original meaning of “public Ministers”—a 
term that appears several times in the Constitution but lacks precise 
contours in contemporary scholarship and practice. Second, for 
formalists, the analysis reorients longstanding debates about the 
process of treaty-making and empowers the Senate to exert greater 
influence over a wide variety of presidential initiatives, including 
communications with North Korea, the renegotiation of trade 
agreements, the campaign to defeat ISIS, and the stabilization of 
Ukraine, all of which have relied on the work of ad hoc diplomats. At 
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a time of trepidation over the nature of U.S. foreign policy, such 
influence might operate as a stabilizing force. Third, the analysis 
illuminates rhetorical and doctrinal maneuvers that have facilitated the 
rise of the modern presidency, including historical revisionism and the 
marginalization of international law as an input in constitutional 
interpretation. These maneuvers complicate the political valence of 
originalism and cast the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel 
(OLC)—a key proponent of the orthodox view—as a motivated 
expositor of the separation of powers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Modern presidents rely on two classes of diplomats to conduct 
foreign relations. One comprises individuals who occupy an office of 
indefinite duration to handle a diverse range of assignments. The other 
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consists of those who serve on a temporary basis to accomplish a 
discrete task. The first class includes a global network of resident 
ambassadors, ambassadors at large, Foreign Service officers, and 
others within the State Department and several other federal agencies, 
while the second involves individuals variously described as special 
envoys, executive agents, and ad hoc diplomats. Both act for and 
ultimately take orders from the president. Both can implicate the 
United States under international principles of state responsibility.1 
Both are entitled to diplomatic immunity under international law.2 
And both carry out similar functions, including negotiating treaties, 
attending official ceremonies and conferences, mediating foreign 
conflicts, and otherwise serving as channels of communication on 
matters of national concern.3 
Consider a few examples. During World War II, President 
Roosevelt designated Harry Hopkins, a special envoy, to act as his 
personal representative in meetings with foreign leaders, report on 
allied needs for military assistance, and participate in strategic talks at 
the Tehran Conference of 1943,4 while in the 1960s, President Kennedy 
assigned Averell Harriman, an ambassador at large, to act as a roving 
emissary to Western European capitals, engage in fact-finding, and 
serve as the U.S. representative to an international conference on the 
status of Laos.5 In 1976, President Carter sent Ellsworth Bunker, an 
ambassador at large, to negotiate the treaties under which the United 
States eventually ceded control over the Panama Canal,6 while in 1981, 
 
 1. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts art. 4, in 
Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., 
Supp. No. 10, at 26, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) (providing that a State organ “includes any person 
or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the State,” and that “[t]he 
conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law”). 
 2. Compare Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 31, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 
3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (establishing immunity from criminal jurisdiction and most types of civil 
and administrative jurisdiction for heads of mission and members of a mission’s diplomatic staff), 
with Convention on Special Missions art. 31, Dec. 8, 1969, 1400 U.N.T.S. 231 (providing similar 
immunities for “representatives of the sending State in the special mission and the members of its 
diplomatic staff”). 
 3. Compare DENNIS C. JETT, AMERICAN AMBASSADORS: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND 
FUTURE OF AMERICA’S DIPLOMATS 117–71 (2014) (describing the functions of ambassadors), 
with HENRY MERRITT WRISTON, EXECUTIVE AGENTS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 
315–824 (1929) (documenting the practices of ad hoc diplomats in early U.S. history).  
 4. CHRISTOPHER D. O’SULLIVAN, HARRY HOPKINS: FDR’S ENVOY TO CHURCHILL AND 
STALIN 75–124 (2015). 
 5. LEE H. BURKE, AMBASSADOR AT LARGE: DIPLOMAT EXTRAORDINARY 61–69 (1972). 
 6. Talks Resumed by Bunker Over Panama Canal Issue, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1976, at 8. 
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President Reagan dispatched Philip Habib, a special envoy, to 
negotiate an end to the Lebanese Civil War.7 Decades later, the Obama 
Administration selected Barbara Weisel, an Assistant U.S. Trade 
Representative for Southeast Asia and the Pacific, to be its lead 
interlocutor on the Trans-Pacific Partnership;8 assigned Todd Stern, a 
special envoy, to be its chief negotiator on climate change;9 and 
appointed Wendy Sherman as Under Secretary of State for Political 
Affairs,10 a position in which Sherman led the talks over the Iranian 
nuclear program.11 Most recently, Donald Trump has relied upon Jared 
Kushner, his son-in-law, to facilitate negotiations over peace in the 
Middle East12 and tasked both Kushner and Robert Lighthizer, the 
U.S. Trade Representative, with orchestrating a renegotiation of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement.13 In these and other ways, 
there is substantial functional overlap between the two classes. 
The appointments process, however, differs markedly between 
them. The president appoints “Ambassadors, other public Ministers 
and Consuls” only “by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate,”14 but appoints ad hoc diplomats unilaterally. Thus, according 
to what has become an orthodox view, the Senate can reject by a 
simple-majority vote the president’s choices for posts such as 
 
 7. Bernard Gwertzman, A Special U.S. Envoy Will Go to Mideast, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1981, 
at A1. 
 8. Barbara Weisel, ROCK CREEK GLOBAL ADVISORS LLC, http://www.rockcreek
advisors.com/barbara-weisel [https://perma.cc/BJ43-CSEX]. 
 9. Kate Galbraith, Clinton Names Climate Envoy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2009), 
https://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/26/clinton-names-climate-envoy/?mtrref=undefined 
[https://perma.cc/4CUN-9L2P]. 
 10. 157 CONG. REC. 13,769 (2011). 
 11. See Jonathan Landay, Joseph Ax & Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, As Trump Leaves Iran 
Deal, Families of Americans Jailed in Iran Urge Talks, REUTERS (May 9, 2018, 9:47 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-prisoners/as-trump-leaves-iran-deal-families-of-
americans-jailed-in-iran-urge-talks-idUSKBN1IB055 [https://perma.cc/KF45-NV6W]. 
 12. See Annie Karni, Kushner in Middle East for Peace Talks, POLITICO (Aug. 22, 2017, 8:15 
AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/22/kushner-in-middle-east-for-peace-talks-241895 
[https://perma.cc/JN9N-HUNC]. 
 13. See Don Lee, Senate Approval of Trump’s Trade Chief Could Speed Up NAFTA Talks, 
L.A. TIMES (May 11, 2017, 3:10 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-trump-trade-
lighthizer-20170511-story.html# [https://perma.cc/3XFV-4CWL]; David Ljunggren & Steve 
Holland, How Trump’s Son-in-law Helped Salvage the North American Trade Zone, REUTERS, 
(Oct. 1, 2018, 8:13 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-nafta-kushner-insight/how-
trumps-son-in-law-helped-salvage-the-north-american-trade-zone-idUSKCN1MC04M [https:// 
perma.cc/Z9JL-M5YZ]. 
 14. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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ambassador at large,15 but plays no part in the appointment of irregular 
agents.16 Returning to the examples above, the Senate had a role in the 
appointments of Harriman, Bunker, Sherman, and Lighthizer, but not 
Hopkins, Habib, Weisel, Stern, or Kushner. Is this constitutional? 
A dearth of scholarship has obscured the significance of the 
question. In the early twentieth century, ad hoc diplomacy attracted 
attention from a small number of political scientists led by Henry 
Wriston, who in 1929 published an eight-hundred-page tome that 
revealed how early presidents had relied at times upon special envoys 
instead of resident ambassadors for reasons of secrecy, informality, 
speed, and aptitude.17 But much has happened in the past eighty-plus 
years of U.S. foreign relations, and no other political scientists have 
followed up with anything more than an occasional collection of 
anecdotes.18 This has made it easier for presidents to pursue unilateral 
appointments without scrutiny. 
 
 15. See 22 U.S.C. § 3942(a)(1) (2012) (“The President may, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, appoint an individual as a chief of mission, as an ambassador at large, as a 
minister, as a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, or as a Foreign Service officer.”). 
 16. See Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31 
Op. O.L.C. 73, 100–05 (2007) (suggesting this position). 
 17. See WRISTON, supra note 3; see generally MAURICE WATERS, THE AD HOC DIPLOMAT: 
A STUDY IN MUNICIPAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1963) (surveying the foreign policy practice 
of presidential reliance on special executive agents in various aspects of foreign affairs); Maurice 
Waters, The Ad Hoc Diplomat: A Legal and Historical Analysis, 6 WAYNE L. REV. 380 (1960) 
(examining the use of special executive agents and the practice’s legality); Maurice Waters, 
Special Diplomatic Agents of the President, 307 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 124 (1956) 
(investigating the presidential power to use special executive agents to carry out foreign 
responsibilities without congressional restrictions) [hereinafter Waters, Special Diplomatic 
Agents]; Henry Merritt Wriston, American Participation in International Conferences, 20 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 33 (1926) (reviewing whether the President may legally send executive agents of any type 
to international conferences without congressional approval); Henry Merritt Wriston, 
Presidential Special Agents in Diplomacy, 10 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 481 (1916) (assessing the legal 
and customary justifications for the employment of special executive agents in diplomacy); Henry 
Merritt Wriston, The Special Envoy, 38 FOREIGN AFF. 219 (1960) (evaluating nearly unrestricted 
presidential use of personal representatives abroad). Additional sources provide more limited 
treatments. See BURKE, supra note 5, at 1–10 (positing “the Ambassador at Large as the personal 
emissary of the President”); JOSEPH P. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE: A 
STUDY OF THE CONFIRMATION OF APPOINTMENTS BY THE UNITED STATES SENATE 284–89 
(1953) (observing that “the President is accorded wide discretion in the selection of persons to aid 
him in the conduct of foreign relations”); ELMER PLISCHKE, SUMMIT DIPLOMACY: PERSONAL 
DIPLOMACY OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 41–51 (1958) (noting the “time-tried 
aspect of summit diplomacy” in which “the President employs personal diplomatic 
representatives to keep himself informed and to extend his personal influence and service 
abroad”). 
 18. See generally Michael Fullilove, All the Presidents’ Men: The Role of Special Envoys in 
U.S. Foreign Policy, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 13 (2005) (discussing the use of special envoys in the Bill 
Clinton and George W. Bush administrations). 
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Legal scholars, meanwhile, have offered little doctrinal clarity or 
support. The ad hoc diplomat is the Appointments Clause analogue to 
the so-called “sole executive agreement,” which is formed when the 
president enters into a commitment with a foreign government without 
the Senate’s advice and consent or other congressional approval. Both 
constitute an unenumerated means by which the president 
independently engages foreign sovereigns. But while sole executive 
agreements have garnered substantial attention,19 few have 
acknowledged unilateral diplomatic appointments, much less analyzed 
their legality. Some commentators from the early twentieth century 
asserted the president’s independent power to appoint special envoys 
under the Article II Vesting Clause,20 the Treaty Clause,21 the Take 
Care Clause,22 the Commander in Chief Clause,23 and the alleged 
inapplicability of the Appointments Clause,24 but offered only limited 
explanation. More recently, Saikrishna Prakash and Michael Ramsey 
at least partly concurred in the orthodox view on originalist grounds, 
but for them, ad hoc diplomacy was only a small piece of a broader 
argument about the meaning of the Article II Vesting Clause, rather 
than a target of sustained analysis.25 
 
 19. See generally Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 1573 (2007) (contending that sole executive agreements must be adopted through either the 
treaty-making or law-making process and that the Supremacy Clause does not allow the President 
to override existing law); Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 
77 N.C. L. REV. 133 (1998) (asserting that while the president may lawfully enter minor executive 
agreements in foreign affairs, the president must receive some form of congressional approval to 
enter significant, binding international obligations or to alter domestic law); Ingrid Brunk 
Wuerth, The Dangers of Deference: International Claim Settlement by the President, 44 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 1 (2003) (arguing that judicial deference to sole executive agreements permitting the 
president to terminate domestic litigation without congressional approval undermines the Treaty 
and Supremacy Clauses). 
 20. See, e.g., QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 333 
(1922). 
 21. BURKE, supra note 5, at 6. 
 22. See, e.g., Waters, Special Diplomatic Agents, supra note 17, at 125. 
 23. See, e.g., Francis N. Thorpe, Is the President of the United States Vested with Authority 
Under the Constitution to Appoint a Special Diplomatic Agent with Paramount Power Without the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate?, 42 AM. L. REG. & REV. 257, 261 (1894). 
 24. See, e.g., WATERS, supra note 17, at 127; see also LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND 
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 42 (2d ed. 1996) (“The constitutional requirement of Senate consent 
was considered inapplicable because these agents, whatever they were called, were not appointed 
to permanent ‘offices’, did not serve indefinitely, did not have emoluments of office (often not 
even compensation), or perform duties prescribed by the Constitution or by Congress.”).  
 25. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power Over Foreign 
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 309–11 (2001). 
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The result is that most contemporary observers and government 
officials simply assume ad hoc diplomatic appointments of all kinds to 
be permissible, and think about the constitutionality of international 
treaties in particular as a simple function of contents and domestic 
forms of adoption.26 Thus, some objected to the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership on the view that it would have delegated to private 
arbitrators adjudicative tasks that are the prerogative of Article III 
courts,27 and the initial debate over the Paris Agreement on Climate 
Change focused on whether the obligations arising from the treaty are 
so substantial as to require some form of direct congressional 
approval.28 Outside of the treaty context, some have objected, on 
grounds of both nepotism and competence, to President Trump’s 
decision to task his son-in-law with an assortment of diplomatic 
assignments in the Middle East.29 In these and many other cases, it has 
been taken as given that the unilateral process by which the president 
appointed the negotiators was constitutional. 
There are good reasons, however, to scrutinize such an 
assumption. The modern executive branch relies upon ad hoc 
diplomats frequently and to address a multitude of issues. In recent 
years, presidents and secretaries of state have independently 
dispatched agents to negotiate treaties such as the Paris Agreement;30 
 
 26. See generally David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical 
Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000) 
(arguing that federalism does not operate as a limit on the Article II power to make treaties); 
Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in 
the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236 (2008) (arguing that congressional-executive agreements 
are a constitutional alternative to Article II treaties). 
 27. See Alan Morrison, Is the Trans-Pacific Partnership Unconstitutional?, ATLANTIC (June 
23, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/tpp-isds-constitution/396389 
[https://perma.cc/F6RH-WJYS]. 
 28. Compare Daniel Bodansky & Peter Spiro, Executive Agreements Plus, 49 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 887, 916–19 (2016) (arguing that the Paris Agreement is constitutional as an 
“executive agreement-plus,” a category of international agreement “supported but not 
specifically authorized by congressional action”), with Michael D. Ramsey, Evading the Treaty 
Power?: The Constitutionality of Nonbinding Agreements, 11 FIU L. REV. 371, 384–87 (2016) 
(tentatively concluding that the Agreement is unconstitutional as “an executive agreement (that 
is, a binding nontreaty agreement)”). 
 29. See, e.g., Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Maggie Haberman, Donald Trump’s Son-in-Law, 
Jared Kushner, Tests Legal Path to White House Job, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/18/us/politics/donald-trump-administration.html?partner=
bloomberg [https://perma.cc/BP4A-N63R] (discussing nepotism objections to Kushner’s 
appointment). 
 30. See Galbraith, supra note 9 (reporting Todd Stern’s appointment to lead U.S. 
negotiations on climate change). 
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promote peace in Sudan,31 the Great Lakes region of Africa,32 
Northern Ireland,33 and the Middle East;34 advance a settlement on the 
status of Kosovo;35 encourage dialogue between the United States and 
Muslim countries;36 arrange for the resettlement of detainees held at 
Guantanamo Bay;37 and reduce the threat posed by shoulder-launched 
surface-to-air missiles,38 among many other reasons. Even under the 
leadership of former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who moved to 
curtail U.S. reliance on special envoys,39 the Trump Administration 
sent agents to renegotiate trade agreements,40 coordinate the military 
campaign against the Islamic State,41 and address issues such as Russian 
aggression in Ukraine.42 Further underscoring the significance of the 
 
 31. See Special Envoy Danforth Discusses Back-Channel Talks with Sant’egidio, Vatican FM, 
WIKILEAKS (Dec. 27, 2001, 4:05 PM), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/01VATICAN
6604_a.html [https://perma.cc/5MR6-G7L2]. 
 32. See Great Lakes; SE Wolpe’s August 28 Consultations with the French, WIKILEAKS (Sept. 
2, 2009, 8:37 AM), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09PARIS1198_a.html [https://perma.cc/
73XQ-GT4K]. 
 33. See Northern Ireland Leaders Thank Special Envoy Dobriansky, WIKILEAKS (Jan. 13, 
2009, 1:12 PM), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BELFAST5_a.html [https://perma.cc/UB9R-
FVFU]. 
 34. See Special Envoy Mitchell’s EU Meetings, WIKILEAKS (Apr. 27, 2009, 6:02 PM), 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BRUSSELS601_a.html [https://perma.cc/QF5D-TQ87]. 
 35. See Special Envoy Wisner’s Visit to Belgrade, WIKILEAKS (Nov. 2, 2006, 3:50 PM), 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06BELGRADE1810_a.html [https://perma.cc/XHK9-MVM8]. 
 36. See Demarche: Announcing the U.S. Special Envoy to the OIC, WIKILEAKS (Feb. 29, 
2008, 12:45 AM), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08STATE20672_a.html [https://perma.cc/
F8JJ-Z3Z2]. 
 37. See Guantanamo: Special Envoy Fried and UNHCR on Next Steps for Resettling 
Detainees, WIKILEAKS (May 20, 2009, 7:35 AM), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/
09GENEVA383_a.html [https://perma.cc/4TGV-RE8A]. 
 38. See Special Envoy for MANPADS – Indonesian Has Questions on Assistance, 
WIKILEAKS (Mar. 28, 2008, 10:18 AM), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08JAKART
A626_a.html [https://perma.cc/7K8K-6ART]. 
 39. See Letter from Rex W. Tillerson, Sec’y of State, to the Hon. Bob Corker, Chairman, 
Comm. on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Aug. 28, 2017, https://www.politico.com/
f/?id=0000015e-2b43-db52-a75e-ff7b3bfa0001 [https://perma.cc/S6D4-SRBZ] (describing 
Secretary Tillerson’s plan to integrate special envoys and special representatives into the State 
Department bureaucracy and eliminate those that are no longer useful). 
 40. See generally Biographies of Key Officials, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/about-us/biographies-key-officials [https://perma.cc/J5ZA-
JYZU] (listing a number of negotiators appointed without the Senate’s advice and consent).  
 41. See Biography: Brett McGurk, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to 
Defeat ISIS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/bureau/213058.htm 
[https://perma.cc/LEP3-9XYB]. 
 42. Josh Rogin, Inside the Trump Administration’s Plans to Restart the Ukraine  
Peace Process, WASH. POST (May 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
opinions/global-opinions/inside-the-trump-administrations-plans-to-restart-the-ukraine-peace-
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issue, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has expanded the use of special 
envoys by dispatching agents to address some of the toughest 
challenges in U.S. foreign policy, including Iran, North Korea, and 
Syria.43 
These appointments typically serve laudable purposes, but good 
intentions do not necessarily make a practice lawful, and more is at 
stake than the specific policies that animate each case. The 
constitutionality of unilateral appointments determines whether the 
Senate can vet envoys for competency and conflicts of interest. The 
constitutionality of these appointments also affects the influence of the 
traditional corps of resident ambassadors and Foreign Service officers. 
It shapes the Senate’s ability to generate public discussion about and 
express opposition toward executive policies. And in the event of 
misconduct, it indirectly determines whether ad hoc diplomats are 
impeachable as “civil Officers of the United States.”44 In short, a 
constitution that requires Senate confirmation is one that subjects the 
conduct of foreign relations to greater degrees of transparency, 
deliberation, consensus building, and public accountability. 
The purpose of this Article is to articulate the originalist case for 
such a requirement.45 The Appointments Clause provides in part that 
the president “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent 
of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the 
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided 
for, and which shall be established by Law.”46 The text thus suggests 
that the requirement of advice and consent applies to a wide variety of 
diplomats—not just ambassadors, but also “other public Ministers.”47 
The orthodox view attempts to sidestep this language, asserting that ad 




 43. Gardiner Harris, Special Envoys Were Once Disdained Under Trump. Now They’re 
Popping Up All Over, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/23/world/
asia/pompeo-north-korea-envoy.html [https://perma.cc/U5HA-X4KC]. 
 44. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the 
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, 
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”). 
 45. I am saving nontextual considerations for a separate, forthcoming article.  
 46. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 47. Id.  
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accredited to represent the United States48 and lack tenure of office.49 
As arguments about original meaning, however, these claims miss the 
mark. Indeed, a wealth of original historical sources show that the 
founders understood the law of nations as supplying the definition of 
the term “public Ministers,” that this definition encompassed various 
types of irregular envoys with statuses and functions equivalent to 
those of contemporary ad hoc diplomats, and that one who qualified as 
a public minister for the U.S. government under the law of nations was 
necessarily a public minister and officer of the United States as a matter 
of domestic constitutional law. 
The issue is not merely of academic interest. In 2017, the Senate 
briefly considered legislation to radically restrict the scope of the 
president’s authority to make unilateral appointments.50 With only 
limited exceptions, Section 301 of the Department of State Authorities 
Act, Fiscal Year 2018 would have required the Senate’s advice and 
consent for the appointment of “any Special Envoy, Special 
Representative, Special Coordinator, Special Negotiator, Envoy, 
Representative, Coordinator, or Special Advisor.”51 This proposal lost 
momentum after passing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 
September of 2017, but members of Congress could revisit the idea in 
the future.52 If and when they do, the constitutionality of unilateral 
appointments will loom large. In demonstrating that ad hoc diplomats 
are, as a matter of original meaning, principal officers under the 
Appointments Clause, the present analysis provides a foundation for 
statutory intervention. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I outlines the modern legal 
position in favor of unilateral diplomatic appointments. Parts II and III 
present the Article’s centerpiece: an originalist argument that the 
 
 48. Presidential Appointment of Foreign Agents Without the Consent of the Senate, 1 Op. 
O.L.C. Supp. 457, 457 (1943). 
 49. See Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, supra 
note 16, at 100–05 (stating the orthodox view). 
 50. See All Information (Except Text) for S.1631 - Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal 
Year 2018, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1631/all-
info?r=1 [https://perma.cc/9DVP-TBJG] (reporting the status of the bill).  
 51. Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal Year 2018, S. 1631, 115th Cong. § 301(b) 
(2017). 
 52. See Joshua Kurlantzick, How Will the Midterm Elections Affect U.S. Foreign Policy?, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.: ASIA UNBOUND (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/blog/how-will-
midterm-elections-affect-us-foreign-policy [https://perma.cc/L5TY-JA9G] (predicting that 
House Democrats “likely will try to get the State Department authorization bill passed,” but also 
suggesting that passage is “a very unlikely prospect”). 
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president lacks the power to appoint most ad hoc diplomats without 
the Senate’s advice and consent. Part II performs a close reading of the 
Constitution’s text to show that, while substantially indeterminate, the 
text not only fails to require the orthodox view, but also provides 
greater support for Senate involvement than executive unilateralism. 
Part III then analyzes a large compilation of historical sources to 
recover the original meaning of the Appointments Clause. These 
sources—which include records from the Constitutional Convention 
and state ratification debates, an early act of the British Parliament and 
accompanying judicial precedents, eighteenth-century treatises on 
diplomacy and international law, transcripts from congressional 
debates, federal appointment and payroll records, and Founding-era 
dictionaries—show that the framers treated many ad hoc diplomats, 
including all of the principal U.S. negotiators of international 
agreements, as public ministers and officers of the United States for 
purposes of the Appointments Clause, without regard for tenure, 
emoluments, or title. Part IV concludes by exploring the significance 
of the analysis from both formalist and functionalist perspectives. 
I.  THE ORTHODOX DEFENSE OF UNILATERAL APPOINTMENTS 
A modern view posits that the president holds power to appoint 
all ad hoc diplomats without obtaining the Senate’s advice and 
consent.53 There is no single official source that fully explains or 
attempts to justify this view, but opinions from the Justice 
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) and a collection of 
academic writing suggest that it rests on three major claims. 
The first is the negative claim that the Appointments Clause does 
not apply because ad hoc diplomats are neither “Officers of the United 
States” nor “inferior” officers.54 In a 2007 opinion, OLC explained that 
a federal office must (1) be “continuing” and (2) “involve[] a position 
to which is delegated by legal authority a portion of the sovereign 
powers of the federal Government.”55 A “continuing” position is “not 
personal, ‘transient,’ or ‘incidental,’”56 and one that involves a 
 
 53. In most cases, this view is merely implicit. See generally, e.g., Fullilove, supra note 18 
(advocating greater presidential reliance on special envoys, without considering whether 
unilateral appointments are consistent with Article II). 
 54. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 55. Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, supra 
note 16, at 77. 
 56. Id. at 100. 
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delegation of sovereign authority will possess “power lawfully 
conferred by the government to bind third parties, or the government 
itself, for the public benefit.”57 OLC’s stance is that ad hoc diplomats 
are never officers because they fail to qualify under the first of these 
criteria.58 Their positions, in other words, are not “continuing” because 
they are “‘summoned into existence only for specific temporary 
purposes.’”59 To justify this conclusion, OLC has cited evidence of 
original meaning, opinions from prior Attorneys General, and case 
law, the most important of which is the Supreme Court’s 1867 decision 
in United States v. Hartwell,60 which did not address diplomatic 
appointments but stated that “[a]n office is a public station, or 
employment, conferred by the appointment of government” and 
“embraces the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, and duties.”61 An 
overwhelming majority of these authorities date back to the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. 
Decades before OLC, political scientist Henry Wriston reached 
the same conclusion on the basis of original and early historical 
practice.62 The essence of his claim was that ad hoc diplomats are not 
officers because presidents since George Washington have consistently 
and frequently appointed such agents on their own authority, and 
because Congress has either acquiesced or opposed the practice on 
grounds motivated by political disagreement rather than constitutional 
 
 57. Id. at 87. 
 58. In contrast, OLC does not appear to contest that ad hoc diplomats generally satisfy the 
second criterion. According to the opinion, a position to which is delegated by legal authority a 
portion of the “sovereign powers of the federal Government” is one conferring powers to “bind[] 
the government or third parties for the benefit of the public,” including “the authority to represent 
the United States to foreign nations.” Id. at 77. This definition would seem to include most ad hoc 
diplomats.  
 59. Id. at 103 (quoting EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1789-
1948, at 86 (5th ed. 1984) (emphasis in original)). 
 60. United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385 (1867). 
 61. Id. at 393; see also The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and 
Congress, 20 Op. O.L.C. 124, 139 (1996) (citing Hartwell as the source of the test for whether a 
position is an office). The nonoriginalist merits of OLC’s position are also worth considering, 
particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lucia v. SEC, which addressed the 
meaning of “Officers of the United States” for purposes of the Appointments Clause. See 
generally Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) (holding that Administrative Law Judges at the 
Securities and Exchange Commission are “Officers of the United States” because they occupy a 
“continuing” position established by law and “exercise[e] significant authority pursuant to the 
laws of the United States”). I will address those merits in a separate article. 
 62. See generally WRISTON, supra note 3 (concluding, on the basis of historical practice and 
congressional acquiescence, that ad hoc diplomacy is constitutional). 
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principle.63 Wriston’s purpose was primarily descriptive, but he clearly 
saw something pragmatic and salutary in the trends that had 
developed. Special emissaries offered a calibrated means by which to 
open relations, communicate with colonial and dependent states, 
participate in international conferences, interface with unrecognized 
regimes, and otherwise pursue objectives for which resident diplomats 
are ill-suited.64 
Several premises appear to underlie the first major claim. One is 
that advice and consent are necessary only where an appointee will 
qualify as both a “public Minister[]” and an “Officer[] of the United 
States.”65 Another is that the criteria that determine whether an 
appointee is a public minister are distinct from those that determine 
whether she is an officer. Still another is that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hartwell supplies the proper test for determining officer 
status. 
As explained below,66 the first of these premises relies on the plain 
language of the Appointments Clause. It is far from obvious, however, 
that the others are justified, and for the most part those who espouse 
the orthodox position do not acknowledge or attempt to justify them. 
There is no significant scholarly analysis on the meaning of “public 
Ministers,” for example, or whether it is warranted to treat officer 
status as an independent precondition to the advice-and-consent 
requirement, rather than as a simple consequence of an appointee’s 
qualification as a public minister. As I will show, this leaves the first 
major claim vulnerable in ways that the literature has failed to 
recognize. 
The second major claim is that the Appointments Clause is also 
inapplicable insofar as ad hoc diplomats are neither “Ambassadors” 
nor “public Ministers.”67 In a 1943 memorandum to the assistant 
solicitor general, attorney-adviser W.H. Eberly explained that those 
terms exclude “personal representatives of the President” and instead 
refer to those who have been “formally accredited to . . . foreign 
governments as official diplomatic representatives of our 
government.”68 This position would not excuse the unilateral 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 315–837. 
 65. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 66. See infra Part II.A. 
 67. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 68. Presidential Appointment of Foreign Agents Without the Consent of the Senate, supra 
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appointment of treaty negotiators or others who exercise 
governmental authority, but would exempt certain types of informal, 
non- or quasi-official appointments from the requirement of advice and 
consent. As justification, Eberly pointed to influential treatises by 
Green Haywood Hackworth and John Bassett Moore,69 the relevant 
portions of which reported a handful of unilateral appointments from 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.70 OLC has never cited the 
Eberly memorandum in a published opinion, but its central conclusion 
is likely to continue to reflect the position of the executive branch.71 
The final major claim is that parts of Article II other than the 
Appointments Clause supply the president with power to appoint ad 
hoc diplomats on his own authority. Commentators have identified a 
number of candidates. Edward Corwin and Quincy Wright emphasized 
the Article II Vesting Clause.72 Wriston invoked the Treaty Clause on 
the view that the power to “make Treaties” implies the power to select 
and dispatch those who would negotiate them.73 Maurice Waters 
pointed to the Take Care Clause.74 One nineteenth-century 
commentator highlighted the Commander in Chief Clause, contending 
that it empowers the president “to send special agents to any part of 
the world to make investigation . . . touching matters pending, or likely 
to be pending, between the United States and another country or 
people.”75 
OLC has not directly weighed in on the final major claim, but its 
opinions endorse broad and exclusive executive authority over the 
conduct of foreign relations, including the selection of those who will 
represent the United States abroad. In a 2009 opinion reviewing a 
statute that purported to block the president from using appropriated 
funds to pay expenses for delegations to any U.N. body chaired by a 
state sponsor of terrorism, OLC stated that Congress lacks “authority 
 
note 48, at 457.  
 69. Id. at 457–59. 
 70. 4 GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412–14 (1942); 4 
JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 452–57 (1906). 
 71. See Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1448, 1481 tbl.1 (2010) (reporting evidence that OLC rarely modifies or overrules prior 
opinions). 
 72. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 207 (4th ed. 1957); 
WRIGHT, supra note 20, at 333. As explained earlier, the same appears to be true of Prakash and 
Ramsey. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 73. WRISTON, supra note 3, at 126–27. 
 74. Waters, Special Diplomatic Agents, supra note 17, at 125. 
 75. Thorpe, supra note 23, at 261. 
SCOVILLE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2019  5:24 PM 
2019] AD HOC DIPLOMATS 921 
to attempt to dictate the modes and means by which the President 
engages in international diplomacy with foreign countries and through 
international fora,” and concluded that the statute in question was 
unconstitutional because it denied the president “the use of his 
preferred agents.”76 Two years later, OLC reiterated that the 
president’s diplomacy power includes “exclusive authority to 
determine . . . the individuals who will represent the United States” in 
international negotiations.77 These opinions cited to virtually every 
part of Article II that implicates foreign relations and suggest that OLC 
would affirm the president’s independent authority to appoint all 
varieties of special envoys on similar grounds.78 As I will show, such a 
position is at odds with original meaning. 
II.  INSIGHTS FROM TEXT 
To evaluate the merits of the orthodox position, I begin by closely 
scrutinizing the text of Article II, which contains all of the alleged 
foundations for unilateral appointments. On its own, this text is in 
many respects indeterminate. But to the extent that it offers any insight 
at all, the text offers stronger support for the view that unilateral 
appointments are impermissible. 
A. The Appointments Clause 
The Appointments Clause states in part that the president “shall 
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall 
appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of 
 
 76. Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations Act, 33 
Op. O.L.C., at 4 (June 1, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/file/18496/download [https:// 
perma.cc/4XW5-ZHWE]. 
 77. Unconstitutional Restrictions on Activities of the Office of Science and Technology 
Policy in Section 1340(A) of the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing 
Appropriations Act, 2011, 35 Op. O.L.C., at 4 (Sept. 19, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/
file/18346/download [https://perma.cc/9MVF-7G4G] (citation omitted). 
 78. See Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations 
Act, supra note 76, at 4; Unconstitutional Restrictions on Activities of the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy in Section 1340(A) of the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing 
Appropriations Act, 2011, supra note 77, at 4 & n.1. From the standpoint of a neutral interpreter, 
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Zivotofsky v. Kerry complicates the matter insofar as it 
rejected the view that the president has “exclusive authority to conduct diplomatic relations” and 
“the bulk of foreign-affairs powers.” Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2085–86, 2089 (2015) 
(internal quotations and citation omitted). It is likely, however, that the executive branch will 
“read [Zivotofsky II] generously in favor of the President in resolving everyday foreign policy 
disputes between the political branches.” Jack Goldsmith, Zivotofsky II as Precedent in the 
Executive Branch, 129 HARV. L. REV. 112, 114 (2015). 
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the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose 
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall 
be established by Law.”79 Plainly, there is no plausible argument that 
ad hoc diplomats qualify as “Judges of the supreme Court.”80 Nor is 
there a persuasive argument that they qualify as “Consuls,” who have 
long executed nondiplomatic functions, such as providing overseas 
assistance to American citizens, issuing passports, and acting as 
notaries.81 Thus, the central question is whether ad hoc diplomats fall 
into any of the remaining categories: “Ambassadors,” “other public 
Ministers,” or “other Officers of the United States.”82 It can be 
constitutional for the president to proceed without Senate approval 
only if special envoys are none of these.83 
A few modest observations at the outset: First, public ministers 
are those who will carry out international diplomatic functions. The 
phrase “Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls” implies as 
much by identifying public ministers as a category that includes 
“ambassadors,” who, according to contemporary and historical 
understanding, officially represent the United States in foreign 
affairs.84 This limitation is transparent to contemporary readers but 
nevertheless significant because the term “public minister” has in the 
past carried an additional meaning that does not concern foreign 
 
 79. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See CHARLES STUART KENNEDY, THE AMERICAN CONSUL: A HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSULAR SERVICE, 1776–1914, at 19–28 (1990) (describing the work of early 
American consuls); see also EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 229–30, 573–83 (Joseph 
Chitty ed. & trans., Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1867) (1758) (distinguishing consuls 
from public ministers and describing their respective functions). For a more recent definition of 
consular functions, see Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 5, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 
77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (enumerating consular functions under modern international law). 
 82. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  
 83. The Appointments Clause also provides that “Congress may by Law vest the 
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts 
of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” Id. As explained below, this language is not directly 
relevant because it is unlikely that a public minister could qualify as an inferior officer. See infra 
note 87 and accompanying text.  
 84. See, e.g., ABRAHAM DE WICQUEFORT, THE EMBASSADOR AND HIS FUNCTIONS 1–6 
(Digby trans., London, Bernard Lintott 1716) (discussing the historical functions of ambassadors); 
AM. ACAD. OF DIPLOMACY, FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE: AMBASSADORS, EMBASSIES AND 
AMERICAN INTERESTS ABROAD 1–14 (Robert V. Keeley ed., 2000) (discussing the modern 
functions of American ambassadors); see also Ambassadors and Other Public Ministers of the 
United States, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 186, 186 (1856) (“The expression ‘ambassadors and other public 
ministers,’ which occurs three times in the Constitution, must be understood as comprehending 
all officers having diplomatic functions, whatever their title or designation.”). 
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relations.85 Second, the public ministers whose appointments require 
Senate confirmation are those who will be “Officers of the United 
States.”86 And third, there are no other restrictions on the objects of 
the confirmation requirement, the effect being that advice and consent 
is necessary for the appointment of all ambassadors and all other public 
ministers who will be officers of the United States.87 This conclusion is 
consistent with the longstanding interpretation of the adjacent 
reference to “Judges of the supreme Court,” which requires Senate 
confirmation for the appointment of all U.S. Supreme Court Justices.88 
More significantly, other references to “public Ministers” suggest 
that the term includes many ad hoc diplomats. The Article II 
Reception Clause provides that the president “shall receive 
 
 85. Cf. Public Minister, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (3d ed. 2007), 
http://www.oed.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/view/Entry/265959? [https://perma.cc/4PP7-GHEN] 
(identifying one definition of “public minister” that dates to at least 1564 as “[a] religious official 
who works in a public capacity”). 
 86. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2. It is conceivable that neither “Ambassadors” nor “other 
public Ministers” are “Officers of the United States” under the Appointments Clause, but this 
reading seems unlikely, given the Clause’s internal structure. The text enumerates only four 
specific categories of appointees—“[1] Ambassadors, [2] other public Ministers and [3] Consuls” 
and “[4] Judges of the supreme Court.” Id. Moreover, the text lists those four categories in 
immediate succession and links the first two by identifying one as a subcategory of the other. Id. 
These conditions seem to limit the plausibility of differential status; if public ministers are not 
officers, then the same is almost certainly true of ambassadors, and most likely true of consuls and 
Supreme Court justices as well. Yet this would mean that the phrase “and all other Officers of the 
United States” appears at the end of a list composed exclusively of non-officers. See id. To the 
modern reader, such phrasing would seem to contradict the implication of the word “other,” 
which is that at least some of the enumerated categories of appointees are illustrative of “Officers 
of the United States.” It would be akin to saying something like, “the United States, other 
Western countries and Japan, South Africa, and all other fruit,” to name just one example. More 
importantly for present purposes, such an interpretation appears to have been rejected at the 
Founding. See, e.g., Letter from Charles Thomson to George Washington (May 19, 1789), in 2 
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 335 (Dorothy Twohig ed., 1987) 
(“It appears that ambassadors, other public minister and consuls, and judges of the Supreme court 
are on the same footing, that is officers recognised by the Constitution & the existence of whose 
offices does not depend on, or require a law for their establishment . . . .”). 
 87. The Appointments Clause also states that “Congress may by Law vest the Appointment 
of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in 
the Heads of Departments.” U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2. This raises the question of whether it 
is possible for a public minister to qualify not as a principal officer, but rather as an “inferior 
Officer[]” to whom the hurdle of advice and consent does not apply. Id. The answer seems to be 
no—the Constitution appears to foreclose such a possibility by referring to public ministers 
exclusively and without qualification as “Officers of the United States.” Id. This language would 
be strange and misleading if a material portion of those who comprise the category of public 
ministers qualify as something else entirely. 
 88. Id. 
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Ambassadors and other public Ministers,”89 while Article III 
establishes both that the judicial power shall extend to “all Cases 
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls” and that 
the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in such cases.90 
Given identical terminology and capitalization, along with similar 
phrasing, it is reasonable to think that these clauses all reflect the same 
conception of “public Ministers.”91 Thus, if the term were to exclude 
all ad hoc diplomats in the context of the Appointments Clause, it 
should do likewise in the context of the Reception Clause and Article 
III. 
Such an exclusion, however, would seem to demand nonsensical 
results. With respect to the Reception Clause, it would require either 
that the president lacks power to receive irregular agents from foreign 
governments, or that another part of Article II—most likely the 
Vesting Clause—operates as the source of that power.92 Given that the 
president’s reception power is indisputably exclusive of Congress and 
the judiciary,93 the first option would mean that no branch of the 
federal government can lawfully receive irregular diplomatic agents, 
even though such agents are a longstanding feature of U.S. foreign 
relations and in many ways functionally identical to resident 
diplomats.94 The second option, meanwhile, would require that the 
source of the power to receive irregular agents either overlaps with the 
Reception Clause itself or picks up precisely where the Clause leaves 
off. The overlap scenario would render the Reception Clause 
superfluous and contradict a general presumption against 
redundancy.95 The other scenario is simply counterintuitive, finding 
 
 89. Id. art. II, § 3. 
 90. Id. art. III, § 2. 
 91. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 789, 792–94 (1999) 
(arguing that “strongly parallel language is a strong (presumptive) argument for parallel 
interpretation”).  
 92. See generally Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 25 (articulating the Vesting Clause thesis). 
 93. Congress has permitted over one hundred foreign leaders and dignitaries to deliver 
official addresses to its membership since 1874, Foreign Leaders and Dignitaries Who Have 
Addressed the U.S. Congress: Fast Facts, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OFF. OF THE 
HISTORIAN, http://history.house.gov/Institution/Foreign-Leaders/Fast-Facts [https://perma.cc/
LLQ2-FTGG], but most view this practice as compatible with the president’s exclusive authority 
under the Reception Clause because it does not entail a formal acceptance of diplomatic 
credentials or operate as an official means of recognizing a foreign state or government. Cf. 
Robert J. Reinstein, Recognition: A Case Study on the Original Understanding of Executive 
Power, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 801, 812–16 (2011) (analyzing the meaning of the Reception Clause).  
 94. See infra Part III (discussing historical usage and functions). 
 95. See Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign 
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reception power only by reaching beyond the one part of the 
Constitution that explicitly addresses reception. 
The categorical exclusion of ad hoc diplomats from the concept of 
public ministers would be equally problematic for Article III, as it 
would create a significant disparity in treatment for functionally similar 
foreign agents. On one hand, Article III would be extremely solicitous 
of foreign diplomats resident in the United States, providing not only 
a separate head of federal jurisdiction for cases that affect them, but 
also exclusive and original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court for suits 
in which they are defendants and concurrent and original jurisdiction 
in the Supreme Court for suits in which they are plaintiffs.96 On the 
other hand, Article III would be entirely indifferent to irregular 
diplomatic agents, declining to provide both a separate head of federal 
jurisdiction and a basis for original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court 
for cases that affect them. This would force ad hoc diplomats to either 
find a different source of jurisdiction in the lower courts or fend for 
themselves in state courts. The logic of such differential treatment is 
hard to imagine, and appears contrary to original intent. In the Virginia 
ratification debates, for example, Edmund Randolph explained that 
the purpose of granting federal jurisdiction over cases affecting public 
ministers was to “perpetuate harmony between [the United States] and 
foreign powers” and ensure that the federal government “judges how 
the United States can be most effectually secured and guarded against 
controversies with foreign nations.”97 The potential absence of federal 
jurisdiction over many cases affecting irregular envoys from foreign 
governments would disserve this purpose. 
 
Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 555 (2004) (making this argument in response to the Vesting 
Clause thesis). 
 96. See U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2; Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80 (providing 
that the Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over “suits or proceedings 
against ambassadors, or other public ministers, or their domestics, or domestic servants, as a court 
of law can have or exercise consistently with the law of nations,” and providing “original, but not 
exclusive jurisdiction of all suits brought by ambassadors, or other public ministers”); see also 
Börs v. Preston, 111 U.S. 252, 256–57 (1884) (according “great weight” to the Judiciary Act of 
1789 as a guide to the meaning of Article III in cases affecting representatives of foreign 
governments). Since 1978, original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court is available but no longer 
exclusive, at least as a matter of statutory law, in cases against ambassadors and other public 
ministers. Diplomatic Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 95-393, § 8(b), 92 Stat. 808, 810 (1978) (codified 
at 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)). But needless to say, this reform is not evidence of original meaning. 
 97. The Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia (June 21, 1788), in 3 
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 570 (photo. reprint 1937) (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES]. 
SCOVILLE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2019  5:24 PM 
926  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:907 
To be sure, it is possible for a single term to carry more than one 
meaning within the four corners of the Constitution. In District of 
Columbia v. Heller,98 for instance, the Supreme Court interpreted 
“State,” which appears numerous times throughout the structural 
articles and the Bill of Rights, to mean “polity” in the context of the 
Second Amendment, even though the word otherwise refers to the fifty 
states.99 But the conditions that justified such differentiation do not 
manifest in relation to “public Ministers.” Unlike “State” and other 
terms that might reasonably vary in denotation throughout the 
Constitution, the multiple references to “public Ministers” exhibit 
remarkable uniformity. They are never accompanied by unique 
modifiers.100 They always use the same capitalization. They always 
appear immediately after “Ambassadors” and typically precede a 
reference to “Consuls.” These similarities exist, moreover, even 
though “public Ministers” appears twice in both Article II and Article 
III. Such conditions strongly suggest that “public Ministers” is a term 
of art with a distinct and—critically—singular meaning. To avoid 
serious difficulties under the Reception Clause and Article III, this 
meaning must encompass ad hoc diplomats. 
A remaining issue concerns the relationship between public 
minister status and officer status. There are two possibilities here. One 
is that “Officers of the United States” circumscribes “public 
Ministers,” such that advice and consent is necessary only if the 
nominee would, upon assuming his or her official functions, satisfy 
criteria that comprise the general category of officers of the United 
States in addition to separate and independent criteria comprising the 
specific category of public ministers. Alternatively, it is possible that 
one who is a public minister—however that term is defined—is 
necessarily an officer of the United States, such that the general 
definition of “Officer” supplies no additional limiting conditions. The 
first view treats officer status as an independent requirement, while the 
second treats it as a simple consequence. As explained above,101 the 
orthodox position favors the former, but that is not obviously correct 
as a textual matter. Merely identifying public ministers as officers of 
 
 98. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 99. Id. at 597. 
 100. Cf. id. (adopting a unique definition of “State” for purposes of the Second Amendment 
in part because “the other instances of ‘state’ in the Constitution are typically accompanied by 
modifiers making clear that the reference is to the several States—‘each state,’ ‘several states,’ 
‘any state,’ ‘that state,’ ‘particular states,’ ‘one state,’ ‘no state’”). 
 101. See supra Part I. 
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the United States does not explain what makes them so, and one can 
easily imagine verbal formulations different from the Appointments 
Clause that would have offered stronger support. 
The Appointments Clause thus presents a problem for the 
practice of unilateral ad hoc diplomacy. The orthodox view is 
justifiable on textual grounds only if either of two propositions holds 
true: (1) the term “public Ministers” excludes all ad hoc diplomats or 
(2) officer status is a separate and independent requirement, the 
satisfaction of which hinges on criteria that categorically exclude ad 
hoc diplomats. The first proposition would have deeply troubling 
consequences for the Reception Clause and Article III, while the 
second lacks affirmative support. In fairness, the plain language of the 
Appointments Clause also fails to provide conclusive evidence that 
unilateral diplomatic appointments are unlawful. But neither does the 
text require unilateralism, and this is a key insight, not only because it 
calls into question the legal necessity of contemporary practice, but 
also because it calls for historical inquiry as a means of understanding 
the rule. The evidence of original meaning, as I will show in Part III, 
strongly favors Senate participation. 
B. The Rest of Article II 
Of course, the orthodox position does not rely exclusively on the 
alleged inapplicability of the Appointments Clause; commentators 
have attempted to identify an affirmative foundation for unilateral 
diplomatic appointments in the Treaty Clause, the Take Care Clause, 
the Commander in Chief Clause, the Reception Clause, and the Article 
II Vesting Clause.102 Yet these arguments each encounter serious 
difficulties of their own. 
The Treaty Clause is problematic for several reasons. One is that 
it does not grant the power to make treaties to the president alone. 
Unlike the Appointments Clause, which explicitly divides the 
appointment power into distinct stages of nomination followed by 
advice and consent103 and allocates control over the first stage 
exclusively to the president,104 the Treaty Clause grants no power 
exclusively to the president—the full power to “make Treaties” exists 
 
 102. See supra notes 20–24. 
 103. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls . . . .”). 
 104. Id.  
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only “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate.”105 This is a 
strange foundation for a power belonging to the president alone. It is 
also underinclusive, given that treaty negotiations are at most a subset 
of the broader practice of ad hoc diplomacy.106 
The Take Care Clause fares no better. In the 1950s, political 
scientist Maurice Waters argued “that the separation-of-powers 
concept implies that each branch has an inherent right to appoint its 
subordinates,” and that “[i]n the case of the executive this right is 
reinforced by the fact that the appointing power results from the 
obligation to see that the laws are faithfully executed.”107 But this 
proves far too much. If the separation of powers and the Take Care 
Clause gave the president an inherent right to appoint any 
subordinates, including all those involved in diplomacy, the 
Appointments Clause would be a dead letter as to all appointments to 
offices in the executive branch. In addition, there are many cases where 
presidents use ad hoc diplomats for purposes other than law 
execution.108 When the president dispatches a special envoy to attend 
an international conference or negotiate an agreement, the agent may 
act in furtherance of little more than executive policy. The Take Care 
Clause appears inapplicable in such circumstances. 
Next consider the Commander in Chief Clause. One nineteenth-
century commentator argued that it empowers the president “to send 
 
 105. Id. (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur . . . .”).  
 106. As another argument, some have suggested that, far from authorizing unilateral 
appointments, the Treaty Clause requires two-thirds approval from the Senate for the 
appointment of treaty negotiators. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 719 (1789) (Gales & Seator eds., 
1849) (Statement of Rep. Tucker). On this view, the Clause envisions advice and consent as a set 
of at least two discrete approvals, with one applying to the appointment of the negotiator(s) and 
another applying later to the completed text, rather than as a single act of comprehensive, ex post 
endorsement. But there are serious problems with this interpretation. First, it would seem to make 
it harder to appoint treaty negotiators than Supreme Court Justices, whose appointments require 
only a simple majority. See U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring two thirds of Senators present 
to concur when giving “Advice and Consent” for the president to make a treaty but not when 
giving “Advice and Consent” for presidential appointments to the Supreme Court). This seems 
odd in light of the relative significance of the two offices, at least by contemporary standards. 
Second, it would contradict the Appointments Clause, which requires only a simple majority of 
the Senate to approve the appointment of treaty negotiators qua “public Ministers.” See infra Part 
III. 
 107. Waters, Special Diplomatic Agents, supra note 17, at 125. 
 108. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (“The duty of the President to see that the laws be executed is a duty that does not 
go beyond the laws or require him to achieve more than Congress sees fit to leave within his 
power.” (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 295 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting))). 
SCOVILLE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2019  5:24 PM 
2019] AD HOC DIPLOMATS 929 
special agents to any part of the world to make 
investigation . . . touching matters pending, or likely to be pending, 
between the United States and another country or people.”109 This 
position also appears to stretch the text to an implausible breadth. As 
David Barron and Martin Lederman have argued, the best reading of 
the Clause treats it as a grant of power to superintend the armed forces 
and make decisions concerning the conduct of military operations.110 It 
appears that most ad hoc diplomats have not been members of the 
military, and from an organizational perspective, it is doubtful that the 
president’s position at the pinnacle of the military command structure 
can justify the unilateral use of diplomatic agents of a nonmartial 
character.111 
One might further imagine the Reception Clause as offering 
support for unilateral appointments by identifying the president as a 
central actor in the conduct of foreign relations, but again there are 
major complications: The Clause does not discuss appointments, it 
provides for a presidential duty rather than a power, and it was 
famously described by Alexander Hamilton as “more a matter of 
dignity than of authority” and one “without consequence in the 
administration of the government.”112 Even if one reads the Clause 
generously as a source of executive power to conduct foreign relations, 
it does not necessarily follow that the president wields independent 
authority to choose the agents on whom he will rely. 
The final asserted basis for unilateral diplomatic appointments is 
the Article II Vesting Clause. A number of influential commentators 
have argued that the reference to “executive power” in Article II, 
Section 1 grants a “residual” foreign affairs power to the president, and 
that this power includes a subsidiary power to dispatch irregular envoys 
without the Senate’s advice and consent.113 The most thorough 
exposition of this claim relies primarily on eighteenth-century sources 
 
 109. Thorpe, supra note 23, at 261. 
 110. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb: 
Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 767–70 
(2008). 
 111. Some special envoys have military backgrounds, but most do not. See, e.g., US Special 
Envoy for Countering PKK in Baghdad, Discusses Makhmour Camp Closure, WIKILEAKS (Oct. 
22, 2006, 7:23 AM), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06BAGHDAD3957a.html [https:// 
perma.cc/4MA6-SWFY] (reporting on the work of General Joseph Ralston, U.S. Special Envoy 
for Countering the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and former Vice Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff). 
 112. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 420 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 113. E.g., Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 25, at 234, 303–04, 309–10. 
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that appear to have treated foreign affairs as a domain of executive 
power.114 The Vesting Clause argument is perhaps the most plausible 
of the traditional justifications for ad hoc diplomacy, but it, too, 
founders under scrutiny. 
Two problems stand out. One is that, by its own terms, the 
argument only identifies the source of residual powers that lie beyond 
the scope of other enumerations.115 This leaves unanswered the far 
more targeted question about the meaning of the Appointments 
Clause, which exhibits the most obvious connection to the issue of 
special envoys. Put differently, there is no reason even to consider the 
Vesting Clause if the Appointments Clause addresses the issue of ad 
hoc appointments. The other problem is that, as demonstrated 
below,116 the founders understood many irregular diplomatic agents as 
public ministers and officers of the United States, and thus as subject 
to the requirement of Senate confirmation. However broad the 
president’s control over foreign affairs, it is apparent—clear, even—
that the founders generally treated this issue as one of shared authority. 
In summary, the text of the Constitution does not support the 
orthodox view. The Appointments Clause does not define “public 
Ministers” to categorically exclude irregular diplomatic agents. Nor 
does it dictate that qualification as an officer of the United States is an 
independent precondition to the need for Senate confirmation, rather 
than a consequence of qualification as a public minister. Indeed, 
cognate language seems to suggest that the term “public Ministers” 
encompasses many irregular envoys, and it is plausible that 
qualification as a public minister constitutes an envoy as an officer of 
the United States. Other provisions in Article II, meanwhile, fail to 
provide affirmative support for unilateral appointments. 
III.  THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF “PUBLIC MINISTERS” 
Perhaps because text alone supplies so little support, advocates of 
the orthodox view have relied in substantial part on evidence of 
original meaning. Wriston, for example, devoted the first chapter of his 
book to an analysis of the Constitutional Convention, state ratification 
 
 114. See id. at 265–355 (discussing supporting evidence from eighteenth-century political 
theory, the Continental Congress, the Philadelphia Convention, the ratification debates, and the 
Washington Administration). 
 115. See id. at 234 (arguing that the source of the president’s residual foreign affairs powers is 
the Vesting Clause). 
 116. See infra Part III. 
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debates, and early practices of the Washington Administration, 
concluding that “Washington found a tradition, though not very firmly 
rooted, of employing private persons for confidential business in 
foreign affairs,” and that “the matter of instruction and negotiation 
became more and more exclusively presidential” over time.117 Given 
these developments, Wriston found it only natural that “the agents 
used [for diplomatic matters] became more and more presidential, as 
well.”118 Similarly, OLC cited diplomatic practice from the 
administrations of George Washington and Thomas Jefferson to justify 
the conclusion that “a position must have continuance or duration” in 
order to constitute “an office [of the United States]” under the 
Appointments Clause.119 
Yet these conclusions either misinterpret or overlook a significant 
volume of relevant evidence. In this Part, I marshal that evidence to 
show that, far from favoring unilateral ad hoc diplomacy, the original 
meaning of the Constitution generally disfavors the practice. 
Specifically, the framers understood the term “public Minister[]” 
exclusively by reference to the law of nations, and as denoting any 
diplomatic agent who officially and publicly represents a sovereign 
state in foreign affairs, without regard for the duration of the position, 
emoluments, or title. This definition excluded consuls, diplomatic 
agents whose official roles were known to receiving governments but 
hidden from the public at large, and individuals dispatched in wholly 
unofficial capacities, but it included a wide range of irregular 
diplomats, such as treaty negotiators, attendees at official ceremonies, 
many international messengers, and even members of multinational 
arbitral tribunals. Moreover, the founders viewed Senate confirmation 
as necessary for the appointment of anyone who satisfied this 
definition. In doing so, they appear to have operated on the premise 
that one who qualifies as a public minister for the U.S. government 
under the law of nations is necessarily a public minister and officer of 
the United States as a matter of domestic constitutional law. 
A. Constitutional Convention and Ratification Debates 
Records from the Constitutional Convention and state ratification 
debates show that the appointment power was one of considerable 
 
 117. WRISTON, supra note 3, at 104–05. 
 118. Id. at 105. 
 119. Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, supra 
note 16, at 102.  
SCOVILLE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2019  5:24 PM 
932  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:907 
interest and deliberation. The topic arose on multiple occasions, 
attracted commentary from a diverse cast of participants, and 
generated divergent proposals. Yet the overwhelming focus of 
discussion and source of disagreement was simply allocation.120 James 
Madison proposed an executive power “to appoint to offices in cases 
not otherwise provided for.”121 Alexander Hamilton’s plan granted the 
executive power over the “appointment of the heads or chief officers 
of the departments of Finance, War and Foreign Affairs” and power to 
nominate “all other officers (Ambassadors to foreign Nations 
included) subject to the approbation or rejection of the Senate.”122 
Charles Pinckney’s draft authorized the Senate alone “to appoint 
Ambassadors & other Ministers to Foreign nations & Judges of the 
Supreme Court.”123 
These diverse proposals reflected a common belief that the locus 
of the appointment power was an issue of significance, capable of 
shaping the quality of the appointments themselves, public 
accountability, federal policymaking, and the relative influence of 
small and large states. In defending the Convention’s decision to divide 
the power between the president and the Senate, Hamilton argued that 
executive control over nominations was optimal because “one man of 
discernment is better fitted to analyze and estimate the peculiar 
qualities adapted to particular offices,” and because “[t]he sole and 
undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense 
of duty and a more exact regard to reputation.”124 The requirement of 
Senate advice and consent, meanwhile, “would be an excellent check 
upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to 
prevent the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, from 
family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to 
popularity.”125 
 
 120. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 16–29 (2003) (summarizing the drafting process 
and public discussion of the Appointments Clause at the Constitutional Convention and 
ratification debates); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSITUTION 221–24 (2016) (discussing various proposals for allocation of the 
appointment power and corresponding arguments). 
 121. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 63 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
(statement of James Madison) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS]. 
 122. 1 id. at 292 (statement of Alexander Hamilton). 
 123. 3 id. at 599 (statement of Charles Pinckney).  
 124. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, supra note 112, at 455 (Alexander Hamilton).  
 125. Id. at 457.  
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The narrower issue of diplomatic appointments garnered far less 
attention, perhaps, as one historian has argued, because the framers 
assumed they would be infrequent.126 But the sources still support a few 
inferences. First, drafters appear to have believed that the text of the 
Articles of Confederation, which referred only to the sending of 
“ambassadors,” had been too limited.127 A mid-summer report from 
the Committee of Detail utilized similar language,128 but later drafts 
referred to ambassadors “and other public ministers”129 and, finally, 
“Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls.”130 In The 
Federalist, James Madison explained the rationale for this shift, stating 
that the “power of appointing and receiving ‘other public Ministers and 
Consuls’ [was] expressly and very properly added to the former 
provision concerning ambassadors” because “[t]he term ambassador, 
if taken strictly . . . comprehends the highest grade only of public 
ministers, and excludes the grades which the United States will be most 
likely to prefer, where foreign embassies may be necessary.”131 On this 
account, ambassadors were understood to be the highest-ranking type 
of public minister, and one purpose of the Appointments Clause was 
to clarify the authority of the president and Senate to appoint 
diplomatic agents of lower status. 
Second, some viewed diplomatic appointments in particular as a 
topic of concern. In 1783, as delegates to the Congress of the 
Confederation, Daniel Carroll and Hugh Williamson sponsored a 
motion that “no public minister should be employed by the United 
States, except on extraordinary occasions,” the justification being that 
such a measure “would not only be economical, but would withhold 
our distinguished citizens from the corrupting scenes at foreign courts, 
and, . . . prevent the residence of foreign ministers in the United States, 
whose intrigues and examples might be injurious both to the 
 
 126. See FREDERICK W. MARKS III, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE 
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 155, 160 (Scholarly Resources Inc. 1986) (1973) (explaining that 
“there was a minimum of floor debate on the diplomatic powers” and that delegates to the 
Convention “assumed that diplomatic negotiations per se would be rare, that foreign relations 
would be commercial in nature, and that treaties would be few”). 
 127. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX (“The United States in Congress 
assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right and power . . . of sending and receiving 
ambassadors . . . .”). 
 128. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 121, at 183 (motion of August 6, 1787).  
 129. 2 id. at 383 (motion of August 23, 1787). 
 130. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 131. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 112, at 264–65 (James Madison).  
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government and the people.”132 Congress adjourned before deciding 
the motion, but both Carroll and Williamson attended the 
Constitutional Convention and later campaigned for ratification in 
their respective home states of Maryland and North Carolina.133 Their 
views on constitutional issues, in other words, appear to have been 
fairly mainstream. Likewise, Elbridge Gerry opposed the Pinckney 
Plan on the ground that exclusive Senate control over diplomatic 
appointments would lead to an unwarranted proliferation of agents 
overseas and undue foreign influence.134 In his assessment, “few [public 
ministers] were necessary,” and it was “the opinion of a great many 
that they ought to be discontinued” in order to control costs and 
foreclose the reciprocal admission of foreign agents to the United 
States.135 Contemporaries such as Francis Dana, Albert Gallatin, 
George Mason, Charles Pinckney, and Thomas Jefferson seem to have 
more or less agreed.136 Their concerns echoed the ideas of the 
philosophes, a group of eighteenth-century public intellectuals who 
assailed classical diplomacy as a source of duplicity, corruption, 
secrecy, foreign entanglement, and war.137 The philosophes envisioned 
 
 132. Debates in the Congress of the Confederation (May 23, 1783), in 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, 
supra note 97, at 90. 
 133. The Founding Fathers: Maryland, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/founding-
docs/founding-fathers-maryland [https://perma.cc/DK8P-KZGP]; The Founding Fathers: North 
Carolina, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/founding-fathers-north-
carolina [https://perma.cc/H7XF-4R57]. 
 134. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 121, at 285 (statement of Elbridge Gerry). 
 135. Id.  
 136. See 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 859 (1798) (statement of Rep. Gallatin) (expressing a desire to 
phase out contacts with European powers over time); 7 id. at 866 (1786) (statement of Rep. 
Pinckney) (“[I]t would appear to be for our interest to have as little political connexion with 
Europe as possible, and therefore Ministers could be of no use, but might do mischief.”); 1 
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 121, at 438 (statement of George Mason) (characterizing 
ambassadorial appointments as sinecures for domestic political allies); Letter from Francis Dana 
to John Adams (Jan. 30, 1785), in 16 THE ADAMS PAPERS, PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS: FEBRUARY 
1784–MARCH 1785, at 500–05 (Gregg L. Lint et al. eds., 2012) (“[T]here is nothing clearer in my 
opinion than that our Interests will be more injured by the residence of foreign Ministers among 
us, than they be promoted by our Ministers abroad. The best way to get rid of the former is not 
to send out the latter.”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Short on Mr. & Mrs. Merry 
(Jan. 23, 1804), in 33 THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW 833 (1928) (characterizing classical 
diplomacy as “the pest of peace” and “the workshop in which nearly all the wars of Europe are 
manufactured”). For a discussion on the various concerns that fueled debate over the 
maintenance of diplomatic relations, see generally WARREN FREDERICK ILCHMAN, 
PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMACY IN THE UNITED STATES 1779–1939: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE 
HISTORY 18–40 (1961). 
 137. See FELIX GILBERT, TO THE FAREWELL ADDRESS: IDEAS OF EARLY AMERICAN 
FOREIGN POLICY 54–66 (1961) (explaining the positions of the philosophes on diplomacy and 
foreign affairs); see also Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
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a world largely without diplomats, with countries linked by commerce 
rather than political alliances and the balance of power,138 and for those 
who shared this vision,139 the power to appoint public ministers would 
be one to wield with caution, if at all. 
Finally, the framers appear to have taken for granted the meaning 
of the term “public minister,” which had been in use for well over a 
century prior to the adoption of the Constitution, including in 
America.140 During the South Carolina ratification debates, for 
example, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney referred to the diplomatic 
agents who had served under the Congress of the Confederation as 
“public ministers.”141 John Adams and Robert Morris, among others, 
engaged in similar usage in early correspondence,142 and many 
employed the term interchangeably with “ministers.”143 No one 
appears to have debated or questioned the term’s meaning. 
 
341, 361–62 (2009) (discussing the Framers’ fear of being corrupted by foreign powers and how 
this fear inspired the adoption of the Foreign Emoluments Clause). But see Seth Barrett Tillman, 
Citizens United and the Scope of Professor Teachout’s Anti-Corruption Principle, 107 NW. U. L. 
REV. 399, 404–06 (2012) (arguing that Teachout overstates the extent of the original concern for 
corruption). 
 138. GILBERT, supra note 137, at 62–66. 
 139. Most historians take the position that the philosophes influenced many of the Framers, 
at least during the early years of the Revolution. See id. at 69 (identifying a “close connection 
between the ideas of the philosophes and American foreign policy” in the early Revolutionary 
Period); LAWRENCE S. KAPLAN, COLONIES INTO NATION: AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1763–1801, 
at 93 (1972) (“The appeal of the ideas of Europe’s philosophes was natural for Americans.”). But 
see James H. Hutson, Intellectual Foundations of Early American Diplomacy, 1 DIPLOMATIC 
HISTORY 1, 18 (1977) (arguing that the philosophes did not influence the Founders, and that 
“American leaders operated in foreign politics according to the assumptions of power politics that 
dominated contemporary European statecraft”).  
 140. See Public Minister, supra note 85 (citing a 1624 proclamation from King James I, who 
discussed “the great priviledges, which by the Laws of God and Nations are attributed unto the 
persons of Ambassadors, Agents, and public Ministers of foreign Princes and States”) (spelling 
modified from original). 
 141. The Debates in the Convention of the State of South Carolina (Jan. 16, 1778), in 4 
ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 97, at 282. 
 142. See, e.g., Letter from John Adams to Samuel Adams (May 21, 1778), in 2 
REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 591–93 (Francis 
Wharton ed., 1889) (referring to U.S. commissioners in France as “public ministers”); Letter from 
Robert Morris to Benjamin Franklin (Sept. 30, 1782), in 5 id. at 788 (referring to American 
diplomats in Europe as “our public ministers in Europe”). For other examples, see Letter from 
Silas Deane to the President of Congress (Sept. 24, 1778), in 2 id. at 739–40; Statement of William 
Paca & William Henry Dayton to Congress (Apr. 30, 1779), as to Arthur Lee, in 3 id. at 147; 
Letter from Francis Dana to Robert Livingston (Sept. 5, 1782), in 5 id. at 700. 
 143. See, e.g., Debates in the Convention of the State of Maryland (Apr. 21, 1788), in 2 
ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 97, at 550 (reporting a proposed amendment “that no person be 
exempt from such jurisdiction and trial but ambassadors and ministers privileged by the law of 
nations”). 
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But what was that meaning? And more specifically, did it 
encompass any ad hoc diplomats, or was it confined to those appointed 
to fill an office that exists indefinitely, such as that of a resident 
ambassador? The records from the drafting and ratification of the 
Constitution provide virtually no insight on this central question. In 
The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton argued that original jurisdiction in 
the Supreme Court is important for cases affecting public ministers 
because “[p]ublic ministers of every class are the immediate 
representatives of their sovereigns.”144 Yet, from this brief statement 
alone, much remains unclear. 
As the following sections will show, other sources are more 
helpful. In particular, histories of the foreign relations of European 
states, eighteenth-century treatises on diplomacy and international 
law, records of official practice, and Founding-era dictionaries together 
provide persuasive evidence that the framers defined “public 
Minister[]” by reference to the law of nations, and that this definition 
included many irregular emissaries. These authorities also suggest an 
understanding that one who qualified as a public minister for the U.S. 
government was necessarily an officer of the United States. The result 
is that the appointment of both resident and many ad hoc diplomats 
requires the Senate’s advice and consent under the original meaning of 
the Appointments Clause. 
B. The Pre-Constitutional Practice of Ad Hoc Diplomacy 
The starting point for the analysis is one of context. Namely, ad 
hoc diplomacy was far from novel at the time of the Founding; the 
practice had deep origins in centuries of European politics. In fact, it is 
common knowledge among historians that ad hoc diplomacy was the 
quintessential mode of contact among European powers prior to the 
late fifteenth century, when Italian city-states began to popularize the 
use of permanent embassies and resident agents among rulers of 
Western Europe.145 England and France, for example, had no 
permanent embassies abroad until 1509, having previously relied 
exclusively on special missions.146 The use of special envoys reportedly 
predominated during this early period because sovereigns often lacked 
sufficient funds to pay for permanent embassies, encountered difficulty 
 
 144. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 112, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 145. See GARRETT MATTINGLY, RENAISSANCE DIPLOMACY 55–118 (1955) (discussing the 
advent of the Italian model). 
 146. See JEREMY BLACK, A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY 53 (2010). 
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finding suitable agents, or simply had no need for regular contact with 
foreign counterparts.147 
Many, moreover, were slow to adopt the Italian model. As M.S. 
Anderson has explained, in the early seventeenth century “Europe was 
still divided between a core of western states, in which permanent 
diplomatic representation was well rooted and between which 
diplomatic relations were active and more or less continuous, and a 
periphery of less developed ones—the Scandinavian countries, Poland, 
Russia, and in the west Scotland and Portugal—where diplomacy was 
less important and diplomatic organisation more primitive.”148 The 
Papacy restricted its embassies to Catholic courts.149 Russia had no 
permanent embassies until 1688.150 The Ottoman Empire relied 
exclusively on special missions until 1793, when it dispatched its first 
resident ambassador to London.151 In addition, most of the princes who 
used permanent missions chose not to maintain them in more than a 
handful of countries.152 One-sided representation, whereby minor 
powers established embassies in the capitals of major powers that 
chose not to reciprocate, was common.153 These conditions ensured the 
continuing importance of missions of limited duration and mandate. 
English practice generally followed these trends, including the use 
of special envoys after the normalization of permanent embassies.154 In 
1759, for example, George II dispatched the earl of Kinnoull to 
apologize for British incursions into Portugal’s territorial waters in the 
Battle of Lagos.155 George III sent Major-General William Faucitt to 
“many German courts with which [England] had no regular diplomatic 
representation to raise German mercenaries to take part in the 
[Revolutionary War].”156 The British also relied on irregular diplomats 
to secure the use of Swiss troops for military operations.157 Still other 
 
 147. See id. at 47; KEITH HAMILTON & RICHARD LANGHORNE, THE PRACTICE OF 
DIPLOMACY: ITS EVOLUTION, THEORY AND ADMINISTRATION 30 (1995).  
 148. M.S. ANDERSON, THE RISE OF MODERN DIPLOMACY 1450–1919, at 27–28 (1993). 
 149. Id. 
 150. BLACK, supra note 146, at 68. 
 151. See J.C. Hurewitz, Ottoman Diplomacy and the European State System, 15 MIDDLE E. J. 
141, 145 (1961). 
 152. See BLACK, supra note 146, at 69. 
 153. Id. at 71. 
 154. See D.B. HORN, THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC SERVICE 1689–1789, at 21–26 (1961). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 25–26. 
 157. See Christopher Storrs, British Diplomacy in Switzerland (1689–1789) and Eighteenth 
Century Diplomatic Culture, 3 ÉTUDES DE LETTRES 1, 7 (2010).  
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examples include missions to invest German princes with chivalric 
orders, compliment new leadership, offer condolences, and even 
conclude a treaty of marriage between George III and the Princess 
Charlotte of Mecklenburg-Strelitz.158 Here as elsewhere, this mode of 
contact was attractive in part because it was less expensive than 
permanent representation.159 
Many of the framers are likely to have been familiar with this 
practice, which formed part of the only diplomatic tradition that was 
reasonably accessible to them. Benjamin Franklin, who attended the 
Constitutional Convention as a delegate for Pennsylvania, had 
acquired years of experience with European diplomacy as a colonial 
agent for Pennsylvania and as America’s leading representative abroad 
during the Revolution.160 His background was exceptional among the 
delegates, but even those without comparable experience had in most 
cases served in the Continental Congress,161 where they received a 
steady stream of news about the latest developments in European 
politics,162 including details about diplomatic etiquette,163 copies of 
correspondence between foreign sovereigns,164 and reports on the 
dispatch of envoys from one court to another.165 Statements from the 
Convention and ratification debates further suggest that the 
participants were often knowledgeable about European politics and 
diplomatic practices.166 And this is unsurprising. Given the precarious 
 
 158. HORN, supra note 154, at 26. 
 159. See id. at 36. 
 160. See KAPLAN, supra note 139, at 14–15. 
 161. See Meet the Framers of the Constitution, NAT’L ARCHIVES, 
https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/founding-fathers [https://perma.cc/86TE-57B7] (listing 
the delegates to the Convention).  
 162. See generally SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, THE DIPLOMACY OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION (1957) (discussing inter alia American attention to European politcal 
developments); see also Letter from Arthur Lee to the Comm. of Foreign Affairs (Mar. 25, 1779), 
in 3 REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 
142, at 100 (explaining that “it is the regular and usual mode in Europe for one nation to treat 
with another on public business through the medium of their public ministers”). 
 163. See, e.g., Letter from John Adams to Robert Livingston (Nov. 8, 1782), in 5 id. at 864–66 
(discussing the importance of “[r]anks, titles, and etiquettes, and every species of punctilios” in 
European diplomacy). 
 164. E.g., Letter from John Adams to the President of Congress (March 29, 1781), in 4 id. at 
335 (sharing with Congress a memorial presented by a Dutch envoy to the Swedish ambassador 
in Paris). 
 165. See, e.g., Letter from John Adams to the President of Congress (Apr. 24, 1780), in 3 id. 
at 626–27 (reporting the use of an envoy extraordinary by the Empress of Russia to the Swedish 
court). 
 166. See, e.g., Debates in the Federal Convention (June 28, 1787), in 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, 
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international position of the United States at the time, foreign relations 
was a matter of national survival.167 
Even more to the point, the United States had ample experience 
sending and receiving special emissaries prior to the Convention. On 
the sending side, Benjamin Franklin and Silas Deane tasked Arthur 
Lee with traveling to Spain in 1777 to negotiate an alliance and 
recognition of American independence.168 Lee failed to obtain either, 
but managed to secure promises of future aid.169 Three years later, the 
Continental Congress appointed John Laurens as an envoy to France 
“for the special purpose of soliciting . . . the . . . aids requested by 
Congress, and forwarding them to America without loss of time.”170 
Laurens gained French assurances of naval support and returned home 
six months later.171 In 1783, Congress designated John Adams, 
Benjamin Franklin, and Thomas Jefferson as commissioners to 
negotiate peace treaties with the Barbary Powers.172 And in 1786, 
Congress sent John Lamb, a brigadier general and customs collector 
from New York, on a special mission to Algiers to secure the release 
of American hostages.173 
The founders also had experience receiving ad hoc diplomats. One 
of the earlier examples came in 1775, when, still uncertain about the 
wisdom of supporting American independence, the Count of 
Vergennes sent Achard de Bonvouloir to the United States as a special 
 
supra note 97, at 249–52 (discussing international relations among certain European states); The 
Debate in the Convention of the State of South Carolina (Jan. 16, 1788), in 4 id. at 268 (recounting 
developments at the 1713 Congress of Utrecht); The Debate in the Convention of the State of 
South Carolina (Jan. 17, 1788), in 4 id. at 266 (“In England, the ministers proceed with caution in 
making treaties.”); The Debate in the Convention of the State of Virginia (June 18, 1788), in 3 id. 
at 505 (“It is the part of the laws of several Oriental nations to receive no ambassadors, and to 
burn their prisoners. It is a custom with the grand seignior to receive, but not to send ambassadors. 
It is a particular custom with him, in time of war with Russia, to put the Russian ambassador in 
the Seven Towers.”). 
 167. See generally MARKS, supra note 126 (discussing American vulnerabilities under the 
Articles of Confederation and their role in the adoption of the Constitution). 
 168. BEMIS, supra note 162, at 52–53. 
 169. Id. at 53. 
 170. 18 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 1130, 1141 (Gaillard 
Hunt ed., 1910).  
 171. 1 WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, THE FINANCIER AND THE FINANCES OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 294–301 (1892) (discussing aid that Laurens secured from France); see also 1 
REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 142, at 
584–85 (discussing Laurens’s mission to France); GREGORY D. MASSEY, JOHN LAURENS AND 
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 173–94 (2000) (same). 
 172. MARKS, supra note 126, at 38–40. 
 173. Id. at 41–42. 
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agent to inquire about the seriousness of the movement for 
independence.174 Bonvouloir’s subsequent report helped persuade the 
French government to aid the American cause.175 Notably, his primary 
contact had been the Committee of Secret Correspondence, the 
members of which included Benjamin Franklin and John Dickinson, 
both of whom attended the Constitutional Convention.176 
Other salient precedents are the British peace commissions of the 
1770s. Lord North appointed the members of the first of these, known 
as the Howe Commission, in 1776 to offer pardons and a resumption 
of trade in exchange for an end to hostilities and a pledge of 
allegiance.177 Acting as spokesmen for Congress, Benjamin Franklin 
and John Adams rejected the concessions as insufficient.178 Two years 
later and with far less leverage, the British sent a second group known 
as the Carlisle Commission to offer virtually anything Congress might 
demand other than independence, but the effort again failed, the 
United States having already secured recognition from the French.179 
In short, ad hoc diplomacy was hardly an unknown or exotic concept 
to the founders; they knew from experience that it was an important 
feature of European and transatlantic relations. 
C. European Usage 
How, then, did contemporaries refer to these kinds of 
representatives? Europeans consistently identified most of them as 
public ministers. 
Part of the evidence comes from eighteenth-century English case 
law concerning the Diplomatic Privileges Act of 1708, which 
Parliament enacted after a famous incident involving the arrest and 
detention of an indebted Russian ambassador.180 Peter the Great 
viewed the arrest as a serious affront and demanded death sentences 
for the perpetrators, but because the detention had been permissible 
under English law at the time, the British government was unable to 
 
 174. BEMIS, supra note 162, at 22–23; KAPLAN, supra note 139, at 88. 
 175. JONATHAN R. DULL, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 57–58 
(1985). 
 176. See id. at 57; 2 SECRET JOURNALS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE CONFEDERATION 5 (Nov. 
29, 1775) (Thomas B. Wait ed., 1820). 
 177. KAPLAN, supra note 139, at 95. 
 178. See id. at 95–96. 
 179. RICHARD DEAN BURNS, JOSEPH M. SIRACUSA & JASON C. FLANAGAN, AMERICAN 
FOREIGN RELATIONS SINCE INDEPENDENCE 4 (2013); KAPLAN, supra note 139, at 106. 
 180. JUSTIN MCCARTHY, THE REIGN OF QUEEN ANNE 317–20 (fine paper ed., 1911). 
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hold anyone accountable.181 Instead, to mollify the Czar and prevent 
similar incidents in the future,182 parliament passed the Diplomatic 
Privileges Act, providing immunity from arrest and service of process 
for “the person of any ambassador or other public minister of any 
foreign prince or state authorized and received as such by her 
Majesty . . . or the domestic or domestic servant of any such 
ambassador, or other public minster,” and also designating as 
“violators of the laws of nations” and subjecting to possible “pains, 
penalties, and corporal punishment” anyone who infringed this 
immunity.183 
Judicial opinions interpreting the Act shed light on eighteenth-
century English understandings. Plaintiffs in civil cases often argued 
that the statute did not apply because the defendant was not a “public 
minister.” This line of argument required courts to ascertain precisely 
what constitutes the category, and courts responded by adopting a 
broad definition that included many ad hoc diplomats. In Barbuit’s 
Case,184 which contained the most extensive discussion of the issue, the 
question was whether a Prussian consular agent was a public minister 
and thus immune from certain civil proceedings.185 The court 
concluded that the agent failed to qualify for this status because he was 
not “intrusted to transact affairs between . . . two crowns,” but instead 
commissioned to “assist his Prussian Majesty’s subjects . . . in their 
commerce.”186 In reaching this decision, the court emphasized that the 
statutory phrase “ambassadors, or other public ministers” covered 
both “ministers sent upon extraordinary occasions, which are 
commonly called ambassadors extraordinary,” and those “who 
constantly reside” at a foreign embassy.187 Thus, the consul could have 
qualified as a minister even if the Prussian government had authorized 
him only to “transact any one particular thing in that capacity, as every 
ambassador extraordinary is; or to remove some particular difficulties, 
which might otherwise occasion war.”188 The problem was simply that 
he held not even this limited authority. Other precedents similarly 
defined “public minister” as one who officially represents a sovereign 
 
 181. Id. at 319. 
 182. Id. at 319–20. 
 183. 7 Ann. c. 12 (1708) (Eng.) (capitalization and spelling modified from original).  
 184. Barbuit’s Case (1737) 25 Eng. Rep. 777 (Ch.). 
 185. Id. at 777. 
 186. Id. at 778 (emphasis omitted). 
 187. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 188. Id. 
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in foreign affairs, without apparent regard for considerations such as 
duration of service and breadth of responsibility.189 Courts understood 
these analyses to reflect the law of nations.190 
European scholars took the same approach. Perhaps the most 
influential in the realm of diplomacy studies was Abraham de 
Wicquefort, a Dutch diplomat who published The Embassador and His 
Functions in 1681.191 Translated into English in 1716 and widely viewed 
at the time as one of the most important works in its field,192 
Wicquefort’s treatise set out to classify diplomatic agents, describe 
their responsibilities, and prescribe how they should conduct 
themselves.193 It is a particularly useful indicator of eighteenth-century 
understandings both because practitioners were familiar with it,194 and 
because its approach was explicitly historical and inductive. The goal 
was to identify the law by reference to state practice rather than by 
deduction from principle or on the basis of ancient texts.195 
Wicquefort devoted his entire first chapter to defining and 
classifying the various types of public ministers in existence at the time. 
To begin, he explained that the term “public minister” encompassed 
two classes of actors. The first consisted of the “embassador”—“a 
publick minister, dispatch’d by a sovereign prince to some foreign 
 
 189. See, e.g., Viveash v. Becker (1814) 105 Eng. Rep. 619, 620 (suggesting that one must 
represent the sovereign in performing a state function to qualify as a public minister); Clarke v. 
Cretico (1808) 1 Taunt. 106, 106 (explaining that a consul was not a public minister because it was 
“no part of his office to transact business between . . . two states”). Contemporary English 
dictionaries adopted similarly expansive definitions of the term “minister,” which in context was 
understood to be a synonym for “public minister.” See, e.g., Minister, THOMAS DYCHE & 
WILLIAM PARDON, A NEW GENERAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (18th ed., 1781) (defining 
“minister” to mean “any great officer that has the charge of embassies or other concerns of 
moment”). 
 190. See Barbuit’s Case 25 Eng. Rep. at 777 (explaining that the Diplomatic Privileges Act is 
“declaratory of the antient universal jus gentium”); Triquet and Others v. Bath (1764) 3 Burr. 
1478, 1480 (“This privilege of foreign ministers and their domestic servants depends upon the law 
of nations. The Act of Parliament of 7 Ann. c. 12, is declaratory of it.”). 
 191. WICQUEFORT, supra note 84; see also Maurice Keens-Soper, Francois de Calliéres and 
Diplomatic Theory, 16 HIST. J. 485, 492 (1973) (discussing the publication of Wicquefort’s 
treatise). 
 192. See generally Keens-Soper, supra note 191 (describing the significance of the treatise).  
 193. See generally WICQUEFORT, supra note 84 (discussing the categories and functions of 
early diplomatic agents). 
 194. See HORN, supra note 154, at 192 (discussing how British diplomats “received a great 
deal of advice from Wicquefort”); see also GILBERT, supra note 137, at 94 (explaining that 
Wicquefort’s treatise was one of “the two most famous books” on the subject of diplomacy in the 
eighteenth century “and ran through many editions”). 
 195. Cf. Keens-Soper, supra note 191, at 494–95 (discussing the importance of Wicquefort’s 
treatise). 
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potentate or state, there to represent his person, by virtue of a power, 
letters of credence, or some commission that notifies his character.”196 
The second comprised all other diplomats, including 
“plenipotentiaries . . . internuncios, envoys, residents, agents, 
commissioners, the secretaries of embassies, and even the secretaries 
of embassadors,”197 along with “those persons whom princes employ 
by a verbal order.”198 Members of this second class held lower rank 
because, unlike ambassadors, they did not represent the sovereign in 
“his person.”199 But what tied the two classes together and 
distinguished public ministers from other kinds of government officials 
was that they were charged by a sovereign “with the prosecution or 
sollicitation of affairs” vis-a-vis a foreign court and “enjoy[ed] the 
protection of the law of nations in its full extent.”200 
Wicquefort plainly included a wide variety of ad hoc diplomats 
within this group. On his account, service on a special mission merely 
qualified a person as a different type of public minister, rather than as 
something other than a public minister. He acknowledged, for example, 
that there are both “embassadors ordinary,” whom he understood to 
reside at a foreign embassy for a substantial period and represent the 
sending sovereign in any matters that might arise, and “embassadors 
extraordinary,” whom he understood to travel to a foreign court on 
behalf of a sovereign to complete a discrete task, but he argued that 
“there is no essential difference between them.”201 Wicquefort also 
enumerated some of the purposes for which a ruler might send a public 
minister to a foreign court: to negotiate, “to be a witness to an oath, for 
the observation and execution of a treaty of peace, or to represent his 
prince at the ceremonies of a christening, a marriage, a coronation, or 
a funeral.”202 To be clear, these were not simply tasks that the ruler 
might choose to delegate to a representative already resident abroad, 
but instead reasons for dispatching a separate public minister 
 
 196. WICQUEFORT, supra note 84, at 2 (emphasis omitted) (capitalization modified from 
original). 
 197. Id. (emphasis omitted) (capitalization modified from original). 
 198. Id. (capitalization modified from original). 
 199. Id. (emphasis omitted) (capitalization modified from original). 
 200. Id. (emphasis omitted) (capitalization modified from original). 
 201. Id. at 4 (emphasis omitted) (capitalization and spelling modified from original); see also 
id. at 8, 10, 22 (implying that ambassadors “ordinary” are those who reside abroad, while 
ambassadors “extraordinary” are those who travel abroad temporarily and to carry out a limited 
assignment). 
 202. Id. (capitalization modified from original).  
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altogether. Wicquefort also wove examples of ad hoc diplomacy into 
his discussion and explained how this form of contact remained the 
norm for some states, such as Poland.203 No one familiar with 
Wicquefort’s treatise could have mistaken his position. 
Though he devoted less attention to the matter, François de 
Calliéres, a French diplomat who rivaled Wicquefort as the most 
popular eighteenth-century commentator on diplomatic practice,204 
appears to have concurred. “Publick ministers,” he explained, “may be 
divided into two kinds; the first and second order.”205 “Those of the 
first order are ambassadors extraordinary, and ambassadors ordinary,” 
while “those of the second order are envoys extraordinary, and 
residents.”206 Members of these orders excluded diplomats sent by 
anyone other than a sovereign, such as the “estates of a country, or the 
magistrates of a town,”207 but included those sent on a mission of “no 
great duration”208 and those given limited assignments, such as 
attending a peace conference or mediating among warring princes.209 
Wicquefort and Calliéres were not breaking new ground in taking 
this position. In an important 1603 treatise, the French diplomat Jean 
Hotman had defined “ambassador” to refer to those “who under the 
assurance of the public faith, authorized by the law of nations, are 
employed to negotiate with foreign princes or commonwealths the 
affairs of their masters, and with dignity to represent their persons and 
greatness during their ambassage.”210 These agents, he explained, are 
of two types: ambassadors extraordinary and ordinary.211 The first are 
sent “for a little time, and for one affair only, as, for renewing some 
alliance, to swear and ratify a treaty, to congratulate, condole, or to do 
like office in the behalf of their masters,” and “return as soon as that 
 
 203. See id. at 3, 6. 
 204. See THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 1600–1715, at 301–20 (Andrew Lossky ed. 1967) 
(explaining that Calliéres’s book, The Art of Negotiating With Sovereign Princes, “enjoyed 
immediate success, and has been regarded ever since as a classic text on diplomacy”); GILBERT, 
supra note 137, at 94 (describing the books by Wicquefort and Calliéres as the eighteenth 
century’s “two most famous books” on diplomacy).  
 205. FRANÇOIS DE CALLIÉRES, THE ART OF NEGOTIATING WITH SOVEREIGN PRINCES 63 
(3d ed. 1738) (emphasis omitted) (capitalization modified from original).  
 206. Id. (emphasis omitted) (capitalization modified from original).  
 207. Id. at 69, 72 (capitalization modified from original).  
 208. Id. at 216 (capitalization modified from original).  
 209. Id. at 229–30. 
 210. See JEAN HOTMAN, THE AMBASSADOR B2 (James Shawe trans., 1603) (capitalization 
and spelling modified from original).  
 211. Id. at B2–B3 (capitalization and spelling modified from original). 
SCOVILLE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2019  5:24 PM 
2019] AD HOC DIPLOMATS 945 
affair is dispatched.”212 The second serve “without having any time 
limited, but at the pleasure of the prince which [s]endeth them.”213 
Writing in 1585, Alberico Gentili had similarly distinguished between 
these two types, with resident ambassadors—“time ambassadors” in 
his terminology—being those sent “on no specific or definite business 
but for a period of time sometimes prescribed, sometimes not, with the 
understanding that while they are on the embassy they shall be 
responsible for the negotiation and performance of everything 
which . . . may happen to be in the interest” of the sending sovereign, 
and all other ambassadors being “sent on a special occasion, their 
orders being to return as soon as they have accomplished their 
mission.”214 
Later treatises were also consistent with Wicquefort and Calliéres. 
Emmerich de Vattel explained in 1758 that the term “public minister” 
included three distinct orders. The first and highest-ranking were the 
“ambassadors,” who represented princes “not only in their rights and 
in the transaction of their affairs, but also in their dignity, their 
greatness, and their pre-eminence.”215 The second and third consisted 
of “[e]nvoys” and “resident[s],” respectively.216 Functionally 
indistinguishable from one another, these latter orders represented the 
sovereign prince “in his affairs,” but not “in his dignity.”217 They could 
transact and communicate, in other words, but unlike ambassadors 
were not treated as the sovereign in ceremonial matters. Yet Vattel was 
not overly concerned with the formalities of rank. In his view, the term 
“public minister” “denote[d] any person intrusted with the 
management of public affairs, but [was] more particularly understood 
 
 212. Id. (capitalization and spelling modified from original).  
 213. Id. at B3. 
 214. See 2 ALBERICO GENTILI, DE LEGATIONIBUS LIBRI TRES 14 (Gordon J. Laing trans., 
Oxford University Press 1924) (1585). 
 215. See VATTEL, supra note 81, at 459. 
 216. Id. at 459–60. 
 217. See id. According to Travers Twiss:  
Louis XI of France is said to have been the first of the European Sovereigns, who 
accredited to another Sovereign Power a Public Minister to represent him in the 
conduct of his affairs only, and not in respect of his personal dignity; and his 
example led the way to the introduction of two distinct classes of diplomatic 
Agents, a higher class representing the dignity of the person of their Constituent 
as well as his affairs, and a lower class simply representing him in the transaction 
of his affairs.  
TRAVERS TWISS, THE LAW OF NATIONS CONSIDERED AS INDEPENDENT POLITICAL 
Communities 340 (London, Clarendon Press 1884). 
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to designate one who acts in such capacity at a foreign court.”218 In 
short, anyone sent by a prince “with credentials and on public 
business” was a public minister,219 and this was true even of individuals 
with nontraditional ranks, such as deputy and commissioner.220 Vattel 
did not specifically address the status of ad hoc diplomats, but his 
capacious definition betrayed little concern for the precise purpose or 
duration of the mission at hand. The only groups he explicitly excluded 
were “agents,” whom he defined as those “appointed by princes to 
transact their private affairs,” and “secret ministers,” whose “character 
is not public.”221 
Other writers from the mid- to late eighteenth century also 
concurred. Although he did not use the term “public minister,” the 
Dutch jurist Cornelius van Bynkershoek defined “ambassador” as 
including a nonresident variety. His position was that “[a]mbassadors 
extraordinary . . . are sent with a commission to transact a particular 
piece of business, while the instructions of ambassadors in ordinary 
cover not one thing only but all things.”222 Citing Wicquefort, he also 
explained that qualification for the status of ambassador under 
international law hinged on “the nature of the mandate,” rather than a 
person’s rank.223 Years later, the German jurist Georg Friedrich von 
Martens defined “public minister” to mean “the person whom the 
sovereign has appointed to superintend his affairs at some foreign 
court.”224 Like others, Martens explained that ambassadors were a type 
of public minister, and that there were both ambassadors ordinary and 
extraordinary, with the division “serv[ing] originally to distinguish 
perpetual embassadors, from such as were sent on some particular 
business.”225 By the late 1700s, sovereigns vested even some of their 
resident diplomats with the title of “ambassador extraordinary” in 
 
 218. VATTEL, supra note 81, at 453. 
 219. See id. at 461. 
 220. See id. 
 221. See id. at 461, 485. 
 222. CORNELIUS VAN BYNKERSHOEK, DE FORO LEGATORUM LIBER SIGULARIS: A 
MONOGRAPH ON THE JURISDICTION OVER AMBASSADORS IN BOTH CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 
CASES 9 (Gordon J. Laing trans., Oxford, Clarendon Press photo. reprint 1946) (1744). 
 223. Id. at 64 (“[W]hatever title it may have pleased a prince to use in his mandate, it is all the 
same so far as the right of embassy is concerned.”). 
 224. See GEORG FRIEDRICH VON MARTENS, SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, 
FOUNDED ON THE TREATIES AND CUSTOMS OF THE MODERN NATIONS OF EUROPE 196 
(William Cobbett trans., 1795) (capitalization modified from original).  
 225. See id. at 203–04 (capitalization modified from original).  
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order to convey a heightened sense of dignity, but the prior usage, by 
which extraordinary meant ad hoc, had not entirely disappeared.226 
The fundamental consistency among these sources seems 
significant. Some of the authors were diplomats while others were 
jurists. In the case of Gentili and Martens they wrote more than two 
centuries apart from one another. And they had different nationalities. 
None of them, however, suggested that ad hoc diplomats were 
categorically or even typically something other than public ministers, 
or that remuneration, tenure, or any other Hartwell-like condition was 
necessary to qualify as such. To the extent they addressed these issues, 
they explicitly concluded otherwise.227 
D. American Familiarity with European Usage 
The English legal authorities and the European treatises are key 
pieces of the historical analysis for one simple reason: they were 
familiar and important to those who drafted and ratified the 
Constitution. Both Blackstone’s Commentaries and participants in the 
ratification debates discussed the incident that led to the Diplomatic 
Privileges Act of 1708,228 and Congress used that statute as the model 
for the Crimes Act of 1790, which employed virtually identical 
language to prohibit arrest and service of process against “the person 
of any ambassador or other public minister of any foreign prince or 
state, authorized and received as such by the President of the United 
States, or the domestic or domestic servant of any such ambassador or 
other public minster.”229 An early opinion from U.S. Attorney General 
William Wirt also mentioned the English statute, along with the 
decision in Barbuit’s Case.230 
 
 226. See id. 
 227. Originalist analyses of the Constitution often scrutinize the writing of individuals such as 
William Blackstone and Samuel von Puffendorf, but while some of these other authors discussed 
rules pertaining to diplomatic immunity, they did not attempt to define “ambassador” or “public 
minister.” See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: IN 
FOUR BOOKS 226–30 (1902). I therefore omit them. 
 228. See id. at 247–48; The Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia 
(June 21, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 97, at 503. 
 229. See Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 25, 1 Stat. 112. 
 230. See U.S. Attorney General, Opinion Letter on Foreign Ministers, Consuls, &c. (Dec. 1, 
1820), as reprinted in 1 OFFICIAL OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL OF THE UNITED 
STATES, ADVISING THE PRESIDENT AND HEAD OF DEPARTMENTS IN RELATION TO THEIR 
OFFICIAL DUTIES 407–09 (Benjamin F. Hall ed., 1852) (1820) (characterizing the pertinent 
language of the Crimes Act of 1790 as an “exact transcript” of the Diplomatic Privileges Act of 
1708 and citing Barbuit’s Case). 
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Many of the framers were equally familiar with the leading 
treatises. Legal scholars have long recognized as much, especially with 
respect to writers such as Vattel,231 but what is interesting is that this 
familiarity extended specifically into writing on matters of diplomacy. 
For example, it appears that early American diplomats read Vattel’s 
analysis on the definition of “public minister.” While serving at the 
court at St. Petersburg, Francis Dana wrote a letter to Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs Robert Livingston, querying whether Congress’s 
decision to commission him as a minister plenipotentiary “ha[d] been 
taken from Vattel’s Law of Nations, where he treats of the several 
orders of public ministers.”232 In Dana’s view, the chosen title had 
failed to serve its purpose insofar as Russia treated ministers 
plenipotentiary no differently than simple ministers.233 Vattel’s 
discussion on public ministers also appeared in major news outlets.234 
Key leaders of the Revolution were also familiar with the major 
commentators on diplomatic affairs. In 1783, a congressional 
committee composed of James Madison, Thomas Mifflin, and Hugh 
Williamson reported a “list of books proper for the use of Congress, 
and proposed that the secretary should be instructed to procure the 
same.”235 This list included roughly two dozen works on international 
law and diplomatic practice—including the treatises by Wicquefort, 
Calliéres, Hotman, Gentili, and Bynkershoek236—and committee 
 
 231. See generally Brian Richardson, The Use of Vattel in the American Law of Nations, 106 
AM. J. INT’L L. 547 (2012) (acknowledging the Framers’ familiarity with Vattel, but critiquing the 
tendency to privilege him over other writers of the period). 
 232. See Letter from Francis Dana to Robert Livingston (Sept. 5, 1782), in 5 THE 
REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 142, at 
702. 
 233. See id. 
 234. See, e.g., Of the Rights, Privileges, and Immunities of Ambassadors, and Other Public 
Functionaries (By Vattel), NAT’L INTELLIGENCER & WASH. ADVERTISER, Nov. 17, 1809. 
 235. Debates in the Congress of the Confederation (Jan. 23, 1783), in 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, 
supra note 97, at 27. 
 236. 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, supra note 170, at 83–84. 
James Madison compiled a list of books on the topic of diplomacy. 6 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON: 1 JANUARY 1783–30 APRIL 1783, at 62–71 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. 
Rachal eds., 1969) (including the following list of books: FRANÇOIS DE CALLIÉRES, THE ART OF 
NEGOTIATING WITH SOVEREIGN PRINCES (Eng. ed., 1716); CARLO MARIA CARAFA, 
L’AMBASCIADORE POLITICO CHRISTIANO (1692); ALBERICO GENTILI, DE LEGATIONIBUS 
LIBRI TRES (1585); JEAN HOTMAN, DE LA CHARGE ET DIGNITÉ DE L’AMBASSADEUR (James 
Shawe trans., 1603); FREDERICK MARSALAER, LEGATUS (1618); CARLO PASQUALE, LEGATUS 
(1598); J. DE LA SARRAS DU FRANQUESNAY, LE MINISTRE PUBLIC DANS LES COURS 
ESTRANGERES &C. (1731); ANTOINE DE VERA, EL EMBAXADOR (1620); and ABRAHAM 
WICQUEFORT, THE AMBASSADOR AND HIS FUNCTIONS (Eng. ed., 1716)). Publication years, 
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members advocated its acquisition on the view that “Congress should 
have at all times at command such authors on the law of nations, 
treaties, negotiations, &c., as would render their proceedings in such 
cases conformable to propriety.”237 The proposal was defeated due to 
concerns about cost,238 but the list still “represents an educated 18th 
century view of what the legislator-statesman ought to be reading” and 
suggests “many of the very books with which Madison”—the list’s 
primary author—“prepared himself for the ordeal of the 
Constitutional Convention four years later.”239 Other references 
corroborate this view: Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth cited Wicquefort 
in an early circuit court opinion addressing the prosecution of a U.S. 
citizen for violations of the Treaty of Paris.240 Thomas Jefferson 
recommended Bynkershoek’s work on ambassadors to James Madison 
a year after Congress considered the acquisition list,241 and he included 
the works of Wicquefort and Calliéres in his personal library 
catalogue.242 
This evidence is in line with other indications that influential 
revolutionaries made serious efforts to learn European diplomatic 
protocol. For instance, in 1779, while serving in France, John Adams 
requested reimbursement after purchasing and studying a “large 
collection of books on the . . . letters and memoirs of those ambassadors 
and public ministers who had acquired the fairest fame and had done 
the greatest services to their countries,”243 and Congress approved his 
 
editions, and volumes are in some cases estimates. Id. With the exception of the books by 
Calliéres, Gentili, Hotman, and Wicquefort, English translations of the listed works do not appear 
to exist. 
 237. Debates in the Congress of the Confederation (Jan. 23, 1783), in 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, 
supra note 97, at 27.  
 238. Id. 
 239. Loren Eugene Smith, The Library List of 1783, at 4–5 (Jan. 30, 1969) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Claremont Graduate School), http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgu_etd/87 
[http://perma.cc/FKT2-C666]. 
 240. Williams’ Case, 29 F. Cas. 1330, 1332 (Cir. Ct. D. Conn. 1799). 
 241. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Feb. 20, 1784), in 21 LETTERS 
OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS 369–70 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1994) (“I have had an opportunity here 
of examining Bynkershoek’s works. There are about a fourth part of them which you would like 
to have . . . [including] du Juge competent des Ambassadeurs . . . .”). 
 242. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1783 CATALOGUE OF BOOKS [circa 1775–1812], at 84–85 
(electronic ed. 2003), https://www.masshist.org/thomasjeffersonpapers/doc?id=catalog1783_84 
[http://perma.cc/G5EN-DBKA]. This catalog is “a record of works [Jefferson] already possessed 
and of others he desired to acquire.” 6 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 236, at 64. 
 243. Letter from John Adams to the Treasury Board (Sept. 19, 1779), in 3 REVOLUTIONARY 
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 142, at 327. 
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request.244 In 1780, Congress’s instructions to Francis Dana, the new 
minister plenipotentiary to St. Petersburg, ordered him to “endeavor 
to acquire a perfect knowledge of the manners and etiquette of the 
court at which [he would] reside.”245 American and foreign diplomats 
in turn educated Congress on the accepted conventions.246 
The idea that the framers studied these works is also in accord with 
evidence concerning the execution of American diplomacy, especially 
toward the later years of the Revolution. Inspired perhaps by the 
philosophes, the first Americans involved in foreign relations “paid 
little attention to the traditional forms and disregarded well established 
rules of diplomatic etiquette.”247 Benjamin Franklin thus wore the 
rustic fur cap of a backwoodsman while serving “among the Powder’d 
Heads of Paris,”248 and American envoys self-consciously employed a 
new language of commerce and trade over political alliance.249 One 
might imagine that such practices would have limited the importance 
of knowledge about European usage. But while they retained a critical 
instinct toward many practices of the Old World, the framers appear 
to have conformed in many cases. In 1776, General Washington 
granted safe conduct passes to the members of the Howe Commission 
in accordance with European custom.250 In 1778, after the French sent 
their first public minister to Philadelphia, Congress followed 
established etiquette by sending to Paris a single diplomatic agent of 
equal rank, even though this required dissolving the joint commission 
of Benjamin Franklin, Arthur Lee, and Silas Deane, who had served in 
 
 244. Id. at 329. 
 245. Instructions to Francis Dana, as Minister Plenipotentiary to the Court at St. Petersburgh 
(Dec. 19 1780), in 4 id. at 201–03. 
 246. See, e.g., Letter from John Adams to John Jay (May 13, 1785), in 1 DIPLOMATIC 
CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 497 (Washington, Blair & Rives 1837) (explaining 
an English custom whereby both public ministers and their families must be introduced to the 
Queen); Letter from John Adams to Robert Livingston (July 31, 1783), in 6 REVOLUTIONARY 
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 142, at 621–24 (reporting 
advice received from the Comte Montagnini de Mirabel, the minister plenipotentiary from the 
King of Sardinia, who wished to advise Congress on certain matters of protocol, including the 
need to “be very exact in the etiquette of titles” in correspondence with European leaders); Letter 
from Silas Deane to the Comm. of Secret Correspondence (Nov. 28, 1776), in 2 id. at 196 (advising 
Congress to consider adopting the “long-accustomed form and etiquette” of the Old World in 
correspondence with European powers). 
 247. PAUL A. VARG, FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 4 (1963). 
 248. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Mrs. Thompson (Feb. 8, 1777), in 7 THE WRITINGS OF 
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 26 (Albert Henry Smythe ed., 1906). 
 249. KAPLAN, supra note 139, at 93–94. 
 250. Id. at 95. 
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France since 1776.251 In 1781, after the British imprisoned the 
American envoy Henry Laurens in the Tower of London on charges of 
treason, his son John Laurens reported to Congress that he had 
“consulted the several ministers at the court of France upon the proper 
measures to be taken when such a flagrant violation of the laws of 
nations had been offered in the person of a public minister, and 
solicited their intervention and assistance.”252 In 1786, John Jay 
brushed aside a British consul’s objections to American violations of 
the Treaty of Paris by pointing out that consuls lacked authority to 
raise such issues as a matter of international law.253 
Anyone who paid attention knew that much was at stake in these 
matters. Adams, for one, warned Congress multiple times of the risks 
of disregarding diplomatic norms. On one occasion he lectured that an 
improvement in the position of the United States vis-à-vis Europe 
would “never be accomplished but by conforming to the usages 
established in the world.”254 On another he warned that Americans 
would “have cause for severe repentance” if they failed to conform,255 
and contemporaries did not have to look far to see that he was probably 
right.256 In navigating such issues, familiarity with the likes of 
Wicquefort and Calliéres would have been enormously useful, serving 
as a source of vital insights on European expectations, as a form of 
 
 251. DULL, supra note 175, at 100–01. 
 252. Letter from John Laurens to the President of Congress (Sept. 6, 1781), in 4 
REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 142, at 
700. 
 253. Letter from John Jay to John Temple (Apr. 7, 1786), in 3 REVOLUTIONARY 
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 243, at 109; Report of John 
Jay Relative to Richard Lawrence (May 26, 1788), reprinted in 3 id. at 126–27; see also David M. 
Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American Constitution, The Law 
of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 959 (2010) 
(discussing this incident). 
 254. Letter from John Adams to John Jay (Feb. 26, 1786), in 2 REVOLUTIONARY 
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 243, at 574. 
 255. Letter from John Adams to John Jay (Sept. 10, 1787), in 2 id. at 802–03. 
 256. The assault on the French consul Barbé de Marbois in Philadelphia in 1784 provided one 
salient example. This incident, together with Congress’s feckless response, provoked the fury of 
the French government, which demanded that American officials treat the offense as a violation 
of the law of nations and surrender the perpetrator to their custody. G.S. Rowe & Alexander W. 
Knott, The Longchamps Affair (1784–86), the Law of Nations, and the Shaping of Early American 
Foreign Policy, 10 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 199, 202 (1986). It also inspired threats that the French, 
Dutch, Swedish, and Spanish governments would withdraw their legations if the United States 
failed to cooperate. Id. at 203. 
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leverage in negotiations, and as evidence of belonging to the class of 
governments from which the United States sought recognition.257 
E. The Incorporation of European Usage 
Unsurprisingly, then, there is considerable evidence that the 
framers were not only familiar with the theory and practice of 
diplomacy in Europe, and not only conformed in many cases to 
European custom, but also incorporated into American practice the 
European and international legal understanding that many ad hoc 
diplomats are public ministers. Equally important, the framers did not 
graft onto this understanding any additional domestic criteria in 
applying the Appointments Clause; they required the Senate’s advice 
and consent for the appointment of anyone who qualified as a public 
minister for the United States under the law of nations. This conclusion 
draws support from a variety of angles, including symmetry between 
the law of nations and the phrasing of the Appointments Clause; 
official practice during the presidential administrations of George 
Washington, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson; debates in Congress; 
early dictionaries; and the nature of diplomatic assignments in the 
eighteenth century. 
1. Textual Symmetry.  A close reading of the Appointments Clause 
presents a puzzle: why would the framers provide for a specific power 
to appoint ambassadors while separately providing for a more general 
power to appoint public ministers? In European practice, the term 
“public minister” had covered a rather extensive hierarchy of ranks, 
including ambassador, envoy, resident, minister, agent, chargé 
d’affaires, and secretary of legation, among others.258 This hierarchy 
was complex, evolved over time, and varied by court.259 Yet there was 
no question, including among the framers, that ambassadors belonged 
within it.260 In this context, those who drafted and ratified the 
Constitution must have understood that retaining a separate reference 
to ambassadors did nothing to change the scope of the appointment 
 
 257. Cf. SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE 133 (2015) (discussing the importance early 
American leaders attached to learning and following European diplomatic customs). 
 258. ANDERSON, supra note 148, at 84.  
 259. Id. 
 260. This is apparent from the text of the Appointments Clause, which explicitly identifies 
ambassador as a subcategory of public minister. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2. It is also apparent from 
the major treatises on diplomatic practice. See supra Part III.C. 
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power; a clause that provided only for the appointment of public 
ministers and consuls would have been functionally identical to the 
version that emerged from the Convention. Moreover, redundancy 
aside, the separate reference to ambassadors is surprising in light of an 
early American aversion to the use of that particular rank of public 
minister, which, owing to an historical association with European 
monarchy and ceremonial extravagance, had both political 
connotations and budgetary implications that were unappealing to 
many of the Founding era.261 In short, why would the framers retain 
functionally redundant language, the apparent effect of which was to 
emphasize the power to appoint a type of diplomat that many of them 
viewed with particular disfavor?262 
There are a few conceivable explanations. One is that the drafters 
desired to emphasize the sovereign equality of the United States in 
relation to Europe, and chose to do so by underscoring the nation’s 
right to send diplomats of a rank historically reserved for major 
powers.263 On this view, the language of the Appointments Clause may 
have had an international communicative dimension; the message was 
that the new republic, like the monarchies of the Old World, possessed 
international sovereignty in full. Another possibility is that the Clause 
reflects the lingering influence of the Articles of Confederation, which 
provided only for the sending and receiving of “ambassadors.”264 On 
this reading, the separate reference to ambassadors may be an artifact 
of an undertheorized and incremental revision by which the drafters 
attached an additional provision for public ministers without 
considering its relationship to the preexisting language. Still another 
possibility is that the framers were simply channeling the law of 
 
 261. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 112, at 265 (James Madison) (discussing 
grades of public ministers other than ambassadors as those “which the United States will be most 
likely to prefer”); see also ANDERSON, supra note 148, at 82 (explaining that as late as the mid-
seventeenth century, “[i]t was still widely accepted that only major rulers (kings and the republic 
of Venice) could send and receive ambassadors”); WILLIAM BARNES & JOHN HEATH MORGAN, 
THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES: ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, AND FUNCTIONS 146 
(1961) (“[T]he rank of ambassador had been regarded as too exalted for the representatives of a 
democratic nation and was, moreover, identified with the monarchical system to whose trappings 
and titles the United States had no wish to defer.”). 
 262. In fact, this aversion was so longstanding that the United States did not appoint its first 
diplomat with the rank of ambassador until 1893. BARNES & MORGAN, supra note 261, at 146. 
 263. Cf. ANDERSON, supra note 148, at 59 (discussing how “republics ranked lower than any 
kind of monarchy” in early European diplomatic protocol). 
 264. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, § 1. 
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nations, such that the separate references to ambassadors and public 
ministers mirrored the doctrinal architecture of the law of diplomacy. 
These options are not necessarily incompatible, but the available 
evidence offers strongest support for the last of the three. While there 
is substantial evidence of sensitivity to European perceptions of the 
United States, and of a desire to be perceived as coequal,265 there is 
little to show that those sentiments played a role specifically in the 
drafting of the Appointments Clause. In addition, records from the 
Constitutional Convention depict the drafting process as generally 
purposeful and deliberative,266 and thus cast doubt on the idea that the 
redundancy is a product of oversight. 
Several points, meanwhile, suggest that the phrasing of the Clause 
reflects the law of nations. First, as shown above, many of the framers 
were familiar with diplomatic law and viewed its major European 
expositors as authoritative.267 Second, the phrasing of the Clause is 
unmistakably symmetrical to the Diplomatic Privileges Act of 1708 and 
the writing of early commentators: all of these authorities divided 
public ministers into the two nonobvious classes of (1) ambassadors 
and (2) diplomats of every other rank.268 According to writers such as 
Wicquefort and Vattel, this scheme reflected an important functional 
difference: when interfacing with foreign courts, ambassadors were the 
only public ministers empowered to act and be treated as if they were 
the very person of the sending sovereign.269 This difference, though 
somewhat strange by modern standards, was important in early 
European diplomacy, when rulers relied upon a baroque system of 
rank and ceremony to communicate the status of their relations with 
other courts and resolve conflicts of precedence among foreign 
emissaries.270 Finally, early American officials consistently and 
 
 265. See, e.g., MARKS, supra note 126, at 96–141. 
 266. Cf. KLARMAN, supra note 120, at 126–256 (recounting the drafting process and 
accompanying debates). But cf. MARKS, supra note 126, at 160 (suggesting that “there was 
minimum floor debate on the diplomatic powers, and the momentous shift from Senate to 
president occurred at the very end of the session when tempers were short and patience wearing 
thin”). 
 267. See supra Part III.D. 
 268. Compare U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2 (providing for the power to appoint “Ambassadors” 
and “other public Ministers”), with 7 Ann., c. 12 (1708) (Eng.) (voiding all writs and processes 
brought against “any Ambassador, or other publick Minister”), CALLIÉRES, supra note 205, at 63 
(distinguishing ambassadors from all other types of public ministers), and WICQUEFORT, supra 
note 84, at 2 (same). 
 269. VATTEL, supra note 81, at 459; WICQUEFORT, supra note 84, at 2. 
 270. ANDERSON, supra note 148, at 56–68. 
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repeatedly took the position that the law of nations informs the 
meaning of the Appointments Clause.271 As James Madison explained, 
“[t]he case of diplomatic missions belongs to the Law of Nations, and 
the principles & usages on which that is founded are entitled to a 
certain influence in expounding the provisions of the Constitution 
which have relation to such missions.”272 It would be only natural for 
the Clause to use the same terminology and phrasing as the law that 
informed its drafting and application. This law, as I have shown, treated 
a wide variety of ad hoc diplomats as public ministers. 
 
 271. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Goodrich v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. 284, 290–91 (1854) (“All 
offices under the government of the United States are created, either by the law of nations, such 
as ambassadors and other public ministers, or by the constitution and the statutes. As to 
ambassadors and other public ministers, the usage of nations determines the tenure of their 
commissions to be at the will of the appointing power.”); 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 1170–71 (1798) 
(statement of Rep. Robert Goodloe Harper) (arguing that the office of public minister is “derived 
from the law of nations,” rather than from the Constitution); 3 THE HISTORICAL REGISTER OF 
THE UNITED STATES 223 (1814) (statement of Sen. Outerbridge Horsey) (“The office of a public 
minister is not an office created by the constitution, nor by any municipal law, but emanates from 
the law of nations.”); On the Constitutional Power of the President to Originate the Appointment 
of a Foreign Minister (Mar. 1826), in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 97, at 480–81 (“If an 
appointment be to an office to be exercised within the limits of the United States or its territories, 
it must be to one which exists, and has been created by the municipal laws of the United States. 
If to an office which is to be exercised without the limits of the United States . . . it must be to one 
which exists, and is recognized by the general principles of international law . . . .”); see also Sarah 
H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 19 (2006) (stating that terms 
such as “ambassador” reference “concepts defined by international law and have been 
understood as inviting consideration of international rules”). This position helps to explain why 
the Framers permitted the president, with the Senate’s advice and consent, to make diplomatic 
appointments even where Congress had not created by statute the offices to which the 
appointments were made. The general understanding appears to have been that these offices 
required no statutory enactment because they existed by virtue of the law of nations. See 
WRISTON, supra note 3, at 131 (“When the new government under the Constitution was 
established, Congress took no action and the executive department proceeded to organize a 
diplomatic and consular service in accord with its own interpretation of the rules of customary 
international law.”); Nomination of Sitting Member of Congress to be Ambassador to Vietnam, 
20 Op. O.L.C. 284, 286–88 (1996) (discussing other early evidence of this view).  
 272. James Madison, Power of the President to Appoint Public Ministers & Consuls in the 
Recess of the Senate (undated memorandum), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 91 n.1 
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910); see also Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (May 6, 1822), 
in id. at 91–93 (“One question is, whether a Public Minister be an officer in the strict constitutional 
sense . . . . According to my recollection this subject was on some occasion carefully searched into, 
& it was found that the practice of the Govt. had from the beginning been regulated by the idea 
that the places or offices of Pub. Ministers & Consuls existed under the law & usages of Nations, 
and were always open to receive appointments as they might be made by competent 
authorities.”); Letter from James Monroe to James Madison (May 10, 1822), in 6 THE WRITINGS 
OF JAMES MONROE 285 (Stanislaus Murray Hamilton ed., 1902) (“Your view of the Constitution, 
as to the powers of the Executive in the appointment of public Ministers, is in strict accord with 
my own, and is, as I understand, supported by numerous precedents, under successive 
administrations.”). 
SCOVILLE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2019  5:24 PM 
956  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:907 
2. Early Appointments.  On its own, symmetry between the law of 
nations and the wording of the Constitution leaves plenty of room for 
uncertainty. But the evidence gets better: the Washington 
Administration treated most ad hoc diplomats as both public ministers 
and officers of the United States by regularly seeking the Senate’s 
advice and consent to their appointment. According to a report 
compiled by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1888 and 
reproduced with modifications in Table 1, Washington utilized twenty-
nine ad hoc diplomats.273 From these a few trends stand out. First, 
President Washington sought and obtained the Senate’s advice and 
consent in eighteen of the cases, often even though the Senate had 
already confirmed the same individual’s nomination to a different, but 
still-ongoing diplomatic appointment. In 1792, for example, 
Washington sought advice and consent for William Carmichael to 
negotiate a treaty with Spain.274 He did this even though the Senate had 
already confirmed Carmichael to the position of chargé d’affaires at 
Madrid in 1789, and even though Carmichael continued to occupy that 
office at the time of his subsequent nomination.275 From a legal 
standpoint, this practice is inexplicable unless the Administration 
understood ad hoc treaty negotiators to be public ministers and officers 
 
 273. S. Exec. Rep. No. 3 app. C (1888), in 8 COMPILATION OF REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE 
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, 1789–1901, First Congress, First Session to 
Fifty-Sixth Congress, Second Session, Treaties and Legislation Respecting Them 337–62 (1901). 
The modifications are the additions of the appointments of Benjamin Lincoln, Cyrus Griffin, 
David Humphreys, Beverly Randolph, Abraham Ogden, Thomas Barclay, Joseph Donaldson, 
Joel Barlow, Henry Knox, Thomas Fitzsimons, James Innes, Christopher Gore, William 
Pinckney, Timothy Pickering, and Isaac Smith, all of which were omitted in the original report. I 
identified these additions by comparing the report to (1) the Senate Executive Journal, (2) 
Charles Lanman’s BIOGRAPHICAL ANNALS OF THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES DURING ITS FIRST CENTURY (1876), and (3) Balances Due to and From the United 
States, Letter from the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 49-363, 49th Cong. 
(1st Sess. 1886). I relied on these sources because, in aggregate, they seemed likely to identify all 
ad hoc diplomatic appointments from the Founding: The Senate Executive Journal reports all 
nominations for which the President sought Senate confirmation. Charles Lanman’s publication 
presents “the names and public services of all those who have, in a prominent manner, been 
identified with the National and State Governments of the Republic.” LANMAN, supra note 273, 
at 3. And the Treasury report, which was produced in response to a House resolution “calling for 
a report of all balances due to and from the United States, as shown by the books of the offices 
of the Register and Sixth Auditor of the Treasury Department, from 1789 to 30th of June, 1885,” 
identifies individuals who received financial compensation for various forms of federal service. 
Balances Due to and From the United States, supra note 274, at 1 (internal quotations omitted). 
In seeking out and reviewing these additional sources, I have made every effort to ensure 
accuracy, but it is possible that omissions and other inaccuracies remain. 
 274. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 2d Cong. (1st Sess. 1792), at 95–96. 
 275. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 1st Cong. (1st Sess. 1789), at 33–34. 
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of the United States. 
Second, seven of the remaining eleven cases were recess 
appointments that do not reveal the Administration’s position on 
unilateral, nonrecess cases. If anything, statements from the 
Administration suggest that it viewed the appointments as active only 
until the Senate reconvened. Washington independently appointed 
John Paul Jones to negotiate with the Dey of Algiers, for instance, but 
accepted that Jones’s commission would continue in force “only till the 
next session of the Senate.”276 In a similar spirit, the Administration 
made efforts to ensure that other recess appointees completed their 





 276. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Paul Jones (June 1, 1792), in 24 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1 JUNE–31 DECEMBER 1792, at 3–10 (John Catanzariti ed., 1990). 
 277. See, e.g., No. 66: Morocco & Algiers (Dec. 16, 1793), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE 
PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 288 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., Washington, 
Gales and Seaton 1832) (discussing Thomas Barclay’s assignment to negotiate with Algiers, and 
informing him that “it is expected the objects of your mission will be accomplished . . . [b]efore 
the end of the next session of the Senate”). 
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Private agent Investigation 
(UK) None 
 
 278. Table 1 and the others below exclude five individuals who received ad hoc foreign 
assignments of a nondiplomatic character. The first is Andrew Ellicott, whom Secretary of State 
John Jay sent to Canada to ascertain a meridian line. See Letter from George Washington to 
Henry Knox (Sept. 5, 1789), 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, PRESIDENTIAL SERIES, 
1 JUNE – SEPTEMBER 1789, at 601–03 n.1 (Dorothy Twohig ed., 1989) (noting that Ellicott was 
“appointed for the purpose” of determining the meridian line); see also Prakash & Ramsey, supra 
note 25, at 299 (discussing this precedent as evidence of an original understanding in favor of 
executive control over foreign affairs). The remaining four—Samuel Bayard and Nathaniel 
Higginson in 1794, James Henry in 1805, and Hugh Lennox in 1806—went overseas to assist 
American merchants who had suffered property loss and impressment at the hands of the British 
navy. See David L. Sterling, A Federalist Opposes the Jay Treaty: The Letters of Samuel Bayard, 
18 WM. & MARY Q. 408, 408–10 (1961) (describing Bayard’s role as “unofficial spokesman of 
American merchants whose ships had been confiscated by Great Britain early in the wars of the 
French Revolution” and recounting Bayard’s efforts to obtain relief for the merchants from 
British courts); see also 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 382–400, 802–20 (1796) (reporting a debate during 
which members of Congress discussed the work of Bayard and Higginson as nondiplomatic in 
character); Letter from James Madison to James Henry (Mar. 25, 1805), in 9 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON 171–72 (Mary A. Hackett et al. eds., 2011) (describing Henry’s duties as 
“altogether confined to the relief of [American] Seamen, who may be left destitute in [Jamaica], 
or who may be impressed”); Letter from James Madison to Hugh Lennox (Mar. 5, 1806), 
FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/02-11-02-0260 [https:// 
perma.cc/DG74-VQ8C] (describing Lennox’s duties as “altogether confined to the relief of 
[American] Seamen, who may be left destitute in [Jamaica], or who may be impressed”). Because 
these five individuals were not public ministers under any fair reading of the law of nations, 
contemporaries did not view the act of appointing them without Senate confirmation as 
constitutionally problematic. See, e.g., 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 382–400, 802–20 (1796) (statement of 
James Madison) (arguing that agents such as Bayard and Higginson “were neither Ambassadors, 
public Ministers, nor Consuls,” and “would have no rank as public characters, but be mere 
agents”). Table 1 also excludes an Appendix C entry for Rufus King, who was appointed as 
minister plenipotentiary to the United Kingdom in 1796. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 1st Cong. (1st Sess. 
1796), at 209. Although President Washington reportedly appointed King to “conclude a treaty 
of commerce with Great Britain, and to modify or extend Jay’s Treaty,” EXEC. REP. NO. 3 app. 
C (1888), in 8 COMPILATION OF REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra 
note 273, at 337, the Senate Executive Journal suggests that King served as a resident ambassador 
to the United Kingdom in pursuing that objective, rather than as an ad hoc agent. S. EXEC. 
JOURNAL, 1st Cong. (1st Sess. 1796), at 209. I therefore excluded King from the list. 
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Method Rank Purpose Other Office Held 
Benjamin 
Lincoln279 








Collector of Port 
of Boston and 
Charlestown280 











































 279. The 1789 appointments of Benjamin Lincoln, Cyrus Griffin, and David Humphreys are 
not listed in Appendix C, but are documented at S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 1st Cong. (2d Sess. 1789), at 
19. 
 280. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 1st Cong. (1st Sess. 1789), at 13. 
 281. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 1st Cong. (2d Sess. 1790), at 57. 
 282. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 1st Cong. (1st Sess. 1789), at 26. 
 283. This case was not listed in the Committee’s report but is documented at S. EXEC. 
JOURNAL, 1st Cong. (3d Sess. 1791), at 74–75. 
 284. No. 66: Morocco & Algiers (Dec. 16, 1793), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: 
FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 277, at 288. 
 285. The committee’s report does not identify recess appointments, so I identified them by 
reference to a list of the session dates of Congress. See Dates of Sessions of the Congress, U.S. 
SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/reference/Sessions/sessionDates.htm [https://perma.cc/XR9M-
QM37].  
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 286. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 1st Cong. (1st Sess. 1789), at 13. 
 287. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 2d Cong. (3d Sess. 1793), at 135–36. 
 288. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 2d Cong. (1st Sess. 1791), at 86, 88. 
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 289. See Treaty of Peace and Amity, U.S.-Algiers, Sept. 5, 1795, 8 Stat. 133 (describing 
Donaldson’s appointment); see also PETER P. HILL, JOEL BARLOW: AMERICAN DIPLOMAT AND 
NATION BUILDER 42–46 (2012) (discussing Donaldson’s assignment). 
 290. See No. 109: Algiers (Feb. 15, 1796), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, supra note 277, at 528–29.  
 291. See Treaty of Peace and Friendship, U.S.-Tripoli, Nov. 4, 1796, 18 Stat. 755 (describing 
the appointment). 
 292. See id. (same); see also HILL, supra note 289, at 41–73 (discussing Barlow’s assignment). 
 293. This case was not in the Committee’s report but is documented at S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 
4th Cong. (1st Sess. 1796), at 204–05. The same is true of the contemporaneous cases of Thomas 
Fitzsimons, James Innes, Christopher Gore, and William Pinkney. Id. These five individuals 
served as commissioners under Jay’s Treaty, which explicitly required that their appointments 
occur “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.” Treaty of Amity Commerce and 
Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., arts. 5–7, Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116, reprinted in 2 TREATIES AND 
OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 245, 249 (Hunter Miller ed., 1931). 
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Thomas 
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U.S. Attorney for 
District of New 
Jersey296 









This leaves only four cases of executive unilateralism: In 1791, 
Washington designated David Humphreys to deliver confidential 
instructions to the American chargé d’affaires at Madrid and a 
 
 294. No. 115: Great Britain (May 5, 1796), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: 
FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 277, at 552. 
 295. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 4th Cong. (1st Sess. 1796), at 208. 
 296. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 1st Cong. (3d Sess. 1791), at 64–65. 
 297. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 4th Cong. (2d Sess. 1797), at 229, 232. 
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proposal regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations to the 
prime minister of Portugal.298 In the mid-1790s, Secretary of State 
Edmund Randolph authorized David Humphreys to employ consuls 
Joseph Donaldson and Joel Barlow as treaty negotiators with the 
Barbary Powers.299 And in 1796, Washington commissioned Secretary 
of State Timothy Pickering to negotiate an explanatory article to Jay’s 
Treaty, without first nominating Pickering to serve as a negotiator.300 
These cases complicate the task of ascertaining the official 
understanding because they seem to depart from the dominant 
pattern—the Senate was in session in each case, but the president did 
not seek advice and consent. 
The question, then, is whether there is anything about these 
appointments that might have led the Administration to conclude that 
Senate confirmation was unnecessary. For two of the cases, the answer 
seems apparent: First, Humphreys likely did not qualify as a public 
minister under the law of nations. Unlike many of his contemporaries, 
he served in secret.301 Vattel, among others, was clear in suggesting that 
secret ministers whose diplomatic character was known to the receiving 
government but hidden from the public at large were not public 
ministers.302 Second, because the Senate had already confirmed 
Pickering to a cabinet-level diplomatic office,303 there is a fair argument 
that additional advice and consent was unnecessary. Indeed, it has long 
been accepted that a separate appointment is unnecessary when 
Congress tasks an incumbent officer with new duties that are 
 
 298. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 1st Cong. (3d Sess. 1791), at 74–75. 
 299. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2235–36 (1797). 
 300. See No. 115: Great Britain (May 5, 1796), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: 
FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 277, at 552 (entrusting Pickering with the “full power . . . to 
negotiate and agree” on an explanatory article so as to rectify any misunderstandings about the 
treaty in an “expedient” manner). 
 301. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 1st Cong. (3d Sess. 1791), at 74–75. (describing the mission as 
“confidential”). 
 302. VATTEL, supra note 81, at 485 (“Sometimes princes send to each other secret ministers, 
whose character is not public. If a minister of this kind be insulted by a person unacquainted with 
his character, such insult is no violation of the law of nations.”); see also CALLIÉRES, supra note 
205, at 68 (distinguishing “private [e]nvoys” from public envoys and defining the former as those 
“who have only private Audiences of the Kings, or other Sovereigns, with whom they treat” 
(emphasis omitted)); MARTENS, supra note 224, at 261 (using the term “secret embassy” to 
describe the mission of a person sent abroad by a sovereign “to treat in secret of some affair of 
importance or that requires dispatch, without giving him the quality of minister, or, at least, 
without permitting him to assume it openly, till the object of his mission is out danger” 
(capitalization modified from original)). 
 303. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 3d Cong. (2d Sess. 1795), at 193. 
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“germane” to his or her original appointment.304 The Washington 
Administration and Senate may have similarly reasoned that there is 
no need for a separate confirmation process when the president assigns 
to an incumbent diplomat additional duties that are germane to his 
original post, or to diplomatic service more generally. 
The cases of Donaldson and Barlow require more explanation. In 
1793, the Washington Administration assigned Humphreys, its acting 
minister resident in Portugal, to negotiate a peace treaty with 
Algiers.305 Humphreys, however, was reluctant to carry out the mission 
himself, so he requested the appointment of someone else to pursue 
the negotiations in his stead.306 The Administration responded not by 
appointing a new commissioner, but rather by granting Humphreys 
authority to employ others to act on his behalf.307 Pursuant to this 
authorization, Humphreys employed Joseph Donaldson, an obscure 
official from the Treasury Department, and Joel Barlow, an old friend 
who had been living in Paris, to negotiate with Algiers.308 Humphreys 
also employed Barlow to negotiate treaties with Tripoli and Tunis, and 
Barlow in turn delegated the negotiations with Tripoli to Richard 
O’Brien, an American who had previously been held captive at 
Algiers, and the negotiations with Tunis to a French merchant named 
Joseph Stephen Famin.309 Around the same time, the Administration 
sought and obtained Senate confirmation for the appointment of 
Donaldson as consul at Tripoli and Tunis, and for the appointment of 
Barlow as consul general at Algiers.310 But treaty negotiation is a classic 
function of public ministers, not consuls, and the Administration did 
not pursue an appointment of any kind for O’Brien or Famin. How can 
we reconcile these cases with the rest? 
 
 304. See Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 301 (1893) (“[W]e do not think that, 
because additional duties, germane to the offices already held by them, were devolved upon them 
by the act, it was necessary that they should be again appointed by the President and confirmed 
by the Senate.”); see also Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 174–75 (1994) (applying this test).  
 305. Frank E. Ross, The Mission of Joseph Donaldson, Jr., to Algiers, 1795–97, 7 J. MOD. HIST. 
422, 422 (1935). 
 306. The primary reason appears to have been concern about his personal safety. HILL, supra 
note 289, at 37.  
 307. No. 109: Algiers (Feb. 15, 1796), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, supra note 277, at 528–29. 
 308. HILL, supra note 289, at 29–50. 
 309. Id. at 51–73; RICHARD B. PARKER, UNCLE SAM IN BARBARY: A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 
133–34 (2004). 
 310. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 4th Cong. (Special Sess. 1795), at 179–80; S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 4th 
Cong. (2d Sess. 1797), at 288.  
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There are a few possibilities. Part of the answer seems to be that 
the irregularities were just that—irregular, rather than evidence of a 
constitutional norm. Additionally, it does not appear that the 
Administration specifically authorized Barlow’s decision to rely upon 
O’Brien and Famin.311 To that extent, Barlow’s action warrants little if 
any weight as evidence of a broader understanding. Finally, the 
Administration may have viewed Senate advice and consent to the 
consular appointments as a sufficient substitute for advice and consent 
to ministerial appointments. Both, after all, are procedurally identical 
in giving the Senate an opportunity to vet nominees and comment on 
their proposed assignments. In this sense, the cases of Donaldson and 
Barlow do not demonstrate an early norm of executive unilateralism. 
The Administration may have reasoned that, by designating these 
agents as consuls, it could avoid signaling a normalization of relations 
with the Barbary Powers while also respecting the Senate’s role in 
foreign-affairs appointments. 
In any event, Washington’s immediate successors followed the 
broader pattern that he established. As shown in Table 2, John Adams 
typically sought and obtained Senate confirmation for the sixteen ad 
hoc diplomats that he appointed.312 The minority of cases in which he 
acted on his own involved either a recess appointment or an individual 
who was already serving abroad as a public minister.313 As shown in 
Table 3, the same is true of Thomas Jefferson, who adhered to the 
established pattern up through his last relevant appointment in 1806,314 
the sole exception being the 1804 appointments of Daniel Smith and 
Return Meigs as commissioners to negotiate a treaty of cession with 
the Cherokee Indians,315 which I address below. 
Many of these were high-profile cases. John Jay was serving as an 
envoy extraordinary when he negotiated with Great Britain to 
 
 311. See PARKER, supra note 309, at 148–51. 
 312. This table is based on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s 1888 report. See S. 
EXEC. REP. NO. 3 app. C (1888), in 8 COMPILATION OF REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 273, at 337–38. 
 313. See id. (identifying the other offices held by appointed diplomats).  
 314. See id. at 338 (identifying diplomats appointed during Adams’s term); see also Letter 
from William Pinkney to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 13, 1806), FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-01-02-3410 [https://perma.cc/RW2X-3XSH] 
(discussing the assignment). 
 315. See No. 109: Cherokees and Others (Dec. 23, 1805), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE 
PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS 699 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., Washington, 
Gales & Seaton 1832) (discussing the appointments of Smith and Meigs). 
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conclude the treaty that came to bear his name.316 Ad hoc 
appointments during the Adams Administration included Charles C. 
Pinckney, John Marshall, and Elbridge Gerry, whose joint commission 
to negotiate with the French culminated in the notorious XYZ 
Affair.317 And Thomas Jefferson nominated Robert Livingston and 
James Monroe to negotiate the Louisiana Purchase.318 From a legal 
perspective, this is sensible only if such individuals were understood as 





 316. See S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 3d Cong. (2d Sess. 1794), at 152 (recording Senate approval of 
Jay’s appointment as envoy extraordinary). 
 317. See No. 139: France (Apr. 3, 1798), reprinted in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, supra note 277, at 153. 
 318. See S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 9th Cong. (1st Sess. 1805), at 36–38. 
 319. The evidence also suggests a different way to think about the Senate’s original role in 
treaty-making. There is a common narrative that although President Washington initially 
obtained advice and consent by consulting the Senate on treaty content both prior to and after 
negotiations, he quickly abandoned this practice and adopted the now-familiar approach whereby 
the president seeks advice and consent only after the negotiations are complete. Jean Galbraith 
has shown that this narrative overstates the speed with which the Washington Administration 
moved away from the practice of prenegotiation advice and consent. See Jean Galbraith, 
Prospective Advice and Consent, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 247, 258–59 (2012). Yet it also overstates its 
case by overlooking how Presidents Washington, Adams, and Jefferson consistently sought advice 
and consent in appointing treaty negotiators. This practice gave the Senate an additional 
opportunity to influence how and even whether planned negotiations should proceed.  
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 320. Appendix C seems to suggest that Charles Pinckney, John Marshall, and Elbridge Gerry 
jointly and severally held the office of envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to France 
prior to and at the time of an additional set of ad hoc appointments in June of 1797. EXEC. REP. 
NO. 3 app. C (1888), in 8 COMPILATION OF REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, supra note 273, at 337. This is either an error or ambiguous drafting. The Senate 
Executive Journal shows that President Washington appointed Pinckney as minister 
plenipotentiary to France, with the advice and consent of the Senate, in late December of 1796. 
S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 4th Cong. (2d Sess. 1796), at 217. But the Journal does not identify Pinckney 
as an “envoy extraordinary” in this initial appointment, id., and the appointment appears to have 
terminated in February of 1797—roughly four months prior to Pinckney’s ad hoc appointment to 
serve alongside John Marshall and Elbridge Gerry. See John LaFayette Brittain, Two Recently 
Discovered Letters of Charles Cotesworth Pinckney: Another Glimpse into the Mind of an 
Eighteenth Century Man of Affairs, 76 S. CAR. HIST. MAG. 12, 13 (1975) (discussing Pinckney’s 
departure from France in February 1797). In addition, the Journal contains no record of 
diplomatic appointments for John Marshall or Elbridge Gerry that predate the ad hoc 
appointments of June 1797. I have modified Table 2 accordingly. 
 321. It appears that the President obtained the Senate’s advice and consent to this 
appointment, but only after issuing full powers for Adams to negotiate. Compare No. 155: Prussia 
(Dec. 6, 1799), reprinted in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 277, 
at 250 (explaining, in an instruction dated July 15, 1797, that “full powers are herewith 
transmitted” for Adams to negotiate with Sweden) with S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 5th Cong. (2d Sess. 
1798), at 265–66 (reporting that the Senate confirmed Adams on March 14, 1798). 
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 322. See LANMAN, supra note 273, at 610–11 (reporting this appointment). 
 323. See id. (reporting this appointment).  
 324. See id. (reporting this appointment).  
 325. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 5th Cong. (3d Sess. 1799), at 311–12. 
 326. Appendix C reports that the appointment occurred on February 26, 1799, but the Senate 
Executive Journal makes clear that it occurred on February 27th. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 5th Cong. 
(3d Sess. 1799), at 318. 
 327. This negotiation concerned the settlement of a claim against the Netherlands for the 
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unlawful seizure of an American ship and culminated in the nation’s first sole executive 
agreement. See Letter from Maarten van der Goes to William Vans Murray (Dec. 7, 1799), 
reprinted in 5 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 1075–78 (Hunter Miller ed., 1937). This suggests an understanding that the Senate 
confirmation requirement was not limited to Article II treaties. 
 328. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 6th Cong. (1st Sess. 1799), at 325–26. 
 329. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 5th Cong. (2d Sess. 1798), at 292. 
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 330. As with Tables 1 and 2, I have resolved any discrepancies between Appendix C and the 
Senate Executive Journal in favor of the latter, given that Journal entries were created closer in 
time to the relevant appointments. 
 331. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 7th Cong. (1st Sess. 1802), at 408–09. 
 332. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 7th Cong. (2d Sess. 1803), at 432, 436. 
 333. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 7th Cong. (1st Sess. 1802), at 404. 
 334. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 7th Cong. (2d Sess. 1803), at 431. 
 335. Appendix C suggests that King was appointed as a minister plenipotentiary, but the 
Senate Executive Journal shows that he was appointed as a commissioner. See S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 
7th Cong. (2d Sess. 1803), at 432, 437. 
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 336. LANMAN, supra note 273, at 610. 
 337. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 8th Cong. (1st Sess. 1803), at 452–53, 455. 
 338. The appointments of Smith and Meigs were omitted from the 1888 report. 
 339. Jefferson sought and obtained Senate confirmation for Monroe’s appointment once the 
Senate reconvened a few weeks later. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 8th Cong. (2d Sess. 1804), at 471–74. 
 340. Appendix C seems to suggest that the ad hoc appointments of James Monroe and 
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Two official opinions from members of Washington’s cabinet also 
touched upon the issue of diplomatic appointments. Though their 
relevance is more attenuated, these opinions are compatible with the 
dominant pattern. First, in 1790, as Congress debated legislation to 
fund the American diplomatic corps, Washington asked Jefferson for 
his views on whether it would be permissible for the legislation to 
dictate the ranks and destinations of those who would serve abroad.341 
Jefferson responded that such provisions would be invalid. Because the 
Constitution assigns to the president power over the “transaction of 
business with foreign nations,” Congress has no authority to make 
decisions about where to send diplomats or the rank with which to send 
them.342 Jefferson acknowledged that Article II gives the Senate a role 
in the making of treaties and appointments, but argued that such 
powers “are to be construed strictly.”343 One might interpret such 
language as evidence that Jefferson would have strictly construed the 
term “public Ministers” in the Appointments Clause to exclude all ad 
hoc diplomats, thus denying the Senate’s power to confirm them.344 
This, however, assumes there was sufficient uncertainty about the 
status of ad hoc diplomats to render such a construction plausible. The 
evidence discussed above suggests otherwise. Jefferson’s opinion, 
moreover, used the seemingly expansive term “foreign Agent” as the 
equivalent of “ambassadors[,] other public ministers[,] and consuls,”345 
and in doing so left open the possibility that the Appointments Clause 
 
William Pinkney occurred during the recess of the Senate, and that both individuals were at the 
time already serving as minister plenipotentiary to the United Kingdom. EXEC. REP. NO. 3 app. 
C (1888), in 8 COMPILATION OF REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra 
note 273, at 338. The Senate Executive Journal, however, suggests that this is substantially 
incorrect. While the Journal makes clear that James Monroe was minister plenipotentiary to the 
United Kingdom at the time of his additional appointment, S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 9th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 1806), at 35, William Pinkney did not become minister plenipotentiary to the United 
Kingdom until 1808, S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 10th Cong. (1st Sess. 1808), at 71. In addition, the Journal 
shows that the Senate confirmed both nominations. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 9th Cong. (1st Sess. 1806), 
at 35. 
 341. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 25, at 305–06 (discussing these events). 
 342. Jefferson’s Opinion on the Powers of the Senate Respecting Diplomatic Appointments 
(Apr. 24, 1790), in 16 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 30 NOVEMBER 1789 TO 4 JULY 1790, 
at 378–82 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1961). 
 343. Id. 
 344. Cf. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 25, at 309–10 (suggesting this interpretation). 
 345. Jefferson’s Opinion on the Powers of the Senate Respecting Diplomatic Appointments, 
supra note 342, at 378–79 (“The Constitution . . . gives the nomination of the foreign Agent to the 
President, the appointment to him and the Senate jointly, the commissioning to the President.”). 
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requires Senate confirmation for a wide variety of foreign 
representatives. 
Second, Attorney General William Bradford touched upon the 
meaning of public ministers in a 1794 opinion addressing whether 
rioting outside the house of the British consul in Norfolk, Virginia 
violated the Crimes Act of 1790 as a form of “violence to the person of 
an ambassador or other public minister.”346 According to Bradford, the 
riot was not an offence within the meaning of the statute. A consul, he 
explained, “is not considered [a public minister] by the writers on the 
law of nations, because he is not in any degree invested with the 
representative character; and it has, more than once, been judicially 
determined that he is not entitled to the privileges attached to the 
person of every public minister.”347 Thus, the statutory meaning of 
“public minister” was a matter of international law, which defined the 
term to refer to agents who represent the prince vis-à-vis foreign actors 
(principally sovereign states). This definition would seem to include 
many irregular envoys, who represented the president in matters 
ranging from treaty negotiations to official ceremonies. Clearly, 
Bradford’s opinion interpreted a statute rather than the Constitution, 
but there is no evidence that the framers envisioned a different 
approach to the Appointments Clause, which used the same 
terminology, and as shown above, officials argued consistently that the 
constitutional meaning of “public Ministers” hinges on the law of 
nations.348 
3. Debates in Congress.  Early members of the House of 
Representatives generally agreed that the appointment of ad hoc 
diplomats, at least in the form of treaty negotiators, requires Senate 
confirmation. For instance, in a 1789 debate over a bill providing for 
the compensation of commissioners to negotiate a peace treaty with 
the Creek Indians, participants uniformly endorsed the view that 
advice and consent was necessary for the appointment of the 
commissioners qua negotiators.349 According to Representative 
Theodore Sedgwick, “no one ever doubted but the President, by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, could employ what and as 
 
 346. Respect Due to Consuls, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 41, 42 (1794) (emphasis omitted) (quoting An 
Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9, § 28, 1 Stat. 112, 118 
(1790)).  
 347. Id. 
 348. See supra notes 271–72 (citing examples). 
 349. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 716–30 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (recording the debate). 
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many negotiators as he pleased.”350 Representative Michael Stone 
concurred: “There was no doubt entertained that the President, with 
the Senate, might appoint the commissioners, and empower them to 
negotiate.”351 Legislators expressed these views even though the 
appointments in question were “a mere temporary expedient.”352 
Other members of Congress took the same position months later in a 
debate over a bill to authorize the creation of a contingent fund for 
foreign relations.353 
In a more subtle way, the same understanding also surfaced in an 
important debate over the implementation of Jay’s Treaty. In March 
of 1796, Representative Edward Livingston proposed a resolution 
 
 350. Id. at 717. 
 351. Id. 
 352. Id. at 721. 
 353. See 12 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA: 4 MARCH 1789–3 MARCH 1791, at 77 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1994) 
(statement of Rep. Laurance) (arguing that “there was a constitutional necessity that the 
president, by and with the consent of the senate, should appoint all the officers employed in 
foreign negociations; the same necessity existed with respect to making treaties”); id. at 79 
(statement of Rep. Sherman) (“The establishment of every treaty requires the voice of the senate, 
as does the appointment of every officer for conducting the business; these two objects are 
expressly provided for in the constitution, and they lead me to believe, that the two bodies ought 
to act jointly in every transaction which respects the business of negociation with foreign 
powers.”). During this debate, Representative William L. Smith made an observation that has 
attracted the attention of modern legal scholars. According to Smith: 
Many officers may be established in the diplomatique line, without being concerned in 
making treaties: A minister may reside twenty years in France without being employed 
in the formation of any treaty whatever. A treaty may be negociated without the 
intervention of any person in such a character; or a person may be employed distinct 
from him, as was the case in the late commercial treaty between France and Great 
Britain. 
Id. at 79–80. Saikrishna Prakash and Michael Ramsey interpret this statement as evidence of an 
original understanding that the president holds power to appoint “special envoys not confirmed 
by the Senate.” Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 25, at 304. I disagree insofar as they use the term 
“special envoys” to include anyone who would have qualified as a public minister under the law 
of nations. My view is that when Representative Smith stated that a “treaty may be negociated 
without the intervention of any person in such a character,” he was referring to the specific 
character of a resident diplomat rather than the more general character of a public minister, and 
was thus making the point that nonresident ministers can negotiate treaties, just like their resident 
counterparts. From such a position, it does not follow that he believed in an independent 
presidential power to appoint nonresident ministers as negotiators. This interpretation better 
aligns with the overwhelming weight of the evidence, including the statements of other members 
of Congress and the practice whereby early presidents consistently sought advice and consent for 
the appointment of negotiators. See supra Tables 1–3; see also Powers of the Executive, 1 U.S. 
Op. Att’y Gen. 65, 65–66 (1796) (concluding that the “President alone, and without the advice of 
the Senate, cannot appoint a commissioner to hold or make a treaty with an Indian tribe” because 
the authority of the United States “cannot be bestowed on any person but by the President, with 
the advice of the Senate”).  
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requesting that the President provide “a copy of the instructions to the 
Minister of the United States, who negotiated the Treaty . . . together 
with the correspondence and other documents relative to the said 
Treaty.”354 Livingston and other Democratic-Republicans supported 
this measure as a means of obtaining information that would help the 
House to evaluate the treaty’s constitutionality, decide on the manner 
of legislative implementation, and interpret unclear terms.355 They also 
argued repeatedly that access to the records would facilitate a 
determination on whether John Jay might have violated his negotiating 
instructions, received improper gifts, or otherwise acted in a way that 
would warrant impeachment.356 In making these arguments, the 
legislators clearly assumed that Jay qualified as a public minister and 
officer of the United States in his capacity as special envoy and 
negotiator: The resolution itself described Jay as a “Minister,”357 and 
participants uniformly referred to him as an “officer.”358 Moreover, 
given the language of the Constitution, which provides only for the 
impeachment of the “President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of 
the United States,” the suggestion of even the mere possibility of 
impeaching Jay qua negotiator necessarily relied on the premise that 
he was an officer in that role.359 Over the course of an entire month of 
discussion, opponents denounced the resolution repeatedly and on a 
variety of grounds, including by arguing that there was no apparent 
reason to believe that Jay had engaged in conduct that might warrant 
impeachment.360 Not a single person, however, questioned that Jay 
qualified as a public minister and officer, or that impeachment was a 
theoretical option, even if unwarranted on the facts.361 Immediately 
after the resolution passed, President Washington declined to provide 
the requested documents, but not because he understood the 
Constitution to preclude the impeachment of a special envoy as a type 
of non-officer.362 Instead, he emphasized simply that the resolution had 
failed to identify impeachment as its purpose.363 
 
 354. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 426 (1796). 
 355. See, e.g., id. at 426–27, 436, 448 (statements of Reps. Livingston, Gallatin, and Harper).  
 356. Id. at 427, 444, 446–47, 501, 556–57, 575, 601, 629. 
 357. Id. at 426. 
 358. See, e.g., id. at 427, 444 (statements of Reps. Livingston and Nicholas).  
 359. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 360. See, e.g., 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 646 (1796) (statement of Rep. Williams). 
 361. Id. at 760. 
 362. Id. 
 363. Id. 
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One can only imagine that legislators operated on a similar 
understanding when they passed the Crimes Act of 1790. As explained 
above, this statute prohibited arrest and service of process against “the 
person of any Ambassador or other public minister of any foreign 
Prince or State authorised and received as such by the President of the 
United States, or domestic or domestic servant of any such 
Ambassador or other public minster.”364 Thus, if contemporaries 
generally understood the term “public ministers” to exclude all special 
envoys, the statute would have criminalized acts against resident 
ministers—along with their servants—while categorically failing to 
prohibit acts against special envoys. Such an interpretation seems 
tenuous at best. There was “little reported debate” on the Act,365 but 
there is no apparent reason to believe that its drafters desired such 
differential treatment. Because both categories of diplomats were 
protected by the law of nations, and because acts against either could 
easily complicate foreign relations,366 the most sensible conclusion is 
that legislators understood the statutory protection as applicable to 
resident and irregular envoys alike. 
To be clear, Congress did not view involvement in work of an 
international character as independently sufficient to qualify an 
individual as a public minister, and this was true even when the work 
was to be performed at the arrangement of the U.S. government. Most 
legislators appear to have been comfortable with the idea that 
something more was necessary to trigger the requirement of advice and 
consent. This much was apparent in early 1796, when the House of 
Representatives debated a bill authorizing the appointment of agents 
to travel abroad and provide relief and protection to American sailors 
who had been seized on the high seas.367 The task of these agents was 
threefold: 
[1] to inquire into the situation of such American citizens or others, 
sailing, conformably to the law of nations, under the protection of the 
American flag, as have been, or may hereafter be impressed or 
detained by any foreign power; [2] to endeavor, by all legal means, to 
obtain the release of such American citizens or others, as aforesaid; 
[and 3] to render an account of all impressments and detentions 
 
 364. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 25, 1 Stat. 112 (spelling modified from original).  
 365. David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First Congress, 
1789–1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 828 (1994). 
 366. See supra Part III.A.  
 367. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 802–21 (1796). 
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whatever, from American vessels, to the executive of the United 
States.368 
Given these purposes, a number of legislators opposed the bill on the 
view that the agents would be public ministers whose appointments 
required Senate advice and consent but not statutory authorization.369 
The majority, however, rejected this position. As James Madison 
explained, “the agents proposed to be appointed in th[e] bill were 
neither Ambassadors, public Ministers, nor Consuls.”370 The majority 
concurred in light of the nondiplomatic nature of the mission.371 
Representative William Giles, for example, emphasized that the agents 
were not public ministers because “[t]hey would not have the smallest 
relation to foreign Powers; they would be appointed to attend to their 
own citizens, and the only thing in which they could have any 
resemblance to Ministers was their residence in a foreign country.”372 
Operating on this premise, the House passed the bill creating the 
offices in question.373 
4. Early Dictionaries.  Early American dictionaries suggest that 
popular usage approximated the official understanding. None of these 
particular sources appear to have included a separate entry for “public 
minister,” but they identified one meaning of “minister” as the 
functional equivalent and did so in a way that seemed to include a wide 
variety of actors.374 For instance, William Perry’s Royal Standard 
English Dictionary defined “minister” simply to be “an agent from a 
foreign power.”375 More precisely, Noah Webster’s American 
Dictionary of the English Language defined “minister” to mean “[a] 
delegate; an embassador; the representative of a sovereign at a foreign 
court; usually such as is resident at a foreign court, but not restricted to 
such.”376 This source is particularly noteworthy because the Supreme 
 
 368. An Act for the Relief and Protection of American Seamen, ch. 36, § 1, 1 Stat. 477 (1796).  
 369. See, e.g., 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 815, 817–18 (1796) (statements of Reps. Sitgreaves, 
Murray, and Sedgwick). 
 370. Id. at 813.  
 371. See id. at 802–21 (reporting the debate). 
 372. Id. at 819; see also id. at 817, 820 (statements of Reps. Nicholas and Gallatin). 
 373. Id. at 820. 
 374. I limit the discussion to the two American dictionaries that are available online and 
discussed in Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to Using Dictionaries from the Founding Era to 
Determine the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 358, 386, 389–90 
(2014).  
 375. Minister, THE ROYAL STANDARD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Worcester 1st Am. ed., 1788). 
 376. Minister, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828). 
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Court has cited it on a number of occasions as evidence of original 
meaning,377 and because its definition of “minister” explicitly included 
nonresident diplomats.378 Insofar as nonresident service equated with 
ad hoc diplomacy, Webster’s dictionary corroborates the view that, as 
a matter of popular understanding, there was no necessary durational 
component to the office of public minister. 
5. Additional Context.  Finally, several background conditions 
suggest that the framers would have viewed many unilateral 
appointments as problematic. One is the nature of diplomatic 
representation in the eighteenth century. Every indication is that both 
resident and irregular representatives were known to wield significant 
power. As many of the foregoing examples illustrate, they negotiated 
treaties, mediated weighty matters of war and peace, and interfaced 
with foreign heads of state. Predating both summit diplomacy and 
international news media, they served as critical sources of information 
for their sending governments.379 Predating the rise of diplomacy as a 
profession in the United States,380 their appointments were viewed at 
times in political and sectional terms.381 Moreover, given the state of 
transatlantic communication in the late eighteenth century, when it 
 
 377. See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2561 (2014) (citing the American 
Dictionary of the English Language in interpreting the Appointments Clause); see also Maggs, 
supra note 374 at 389–90 (discussing the American Dictionary of the English Language as potential 
evidence of original meaning).  
 378. Minister, supra note 376. 
 379. Cf. JENNIFER MORI, THE CULTURE OF DIPLOMACY: BRITAIN IN EUROPE, C. 1750–1830, 
at 120–21 (2010) (discussing how the rise of ministerial diplomacy in the early nineteenth century 
marginalized envoys by limiting their autonomous powers to make policy and their opportunities 
to interface with heads of state). 
 380. BLACK, supra note 146, at 130 (explaining that the American diplomatic service 
“retained a relatively amateurish approach until the reforms of the 1940s”). 
 381. The most salient example at the Founding was John Jay’s appointment to negotiate a 
treaty with Spain in 1786. Sectional interests in the negotiations diverged sharply, with northern 
states hoping to secure trade liberalization and southern states hoping to obtain a promise of 
freedom of navigation on the Mississippi River. KLARMAN, supra note 120, at 48–69. After 
encountering Spanish intransigence on the latter issue, Jay advocated for Congress to abandon 
an instruction to insist upon freedom of navigation, and focus instead on obtaining a commercial 
agreement. Id. at 56–58. This outraged southern leaders, who accused Jay—a New Yorker—of 
sectional bias and proposed that the negotiation take place in Europe, “where they anticipated 
that Jefferson, the minister to France, would do a better job than Jay of protecting southern 
interests.” Id. at 65; see also GILBERT, supra note 137 at 80 (recounting how the Confederation 
Congress appointed multiple agents to “a single diplomatic mission, in order to reflect the 
differing opinions in Congress”); KAPLAN, supra note 139 at 123–25, 207–08 (discussing the 
political orientations of early diplomats such as John Adams, Thomas Pinckney, and Thomas 
Jefferson, and the influence of those orientations on their work). 
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took weeks to transmit instructions, they were forced at times to make 
important and controversial decisions without official guidance.382 
Diplomats of all varieties thus played a critical role in the execution 
and even the development of foreign policy. This context makes it 
harder to imagine the framers dividing the power to appoint all 
resident diplomats while granting to the president alone the equally 
significant and in many ways functionally identical power to appoint all 
special envoys. Such differential treatment would have likely been 
viewed as arbitrary, given the significance of many ad hoc assignments 
and the purposes of the Appointments Clause. 
Another condition is the nature of early consular work. Duties 
included reporting political and commercial intelligence to the 
Secretary of State, notifying U.S. merchants of the advent of war, 
receiving protests on maritime matters, helping to settle the estates of 
Americans who died abroad, and assisting stranded or shipwrecked 
vessels and their crews.383 It is difficult to imagine why the framers 
would have cared to subject the appointments of these officers to a 
requirement of Senate confirmation, but not the appointments of 
special envoys responsible for such consequential tasks as negotiating 
treaties and communicating with heads of state. Counter-intuitively, 
the orthodox view has the framers categorically subjecting some 
mundane appointments to shared authority while permitting the 
president alone to make many appointments of great significance.384 
Lastly, consider again the original trepidation over foreign 
relations. As explained earlier,385 some of the most influential framers 
viewed diplomatic relations as a risky endeavor and something to be 
undertaken with great care, if not avoided altogether.386 It seems 
 
 382. BLACK, supra note 146, at 97, 120; LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY 
IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 128–30 (1948). 
 383. See Letter XLI—Circular to Consuls (Aug. 26, 1790), in 17 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, 6 JULY – 3 NOV. 1790, at 423–25 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1965) (discussing consular 
duties); see also An Act Concerning Consuls and Vice-Consuls, §§ 2–7, 1 Stat. 254, 255–56 (1792) 
(same).  
 384. As Jennifer Mascott has shown, there is substantial evidence that the original 
understanding of “Officers of the United States” also extended to positions with even less 
responsibility than consuls, such as account-keeping clerks, certain personnel tasked with customs 
enforcement, lieutenants in the military, and interpreters. See generally Jennifer L. Mascott, Who 
are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443 (2018). This understanding would seem 
to render unilateral diplomatic appointments even more problematic, given the importance of the 
work in question. 
 385. See supra Part III.A. 
 386. This sentiment was influential—even if less than universally held—throughout the 
Founding era. For example, in early 1798, members of Congress engaged in an extended debate 
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plausible and even likely that those who held this concern would have 
preferred to subject diplomatic appointments of all kinds to the shared 
authority of the president and the Senate. To permit the president to 
make unilateral appointments of the ad hoc variety would have been 
to remove a significant procedural restraint on the risk of entanglement 
with European and other powers. 
F. Responding to the Orthodox View 
For the most part, analyses in favor of unilateral ad hoc diplomacy 
simply ignore the evidence presented above. Even while arguing in part 
on the basis of original meaning, neither OLC nor commentators have 
acknowledged the significance of the Diplomatic Privileges Act of 
1708, Barbuit’s Case, writers such as Wicquefort, early dictionaries, the 
pattern whereby presidents submitted most special diplomatic 
appointments to the Senate, or the background conditions that would 
have made this pattern normatively attractive. The evidence cited in 
favor of unilateral appointments is incomplete at best. 
That evidence, moreover, is problematic even on its own terms. 
Consider this: In 1789, President Washington designated Gouverneur 
Morris to undertake a mission to London, where Morris was to inquire 
informally about British intentions to comply with certain provisions 
of the Treaty of Paris, the possibility of negotiating a treaty of 
commerce, and the future commissioning of a resident minister to the 
United States.387 OLC characterizes this appointment as evidence of an 
early understanding that an office is a position with continuance or 
duration.388 Yet that interpretation disregards the majority of cases in 
which Washington sought advice and consent for the appointment of 
 
over a proposed measure to reduce appropriations for the salaries of certain American diplomats. 
See 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 848–945, 1083–1216 (1798); 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1217–34 (1798). One 
of the primary questions was whether it was constitutional for the House of Representatives to 
utilize its appropriations power to control the president’s ability to dispatch public ministers. 
While the participants disagreed on the resolution of this question, several congressmen on both 
sides concurred that maintaining diplomatic relations with European powers was generally 
dangerous and less than ideal. A number opined that the United States would be better off 
without any public ministers. See, e.g., 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 851–53, 886, 906, 916–18, 930, 933, 
1088 (1798).  
 387. See Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, supra 
note 16, at 102; 1 JARED SPARKS, THE LIFE OF GOUVERNEUR MORRIS 339–47 (Boston, Gray & 
Bowen 1832) (describing the mission in detail).  
 388. Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, supra 
note 16, at 102. 
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ad hoc negotiators.389 The conclusion that better aligns with early 
practice is that Washington appointed Morris on his own authority 
because Morris was not understood to be a public minister. In 
describing the mission, the President emphasized that Morris would 
proceed as a “private Agent” rather than in a public capacity to reduce 
the “risk of humiliation for the administration if the British refused to 
negotiate.”390 As explained above, a number of influential 
commentators took the position that such agents were not public 
ministers insofar as their diplomatic character was hidden from the 
public at large.391 
As “[t]he most prominent early example” in favor of its position, 
OLC also has highlighted a statement in which Alexander Hamilton 
argued that the President held independent power to appoint 
commissioners to resolve claims under the Treaty of Paris.392 
According to Hamilton, the Appointments Clause did not apply to the 
commissioners because they were “not in a strict sense officers,” but 
rather “arbitrators” between the United States and Great Britain.393 
Yet OLC omitted a critical fact: President Washington sought and 
obtained Senate confirmation for the treaty commissioners only two 
months after Hamilton had argued against it.394 Hamilton’s argument 
did not prevail. 
It is possible, of course, that Washington submitted these 
nominations merely as a political courtesy, but the more sensible 
explanation seems to be that the Administration viewed Senate 
confirmation as constitutionally required. This interpretation is 
consistent with the broader confirmation trends identified above, and 
with evidence that commissioners under the Treaty of Paris understood 
 
 389. See supra Table 1. 
 390. Letter from George Washington to Gouverneur Morris (Oct. 13, 1789), in 4 THE PAPERS 
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES, SEPTEMBER 1789–JANUARY 1790, at 179–83 
n.1 (Dorothy Twohig ed., 1993).  
 391. See supra note 306 and accompanying text (citing sources). 
 392. Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, supra 
note 16, at 103. 
 393. Id. (quoting Alexander Hamilton, The Defence No. XXXVII (Jan. 6, 1796), in 20 THE 
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 20 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1974)); see also The Constitutional 
Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, supra note 61, at 146 & n.67 (citing 
Hamilton’s statement as the principal example of a “long historical pedigree” for the notion that 
“members of multinational or international entities who are not appointed to represent the 
United States” need not be confirmed by the Senate, “[a]t least where th[ose] entities are created 
on an ad hoc or temporary basis”). 
 394. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 4th Cong. (2d Sess. 1796), at 204. 
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themselves as public ministers. Shortly after Christopher Gore and 
William Pinkney arrived in London to arbitrate claims in 1796, the 
British government ordered one of them to pay import duties on 
certain items.395 The law of nations clearly exempted public ministers 
from payment, but the British government asserted that the 
commissioners failed to qualify for the exemption because they “ha[d] 
no letters of Credence to His Majesty, and ha[d] not been received by 
His Majesty with the formalities usually practised on the reception of 
foreign public Ministers.”396 On this view, Gore and Pinkney were 
present merely “in the character of American citizens, resident in 
[Great Britain] under the protection of the American Minister, though 
invested by the United States with the character of Commissioners for 
a special purpose, under the stipulations in the [Treaty of Paris].”397 
Gore and Pinkney disagreed. In a detailed response that cited 
international legal authorities such as Wicquefort and Vattel, the 
commissioners argued that they were entitled to the duties exemption 
because a person may be “a public minister, under whatever name, 
title, or style he may be authorized and commissioned, altho’ he have 
no letters of credence to the sovereign, or be not received by him, with 
any particular formalities.”398 To qualify, one needed only “a letter of 
credence, a power, or some commission from the sovereign of a 
country”; “acknowledg[ment] and allow[ance] by the sovereign of the 
country to which he was sent in the character communicated by his 
commission”; and an entrustment “to transact public affairs or business 
between nation and nation.”399 Gore and Pinkney ultimately 
acquiesced to the British demand, but only for the sake of relations, 
and without retreating in principle from their original legal position.400 
OLC has further relied upon President Jefferson’s unilateral 
appointment of Daniel Smith as evidence that a diplomatic position 
“must have continuance or duration” in order to qualify as an office.401 
 
 395. 1 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 345 (Washington, 
Government Printing Office 1898). 
 396. Report by the Queen’s Advocate and the Law Officers of the Crown (Dec. 22, 1796), in 
FULL POWERS AND RATIFICATION: A STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TREATY-MAKING 
PROCEDURE 178 (J. Mervyn Jones ed., 1946). 
 397. Id. 
 398. 1 MOORE, supra note 395, at 348 (quoting from the response). 
 399. Id. This is John Bassett Moore’s paraphrase of the contents of the response, a copy of 
which I was unable to locate. 
 400. Id. 
 401. See Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, supra 
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According to OLC, Smith’s appointment was a “striking” case because 
he was a U.S. Senator who “did not vacate his seat” prior to acting as 
a treaty commissioner.402 On this account, Smith’s dual position as a 
Senator and commissioner demonstrates that the position of treaty 
commissioner did not qualify its occupant as an “Officer of the United 
States,” for if it had, Senator Smith would have violated the 
Incompatibility Clause, which provides that “no Person holding any 
Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House 
during his Continuance in Office.”403 
The problem with this treatment is that it frames as representative 
a case that was instead aberrational. Smith’s appointment was directly 
contrary to the practice of President Washington, who sought and 
obtained Senate confirmation for the appointment of Isaac Smith to 
negotiate a treaty with the Seneca Tribe in 1797.404 The appointment 
also contradicted an official opinion from Washington’s Attorney 
General, Charles Lee, who explained that “the President alone, and 
without the advice of the Senate, cannot appoint a commissioner to 
hold or make a treaty with an Indian tribe.”405 It contradicted the views 
of members of the First Congress.406 And it was squarely at odds with 
the dominant practice of President Adams and President Jefferson 
himself, who sought advice and consent for treaty negotiators on 
virtually every occasion.407 The best reading of the evidence in context 
is that Smith’s position as a commissioner made him a public minister 
and officer of the United States, and that President Jefferson acted in 
contravention of precedent by making the appointment on his own 
authority. 
It is unclear why no one objected. Chronology, however, seems to 
explain why no one objected specifically on the grounds of the 
Incompatibility Clause. President Jefferson commissioned Smith in 
late April 1804,408 and Smith concluded the negotiations on one of 
 
note 16, at 102. 
 402. Id. 
 403. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2; see also generally Seth Barrett Tillman, Originalism & the 
Scope of the Constitution’s Disqualification Clause, 33 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 59 (2014) (arguing 
that “Office under the United States,” as used in the Incompatibility Clause, encompasses 
“Officers of the United States,” as used in the Appointments Clause, and covers appointed 
officers in the executive branch). 
 404. S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 4th Cong. (2d Sess. 1797), at 229.  
 405. Powers of the Executive, supra note 353, at 65. 
 406. See supra Part III.E.3. 
 407. See supra Tables 1–3. 
 408. See Papers of Gen. Daniel Smith, 6 AM. HIST. MAG. 213, 233 (1901); see also No. 109: 
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three treaties with the Cherokees in October of the same year.409 Both 
of these developments preceded Smith’s election as a Senator in late 
1804.410 To be sure, Smith negotiated the two remaining treaties in 
October 1805,411 several months after the commencement of his term 
as a Senator, which began on March 4, 1805,412 but Congress did not 
convene until December of 1805, over a month after he completed the 
negotiations.413 Given these circumstances, it is plausible that no one 
even noticed the problem. I came across no evidence that members of 
Congress or the Administration anticipated Smith’s election at the time 
of his original appointment as commissioner, or that he missed any 
votes or hearings as a Senator because of the earlier assignment. 
Advocates of the orthodox view seem to have misinterpreted 
other evidence, as well. In an undated memorandum, James Madison 
explained that “[t]he place of a foreign Minister or Consul is not an 
office in the constitutional sense of the term,” as it is “not created by 
the Constitution” and “is not created by a law authorized by the 
Constitution,” but is instead “created by the Law of Nations.”414 
Wriston construed this statement as suggesting that all diplomatic 
agents—whether resident or ad hoc—are non-officers and thus exempt 
from the Appointments Clause.415 But that was almost certainly not the 
point. Madison clearly understood that a public minister is an officer 
 
Cherokees and Others (Dec. 23, 1805), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN 
AFFAIRS, supra note 315, at 699 (describing Smith’s assignment). 
 409. See Carolyn Thomas Foreman, The Lost Cherokee Treaty, 33 CHRONS. OF OKLA. 238, 
238 (1955) (recounting the chronology of the negotiations). 
 410. See BEN PERLEY POORE, THE POLITICAL REGISTER AND CONGRESSIONAL 
DIRECTORY: A STATISTICAL RECORD OF THE FEDERAL OFFICIALS, LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, 
AND JUDICIAL, OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1776–1878, at 29 (Boston, Houghton, 
Osgood & Co. 1878). 
 411. No. 108: Wyandots and Others, reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN 
AFFAIRS, supra note 315, at 698. 
 412. Smith, Daniel, (1748-1818), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONG., 1774–
PRESENT, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=S000524 [https://perma.cc/
PY84-9GCB]. 
 413. Compare No. 108: Wyandots and Others, reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: 
INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 315, at 698 (reporting a treaty-conclusion date of October 27, 1805), 
with Dates of Sessions of the Congress, supra note 285 (reporting that the first session of the Ninth 
Congress commenced on December 2, 1805). 
 414. Power of the President to Appoint Public Ministers & Consuls in the Recess of the 
Senate, supra note 272, at 91 n.1. 
 415. WRISTON, supra note 3, at 159 (responding to Madison’s assertion: “but it is not true that 
diplomatic officials are not officers in the strict constitutional sense. Article II, Section 2, of the 
Constitution calls them officers, and differentiaties them from others which are to be established 
by law”). 
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whose appointment requires advice and consent; the Constitution says 
so explicitly.416 In writing that the place of a public minister or consul is 
“not an office in the constitutional sense of the term,” Madison more 
likely meant simply that the Constitution does not supply the criteria 
by which to determine whether diplomatic agents qualify as officers for 
purposes of the Appointments Clause. Those criteria depend instead 
upon the definition of “public minister” under the law of nations.417 
Under this reasoning, the eventual Hartwell line of cases and OLC 
opinions that defined “officers of the United States” by reference to 
purely domestic legal considerations such as “continuation” are 
irrelevant, even if applicable in other contexts. 
Of course, the executive branch has also characterized the 
Appointments Clause as at least partly inapplicable on the view that 
many ad hoc diplomats are not “public Ministers,” who must be 
“formally accredited to . . . foreign governments as official diplomatic 
representatives of our government,” but rather “personal 
representatives of the President.”418 The 1943 memorandum that 
appears to stand as the only official, public explanation of this position, 
however, does not purport to rely on original meaning,419 and would 
have encountered difficulty if it had: Wicquefort explained that 
credentials are, while generally required, unnecessary where a 
receiving sovereign acknowledges an agent as a public minister,420 and 
the Washington Administration appears to have internalized this 
position.421 Moreover, the 1943 memorandum does not purport to 
justify the unilateral appointment of ad hoc diplomats who wield 
transactional authority as U.S. officials.422 
 
 416. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 417. Power of the President to Appoint Public Ministers & Consuls in the Recess of the 
Senate, supra note 272, at 91 n.1. 
 418. Presidential Appointment of Foreign Agents Without the Consent of the Senate, supra 
note 48, at 457. 
 419. See id. 
 420. WICQUEFORT, supra note 84, at 2 (explaining that the class of “public minister” includes 
“those Persons whom Princes employ by a verbal Order; provided that he, with whom they are to 
negociate, acknowledges ‘em in that Quality, and gives them a Credit which he would not give to 
another without Letters”). 
 421. See supra Part III.E.2. 
 422. Presidential Appointment of Foreign Agents Without the Consent of the Senate, supra 
note 48, at 457 (acknowledging that the terms “Ambassadors” and “other public Ministers” refer 
to those who have been “formally accredited to . . . foreign governments as official diplomatic 
representatives of our government”). 
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G. Questions of Scope 
Even accepting that advice and consent is generally required for 
the appointment of irregular diplomatic agents, the historical record 
leaves uncertainty regarding that requirement’s precise contours. 
Three issues stand out. 
First, there is a marginal uncertainty of breadth: what types of 
diplomatic functions trigger the status of public minister? Substantial 
evidence suggests that treaty negotiation and other types of official, 
public, and intergovernmental representation qualify regardless of 
duration, but there is no evidence on ad hoc representation vis-à-vis 
international organizations, which simply did not exist in the 
eighteenth century. 
Second, there is a marginal uncertainty of depth: how far down an 
organizational chart does the status of public minister extend? In terms 
of rank, special envoys and lead negotiators qualify, given their close 
comparability in status to those who received Senate confirmation 
during early presidential administrations,423 but modern diplomacy 
tends to rely on personnel with much greater diversity of ranks and 
titles. Whereas John Jay single-handedly represented the United States 
in negotiating with the British in 1794,424 a modern trade negotiation, 
to name just one example, might entail diplomatic communications by 
not only the U.S. Trade Representative, but also one or more Deputy 
U.S. Trade Representatives, the Chief of Staff, the Senior Advisor, the 
General Counsel, and various Associate General Counsels in the 
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.425 The proper treatment of 
these and other modern titles is not self-evident under an originalist 
framework. 
Finally, there is a marginal uncertainty of frequency: if the 
president seeks to rely upon an individual to conduct separate 
negotiations with multiple foreign governments over a period of 
months or years, how often, if ever, must he go back to the Senate for 
fresh advice and consent? Returning to the example of trade, must 
Donald Trump obtain Senate confirmation for Robert Lighthizer and 
his deputies in advance of each new trade negotiation, or is a single 
appointment sufficient? In combination, these questions create the 
 
 423. See supra Tables 1–3. 
 424. SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, JAY’S TREATY: A STUDY IN COMMERCE AND DIPLOMACY 203 
17, 232 51 (1923). 
 425. See Biographies of Key Officials, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/biographies-key-officials [https://perma.cc/ZL2H-4PHQ]. 
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possibility of substantial variation in the ambit of the Appointments 
Clause, even if one operates within originalist parameters. 
On these issues, the case for broader Senate involvement relies 
more heavily on interpretive judgment and translation, but is far from 
implausible. Begin with breadth. Because the early evidence is largely 
silent on the issue of representation vis-à-vis international 
organizations, it is fair to question whether the original understanding 
of the Appointments Clause can encompass ad hoc diplomacy 
involving the United Nations, the International Criminal Court, or 
other, similar organizations. If it does not, then advice and consent is 
necessary at most for appointments involving representation to foreign 
states. 
Yet the condition of the evidence is most likely a result of the 
absence of multilateral institutions at the time of the Founding, rather 
than a specific intent for public ministerial functions to exclude 
anything other than bilateral, international diplomacy. Indeed, in the 
case that most closely approximated contemporary appointments to 
international organizations—the appointment of claim commissioners 
under the Treaty of Paris—the Washington Administration sought and 
obtained the Senate’s advice and consent.426 Some disagreed that the 
commissioners were public ministers, but this view did not prevail 
within the Administration,427 and context suggests a potential 
explanation: Insofar as he delimited the functions of public ministers 
by reference to the character of the foreign audience or receiving 
entity, Wicquefort did so in broad terms. Most notably, he explained 
that although “Sovereigns send their Embassadors only to 
Sovereigns,” they can also send ambassadors to “Assemblies compos’d 
of several representing Ministers.”428 While superficially contradictory, 
Wicquefort treated these ideas as consistent on the view that 
ambassadors sent to multilateral assemblies “are in reality sent to the 
Sovereigns” represented by those in attendance.429 
The practice for public ministers below the rank of ambassador 
was even more permissive: “Sovereigns send Ministers sometimes to 
those Places where their Interest requires it, notwithstanding there is 
no Sovereign there for them to consider.”430 Thus, to name just one 
 
 426. See supra Part III.E.2. 
 427. Id. 
 428. WICQUEFORT, supra note 84, at 45 (emphasis omitted). 
 429. Id. (emphasis omitted) 
 430. Id. 
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example, “France . . . had a Resident [public minister] at Hamburgh, 
not for any Affairs it had to adjust with the Magistrate, nor to facilitate 
the Correspondence it had with Sweden, but upon other particular 
Considerations.”431 An approach that emphasizes this evidence would 
honor Founding-era concerns about foreign entanglement by erecting 
a broader barrier against executive unilateralism, without regard for 
the organizational character of the recipient. It would also explain why 
the Washington Administration repeatedly sought Senate 
confirmation in appointing individuals to negotiate treaties with native 
tribes that many regarded as inferior to sovereign states.432 
Next consider the issue of depth. Because early administrations 
sought advice and consent only for principal negotiators, it is 
questionable whether positions of lesser authority also qualify as public 
ministers as a matter of original meaning. Yet there are several reasons 
to believe they can: Wicquefort opined that the term “public ministers” 
encompassed a diversity of actors, including 
“plenipotentiaries . . . internuncios, envoys, residents, agents, 
commissioners, the secretaries of embassies, and even the secretaries of 
embassadors.”433 The framers, moreover, chose to require Senate 
confirmation for the appointment of consuls, who exercised relatively 
limited authority.434 And to the extent that early presidential 
administrations deployed teams of negotiators, they regularly sought 
and obtained advice and consent separately for each and every 
negotiator, even though some inevitably played less significant roles 
than others.435 Together, this evidence suggests that the status of public 
minister extends below the ranks of chief negotiators and other top-
level envoys. 
Now consider the issue of frequency. During early 
administrations, it was uncommon for the president to rely upon a 
single appointee to negotiate multiple, separate agreements with 
different foreign governments, and to that extent, it was also 
uncommon for the president to seek fresh advice and consent in 
advance of a current appointee’s negotiation of a new agreement.436 In 
part for this reason, Michael Ramsey has argued that transaction-
 
 431. Id. (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 45–46 (citing other examples). 
 432. See, e.g., Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 567–68 (1823) (acknowledging the view that 
native tribes are less than fully sovereign and citing to supporting authority). 
 433. Id. at 2 (emphasis altered and added) (capitalization modified from original). 
 434. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 435. See supra Tables 1–3. 
 436. Id. 
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specific appointments are unnecessary to honor the original 
understanding.437 In his view, it is sufficient for the president to make a 
single appointment conferring general powers of negotiation.438 
Ramsey’s position is not unreasonable, but seems to overlook 
relevant considerations. One is that an approach that permits general 
powers of negotiation is harder to justify in view of historical 
constraints on states’ discretion to ratify agreements. Several leading 
writers on the law of nations held that treaty signature triggers an 
obligation to ratify as long as the negotiator followed his instructions 
in drafting the text.439 This principle operated in considerable tension 
with Article II’s provision for Senate advice and consent in the making 
of treaties, which is meaningful only if discretionary, but there is 
evidence that early U.S. officials were familiar with and at times 
invoked the principle anyway.440 If that evidence reflects a broader 
Founding-era acknowledgement of the obligation to ratify—either as a 
binding rule of international law or as a moral precept by which to 
satisfy the expectations of European governments—then it is at least 
plausible that the founders perceived meaningful Senate involvement 
at the front end of the adoption process as the best opportunity for 
Congress to shape U.S. treaty obligations. It is precisely that 
involvement, however, that the conferral of general negotiating 
authority would render less frequent. To be sure, it is possible that the 
founders would have nevertheless accepted such as practice, but doing 
so would have further marginalized a Senate that already faced 
considerable international constraints on its discretion to advise and 
consent to ratification. 
In addition, a requirement of transaction-specific advice and 
consent would seem to better serve the original purposes of the 
Appointments Clause.441 Professor Ramsey’s argument seems to 
suggest that a single act of advice and consent could suffice regardless 
of the number, content, importance, and foreseeability of the 
agreements the appointee might negotiate, and regardless of the 
 
 437. Michael Ramsey, Ryan Scoville on Renegotiating NAFTA, ORIGINALISM BLOG (May 2, 
2017), http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2017/05/ryan-scoville-on-
renegotiating-naftamichael-ramsey.html [https://perma.cc/F9HS-NNYG]. 
 438. Id. 
 439. See John Eugene Harley, The Obligation to Ratify Treaties, 13 AM. J. INT’L L. 389, 392, 
398–400 (1919) (summarizing the views of early commentators).  
 440. See id. 
 441. See supra Part III.E.1 (discussing evidence of the Appointments Clause’s original 
purpose). 
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succession of foreign governments with which the appointee negotiates 
and the domestic and international implications of those negotiations. 
But this would make it much harder for the Senate to vet nominees for 
competency. It would also complicate the task of policing for conflicts 
of interest. And it would limit opportunities for public debate over 
important questions of foreign policy. 
Unsurprisingly, then, an approach that permits general advice and 
consent does not appear to be the original model. In the late eighteenth 
century, the president did not nominate and the Senate did not approve 
the appointment of any individual to exercise roving, general authority 
to negotiate treaties. Instead, the Senate approved the designation of 
each negotiator shortly prior to each new negotiation.442 Moreover, the 
Senate did this even when it had already confirmed the same individual 
to a different but ongoing diplomatic appointment.443 This approach 
enabled Senators to advise and consent to the appointments in an 
informed manner, with a specific negotiation in mind. True, the 
Constitution does not specifically say that such case-by-case approval 
is necessary, and the mere existence of a pattern of early practice does 
not necessarily mean that the founders understood it as constitutionally 
required. But this practice was not merely occasional. It was the custom 
throughout the administrations of Washington, Adams, and Jefferson, 
and it manifested in relation to over two dozen international 
negotiations.444 It is hardly a stretch to imagine that the practice would 
have acquired a certain normative gravity in these circumstances, such 
that departures would have been viewed with suspicion and even 
opposed on constitutional grounds. 
In summary, there is ample reason to believe that the dominant 
narrative about the original understanding of ad hoc diplomacy is 
incorrect. A substantial collection of evidence—virtually all of it 
ignored by those who espouse the orthodox view—suggests three 
essential conclusions: First, the framers generally understood the term 
“public Ministers,” as used in the Appointments Clause, exclusively by 
reference to the law of nations. Second, the law of nations defined 
public ministers to include both resident and various types of irregular 
diplomats. Most clearly, public ministers included the chief negotiators 
of international agreements and any others who officially and publicly 
represented the sovereign abroad, regardless of the duration of the 
 
 442. See supra Tables 1–3 and accompanying text.  
 443. See supra Part III.E.2. 
 444. See supra Tables 1–3. 
SCOVILLE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2019  5:24 PM 
2019] AD HOC DIPLOMATS 991 
position or the precise nature of the diplomatic assignment, whether 
that be transmitting or collecting information or merely attending a 
ceremony. Third, the framers generally understood qualification as a 
public minister under the law of nations as independently productive 
of the status of “Officer of the United States,” and thus as triggering 
the requirement of advice and consent. A nominee’s qualification for 
officer status, in other words, was not an analytically separate 
precondition to the need for Senate confirmation, but rather a simple 
consequence of qualification as a public minister for the U.S. 
government as a matter of international law. While there are 
uncertainties on the margins, the constitutional argument against much 
of the contemporary practice seems strong from an originalist 
perspective. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS 
For nearly a century, scholars have taken it as given that the 
Constitution empowers the president to dispatch all ad hoc diplomats 
without the Senate’s advice and consent. OLC has also adopted this 
position in recent years, relying in substantial part on evidence from 
the Founding. The text of the Constitution, however, does not support 
unilateral appointments, and an abundance of previously overlooked 
evidence of original meaning squarely contradicts much of the 
orthodox view. 
These conclusions accentuate what was already a yawning chasm 
between original and modern practice in treaty making. At the 
Founding, it is now apparent, the dominant model was for the president 
to seek advice and consent in appointing the negotiators, actively 
consult with the Senate during the course of negotiations, and then 
submit the finalized text for approval by two-thirds of the Senate, 
which would in turn deliberate, possibly at length, on whether to grant 
that approval.445 In contrast, consider the process involved in the ill-
fated Trans-Pacific Partnership: President Obama independently 
appointed all of the negotiators,446 strictly limited the ability of 
 
 445. See generally Cory Adkins & David Singh Grewal, Two Views of International Trade in 
the Constitutional Order, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1495 (2016) (discussing the significance of some of the 
procedural differences between original and contemporary practice). 
 446. See Consultation With Stakeholders: An Integral Part of the Process, OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Lead-Negotiators-2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3N9D-4XNJ] (listing the members of the U.S. negotiating team for the Trans-
Pacific Partnership). 
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members of Congress to even look at early drafts,447 and had planned 
to submit the finalized text as a congressional-executive agreement that 
requires only simple majorities of each house rather than two-thirds of 
the Senate.448 Moreover, because Congress gave the president trade 
promotion authority with respect to the TPP, legislators would have 
had only a limited window within which to consider adoption and 
would have lacked any ability to make amendments.449 For better or 
worse, this is—from start to finish—a significant departure from 
original design.450 
A. Implications for Formalists 
Of course, the significance of this analysis depends heavily on 
one’s preferred approach to constitutional interpretation. For those 
who give exclusive or primary weight to text, the analysis suggests that 
a salient feature of contemporary U.S. foreign relations is generally 
unconstitutional, and that, rather than act alone, the president must 
obtain Senate approval in appointing anyone who would qualify as a 
public minister under the historical law of nations. This includes the 
principal negotiators of international agreements and likely includes 
all other agents who officially and publicly interface with foreign 
sovereigns on behalf of the United States, regardless of the duration of 
their position, emoluments, or other Hartwell-esque criteria. From 
such a perspective it follows that presidents have acted unlawfully by 
independently appointing special envoys to work with foreign 
governments on issues ranging from the resettlement of Guantanamo 
detainees to Eurasian energy and peace in the Middle East.451 This 
perspective also dictates that the method by which President Obama 
appointed the primary negotiators of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the 
Paris Agreement on Climate Change, and numerous other treaties is 
 
 447. Alleen Brown, You Can’t Read the TPP, But These Huge Corporations Can, INTERCEPT 
(May 12, 2015, 1:36 PM), https://theintercept.com/2015/05/12/cant-read-tpp-heres-huge-
corporations-can [https://perma.cc/6PGY-LA7M]. 
 448. Paul Lewis, Barack Obama Given ‘Fast-Track’ Authority Over Trade Deal Negotiations, 
GUARDIAN (June 24, 2015, 6:27 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/24/barack-
obama-fast-track-trade-deal-tpp-senate [https://perma.cc/VLM4-JVFA]. 
 449. Id. 
 450. The same is true of the equally ill-fated Paris Agreement on Climate Change, which 
President Obama negotiated and adopted without congressional approval. Dave Boyer, Obama, 
Chinese President Ratify Climate-Change Agreement, WASH. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2016), 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/sep/3/obama-xi-ratify-climate-change-agreement 
[https://perma.cc/NDV6-K6E4]. 
 451. See supra notes 30–43 (documenting cases). 
SCOVILLE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2019  5:24 PM 
2019] AD HOC DIPLOMATS 993 
unconstitutional, and that President Trump has violated the 
Appointments Clause by independently designating agents to 
renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement, orchestrate 
the campaign to defeat ISIS, communicate with North Korea, pursue a 
settlement between Israel and Palestine, or work toward the 
stabilization of Ukraine. 
It bears emphasis that, from an originalist perspective, the advice-
and-consent requirement applies to the principal U.S. negotiators of an 
international agreement regardless of the domestic process by which 
the United States adopts the agreement itself. U.S. foreign relations 
law has traditionally subdivided the instruments that qualify as treaties 
under international law into three categories452: (1) Article II treaties 
that require advice and consent from two-thirds of Senators present,453 
(2) congressional-executive agreements that require simple-majority 
approval from both houses of Congress, and (3) sole executive 
agreements that require no congressional approval.454 The original 
meaning of “public Ministers,” however, does not recognize these 
distinctions.455 By seeking and obtaining Senate confirmation in 
appointing the negotiators of both Article II treaties and sole executive 
agreements, early presidents implied that the primary negotiator of an 
international agreement will qualify for the statuses of public minister 
and officer of the United States regardless of the agreement’s 
classification under domestic law.456 From this perspective, the 
legislative branch is currently underinvolved in the adoption of all 
 
 452. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(1)(a), opened for signature May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (defining “treaty” as “an international agreement concluded between 
States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single 
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation”); 
Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 28, at 892–93 (discussing the traditional, domestic-law 
classifications of U.S. treaties). 
 453. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 454. Daniel Bodansky and Peter Spiro recently argued that there is a fourth, previously 
unrecognized category of “executive agreements+,” which they define as agreements that “are 
supported but not specifically authorized by congressional action.” Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 
28, at 887. Because the definition of “public Ministers” does not depend on the domestic process 
by which the sovereign eventually adopts an agreement, it is likely that the requirement of Senate 
confirmation would also apply to the principal U.S. negotiators of this additional category of 
agreements. 
 455. See supra Part III.C (discussing the definition of “public Ministers” in the early treatises). 
 456. See supra Tables 1–3 and note 309 (reporting that early presidents regularly sought and 
obtained Senate advice and consent for the appointment of Article II treaty negotiators, and for 
the appointment of William Vans Murray, who negotiated the first sole executive agreement in 
1799). 
SCOVILLE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2019  5:24 PM 
994  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:907 
types of international agreements, not just Article II treaties, and there 
is no such thing as a “sole” executive agreement because the Senate 
must always be involved, at a minimum, in the appointment of those 
who would serve as its principal negotiators. 
The formalist critique of unilateral appointments also offers fresh 
insights on interim obligations. As a matter of international law, the 
president’s unilateral act of signing an ex post congressional-executive 
agreement or an Article II treaty triggers an obligation for the United 
States to “refrain from acts which would defeat [the agreement’s] 
object and purpose.”457 This obligation continues “until [the United 
States] shall have made its intention clear not to become a party,”458 or 
until the agreement’s entry into force, at which point the United States 
assumes a more extensive obligation of performance in good faith.459 
The precise nature of the interim obligation is a subject of 
disagreement,460 but the doctrine has been invoked to justify a broad 
range of policies461 and likely requires at least that the United States 
refrain from “actions that would substantially undermine the ability of 
the parties to comply with, or benefit from, the treaty after 
ratification.”462 
Some commentators have suggested that this doctrine, 
particularly in its more robust iterations, is constitutionally 
problematic insofar as it empowers the president to assume certain 
types of treaty obligations without any form of congressional 
approval.463 The Appointments Clause complicates this analysis. On 
 
 457. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 452, at art. 18; see also, Frequently 
Asked Questions: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP’T OF ST., 
https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm [https://perma.cc/TA4X-3QKT] (explaining that 
although the Senate has not provided advice and consent to the Vienna Convention, the United 
States “considers many of the provisions of the . . . Convention . . . to constitute customary 
international law on the law of treaties”). 
 458. Id. art. 18(a). 
 459. Id. art. 26 (“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed 
by them in good faith.”). 
 460. See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties, 
14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171, 173 (2003) (“As a matter of international law, core treaty obligations 
attach . . . upon signature of the treaty.”); see also generally Jan Klabbers, How to Defeat a Treaty’s 
Object and Purpose Pending Entry into Force: Toward Manifest Intent, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 283 (2001) (discussing divergent interpretations of the doctrine and proposing a separate test). 
 461. See Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitution, 
48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 307, 315–16 (2007) (discussing recent invocations of the doctrine). 
 462. Id. at 308. 
 463. Id. at 309 (arguing that “broad obligations arising from signature are in tension with the 
U.S. constitutional process for making treaties”); David H. Moore, The President’s 
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one hand, it accentuates the claim of executive unilateralism by 
revealing that presidents often bypass the Senate in appointing those 
who will shape the text of the agreement that the president will sign, 
and in turn the interim obligations that flow from signature. On the 
other hand, it suggests a plausible remedy: simple-majority advice and 
consent. By obtaining Senate approval for the appointment of an 
agreement’s chief negotiators, the president might effectively rebut 
claims that interim obligations are unconstitutional as unilaterally 
assumed. After all, no Senator who votes in favor of such an 
appointment could plausibly disclaim the foreseeability of interim 
obligations pending entry into force, and the bare requirement of 
simple-majority approval from one house is plausibly commensurate 
to the limited nature of the obligations themselves. 
To be clear, none of this is necessarily to say that unilateral 
appointments are categorically undesirable, or that any of the specific 
policies that animate each case of ad hoc diplomacy are ill-advised. 
Indeed, there are good arguments that special envoys generally do 
important work, that the Trans-Pacific Partnership would have been 
net-beneficial for the United States, that the Paris Agreement remains 
an important part of the effort to mitigate climate change, and that the 
United States would benefit if Congress had fewer rather than more 
tools for obstructing the president’s conduct of foreign affairs. It is 
conceivable, moreover, that an originalist approach to diplomatic 
appointments would incentivize the president to circumvent the Senate 
by making a larger portion of ad hoc appointments secret, thereby 
precluding agents from qualifying as “public Ministers” even under the 
original meaning of the term.464 This would likely interfere with 
congressional involvement in foreign policy even more than the 
orthodox view by not only depriving the Senate of the opportunity to 
advise and consent to nominations, but also complicating congressional 
oversight of active agents. But normative considerations are not 
relevant to the present analysis. The point is simply that the practice of 
appointing ad hoc diplomats without the Senate’s advice and consent 
is, for better or worse, at odds with the Constitution’s text and, for 
those who prioritize text, unconstitutional. 
 
Unconstitutional Treatymaking, 59 UCLA L. REV. 598, 613–32 (2012) (arguing that interim 
obligations are unconstitutional regardless of the breadth of the doctrine). 
 464. See supra note 302 (identifying sources that exempted secret actors from the category of 
“public minister”). 
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Nor is this to say that extant treaties are invalid if they were 
negotiated by unilaterally appointed agents. The Supremacy Clause 
provides that treaties are the supreme law of the land only when made 
“under the Authority of the United States.”465 In 1796, Attorney 
General Charles Lee explained that this phrase refers to “the 
constitutional authority of the United States, which . . . cannot be 
bestowed on any person but by the President, with the advice of the 
Senate.”466 From this position it would seem to follow that treaties 
negotiated by individuals appointed without the Senate’s advice and 
consent are not made under the authority of the United States, and are 
thus ineligible for the status of supreme federal law. Yet the Supreme 
Court would likely shy away from such a destabilizing outcome for at 
least two reasons. The first is procedural: from an accountability 
standpoint, one might fairly conclude that the president’s signature and 
the Senate’s advice and consent expunge any constitutional defect 
emanating from the appointment of the negotiators. The second reason 
is precedential: In Buckley v. Valeo,467 the Court invalidated part of the 
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 as establishing an 
unconstitutional method of appointment for members of the Federal 
Election Commission, but then accorded “de facto validity” to the 
members’ past acts.468 In Ryder v. United States,469 the Court suggested 
that a similar result might pertain in other cases where necessary to 
avoid “grave disruption or inequity.”470 One can only imagine that this 
would apply to unconfirmed diplomatic appointments, the 
unconstitutionality of which would otherwise render invalid scores of 
international agreements.471 
 
 465. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 466. Powers of the Executive, supra note 353, at 66. 
 467. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 468. Id. at 142. 
 469. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177 (1995). 
 470. Id. at 185. 
 471. The constitutional infirmity of the agreements would likely fail to render them invalid as 
a matter of international law. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “[a] person 
is considered as representing a State for the purpose of adopting or authenticating the text of a 
treaty” if he or she “produces appropriate full powers” or “[i]t appears from the practice of the 
States concerned or from other circumstances that their intention was to consider that person as 
representing the State for such purposes and to dispense with full powers.” Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, supra note 452, at art. 7(1). Past negotiators of now-operative agreements 
undoubtedly qualified as representing the United States under this language. Moreover, “[a] State 
may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation 
of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its 
consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental 
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For an originalist, the analysis does, however, suggest avenues by 
which Congress might attempt to reclaim influence over the future 
conduct of foreign affairs. First, where the president proposes to 
appoint irregular agents, the Senate might insist upon advice and 
consent as an opportunity to publicly debate executive policies and, if 
necessary, reject ad hoc appointments as a way of complicating and 
discouraging those initiatives that appear fundamentally unsound. In 
this regard, Section 301 of the Department of State Authorities Act, 
Fiscal Year 2018 is well grounded.472 In proposing to require the 
Senate’s advice and consent for the appointment of “any Special 
Envoy, Special Representative, Special Coordinator, Special 
Negotiator, Envoy, Representative, Coordinator, or Special 
Advisor,”473 the bill would merely resuscitate original practice. If the 
president were to reject such an initiative, Congress might respond by 
factoring that maneuver into its decisions on whether and how to 
cooperate on related matters, including, in the event of a treaty or 
other international agreement, the question of whether to approve any 
resulting text. 
Second, and more coercively, Congress might refuse to 
appropriate funds for the compensation of envoys appointed without 
advice and consent. “[I]t has long been established that the spending 
power may not be deployed to invade core Presidential prerogatives in 
the conduct of diplomacy,”474 but the foregoing analysis shows that, at 
least for an originalist, unilateral appointments are typically not an 
executive prerogative. 
Third, in extreme cases, the House and Senate might impeach, 
convict, remove, and disqualify from holding future office any ad hoc 
diplomat who commits “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
 
importance.” Id. art. 46(1). The Appointments Clause is almost certainly an “internal law of 
fundamental importance,” but there is a strong argument that the violation is not “manifest,” 
given the ubiquity of unilateral appointments by modern presidents. Cf. Jan Klabbers, The 
Validity and Invalidity of Treaties, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES 561–64 (Duncan B. 
Hollis ed., 2012) (explaining Article 46 in relation to “manifest” treaty violations). Thus, the 
disruption associated with a declaration of unconstitutionality would likely stem from the 
practical necessity to terminate or withdraw from operative treaties in order to resolve the 
contradiction between their domestic and international validity, rather than from an automatic 
invalidation of those treaties as a matter of international law. But either way, the damage to U.S. 
foreign relations would be incalculable. 
 472. S. 1631, 115th Cong. § 301 (2017).  
 473. Id. 
 474. Section 609 of the FY 1996 Omnibus Appropriations Act, 20 U.S. Op. O.L.C. 189, 197 
(1996). 
SCOVILLE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2019  5:24 PM 
998  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:907 
Misdemeanors.”475 Because impeachment is available only against the 
“President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United 
States,”476 the modern view has had the effect of immunizing ad hoc 
diplomats from accountability as non-officers. The original 
understanding, in contrast, would create the possibility of 
impeachment by categorizing ad hoc diplomats as both public ministers 
and officers of the United States. Under this approach, Congress might 
consider the impeachment of Jared Kushner for allegedly engaging in 
improper communications with Russia,477 just as the Fourth Congress 
considered the impeachment of John Jay for alleged improprieties in 
the negotiation of Jay’s Treaty.478 
These measures would not be without functional logic. As shown 
above,479 the unilateral method of appointment exacerbates other 
forms of executive unilateralism. It makes possible “sole” executive 
agreements in the fullest sense. It enables the president to assume 
interim obligations with respect to treaties regardless of congressional 
support. It eliminates many opportunities for Congress to scrutinize, 
debate, and influence U.S. policy on topics ranging from arms control 
to negotiations between Israel and Palestine. As a result, foreign policy 
is less deliberative, less subject to compromise, and more vulnerable to 
significant shifts based on the preferences of the White House. Many 
have been comfortable with this state of affairs because they have 
trusted, at least in basic terms, the character and judgment of most of 
the individuals who have occupied the office of president, but that trust 
is now in question.480 By insisting upon a return to the original practice, 
the Senate might mitigate the contemporary dangers of executive 
independence in foreign affairs. 
Revitalizing the Appointments Clause would also make it harder 
for the president to pursue the most extremely unqualified or 
otherwise controversial appointments. Presidents face political 
 
 475. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 476. Id. 
 477. See Ryan Goodman, Can Jared Kushner Be Impeached?, JUST SECURITY (July 24, 2017), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/43463/jared-kushner-impeached [https://perma.cc/6MRK-CUSS]. 
 478. See supra Part III.E.3. 
 479. See supra Part IV. 
 480. See Frank Newport, Americans Evaluate Trump’s Character Across 13 Dimensions, 
GALLUP (June 25, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/235907/americans-evaluate-trump-
character-across-dimensions.aspx [https://perma.cc/EK9A-5G7Y] (reporting that no more than 
37% of Americans hold favorable views of President Trump’s honesty and trustworthiness, 
likability, admirability, skill at choosing advisers and cabinet officers, and ability to work well with 
both parties). 
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incentives to make wise choices regardless of Senate involvement, and 
yet, there is no guarantee that the current president or future 
presidents will operate on informed, common conceptions of 
competence or propriety. President Trump, after all, has 
independently chosen his son-in-law, a real estate developer with zero 
experience in international relations, to serve as one of his principal 
representatives in the Middle East.481 If unilateral appointments are 
permissible, there are no formal checks to preclude similar 
appointments in the future. Admittedly, the Senate rarely turns down 
unqualified nominees for diplomatic posts even when it has the 
opportunity,482 but senators have used the confirmation power to reject 
some of the most grossly unqualified nominees and encourage the 
withdrawal of others.483 Moreover, the mere possibility of Senate 
opposition plausibly strengthens the president’s incentive to avoid 
controversial picks. A return to original practice would ensure that 
these checks also operate with respect to many ad hoc appointees, and 
thus encourage selections that satisfy generally accepted standards of 
merit and facilitate an effective foreign policy. 
B. Implications for Everyone Else 
For those who reject the relevance of original meaning, the 
implications are quite different. Insofar as modern customary practice 
and other related considerations are significant, the analysis does not 
resolve the question of constitutionality in any ultimate sense. Yet it is 
still consequential for several reasons. One is that it shifts the burden 
of persuasion to those who espouse the orthodox view. As Curtis 
Bradley and Trevor Morrison have explained, there is typically an 
inverse relationship between, on one hand, the clarity of the 
Constitution’s text and, on the other hand, the ability of nontextual 
 
 481. Amir Tibon, Trump Reportedly Confirms Kushner to Serve as Mideast Peace Broker, 
HAARETZ (Jan. 16, 2017, 4:17 PM), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/trump-reportedly-
confirms-kushner-to-serve-as-mideast-peace-broker-1.5486300 [https://perma.cc/QEC8-DZQQ]. 
 482. See, e.g., Josh Rogin, Another Obama Fundraiser Turns Out to be a Bad Ambassador, 
FOREIGN POLICY (Feb. 23, 2012, 5:56 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/23/another-obama-
fundraiser-turns-out-to-be-a-bad-ambassador [https://perma.cc/EY9E-ERWC] (discussing the 
poor performance of Nicole Avant, a political fundraiser whom the Senate confirmed as 
ambassador to the Bahamas). 
 483. See, e.g., Paul Richter, Obama Donor George Tsunis Ends His Nomination as Norway 
Ambassador, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2014, 7:51 PM), http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-
norway-ambassador-nominee-withdraws-20141213-story.html [https://perma.cc/DT48-UF38] 
(reporting that George Tsunis withdrew his nomination after a poor performance at his 
confirmation hearing provoked a political backlash). 
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considerations to dictate legality; “[t]he more an interpreter 
deems . . . evidence like the text and original understanding to be clear, 
the less likely the interpreter is to credit [nontextual arguments] that 
point[] in a different direction.”484 On this view, the textual case against 
unilateral appointments means, at a minimum, that the argument in 
favor of the practice will be harder to sustain. The question is not 
whether the Senate is justified in inserting itself into the matter of 
irregular diplomatic appointments, but whether the president is 
justified in rejecting the original model of shared governance by acting 
alone. 
The analysis also helps to further elucidate the original 
relationship between the Constitution and international law. Some 
recent Justices have expressed an aversion to the use of international 
law as an input in constitutional interpretation, at least in certain areas 
such as the Eighth Amendment.485 The historical sources, however, 
show that the framers had no such aversion with respect to the 
Appointments Clause. Intriguingly, this means that international law, 
at least in appointments, should be most relevant to those who have 
otherwise expressed the strongest objections to its relevance, and 
perhaps least relevant to those who have otherwise embraced its 
utilization. 
The analysis also enriches current understanding of the way in 
which international norms have shaped the separation of powers. Jean 
Galbraith has demonstrated that the law of nations strengthened the 
president vis-à-vis Congress in areas such as recognition, war powers, 
and treaty making.486 Under the Appointments Clause, however, the 
original effect of the law of nations was precisely the opposite—the 
empowerment of the Senate at the expense of the president. On this 
account, it is the gradual domestication of the meaning of “public 
Ministers,” accomplished through a subtle grafting of Hartwell’s 
conception of “officer,” that has liberated modern presidents from the 
 
 484. Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 430 (2012). 
 485. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 622–28 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). But see 
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2085–86 (2015) (relying in part on 
international law to determine the scope of the president’s power to recognize foreign borders); 
Ingrid Wuerth, International Decision, Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 
United States Supreme Court, June 8, 2015, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 636, 638–40 (2015) (discussing the 
use of international law in Zivotofsky by both the majority and the dissent). 
 486. See generally Jean Galbraith, International Law and the Domestic Separation of Powers, 
99 VA. L. REV. 987 (2013). 
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need for advice and consent with respect to many ad hoc diplomats. 
This suggests a more complicated story about the rise of executive 
power, with international law serving less as a reliable causative force 
than as an occasional tool of convenience, to be deployed by the 
president when helpful but otherwise disregarded. 
Finally, the early evidence regarding special envoys sheds light on 
the utility of history in the ongoing contest between the political 
branches for control over foreign relations. By citing to Founding-era 
sources, OLC’s 2007 opinion on the Appointments Clause strongly 
suggests that modern custom reflects the original meaning of the 
Constitution.487 Yet such a position, as I hope to have shown, is 
extremely difficult to square with the weight of the evidence. This not 
only raises questions about OLC’s objectivity,488 it also raises the 
possibility that the executive branch deploys revisionism as a device by 
which to normalize and legitimate historically aberrational features of 
the status quo. By reconfiguring the past—by “inventing tradition”—
OLC is able to create the appearance of historical continuity and thus 
tap into the Founding as an added source of authority.489 Together with 
justiciability and remedial doctrines that complicate private efforts to 
enforce the separation of powers,490 and structural conditions that 
disadvantage Congress in horizontal struggles with the executive 
branch,491 such revisionism plausibly operates as a material sociological 
contributor to executive primacy. 
CONCLUSION 
The presidency’s ascent to dominance in foreign affairs has relied 
in part on a pervasive belief in the basic competence and character of 
 
 487. Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, supra 
note 16, at 100–05. 
 488. Cf. Trevor W. Morrison, Libya, “Hostilities,” the Office of Legal Counsel, and the Process 
of Executive Branch Legal Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. F. 62, 63 (2011) (“[I]n spite of 
episodes like the notorious ‘torture memos,’ OLC has earned a well-deserved reputation for 
providing credible, authoritative, thorough and objective legal analysis.”). 
 489. Cf. Eric Hobsbawm, Introduction: Inventing Traditions, in THE INVENTION OF 
TRADITION 1 (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1983) (“‘Invented tradition’ is taken to 
mean a set of practices . . . which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by 
repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they 
normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past.”). 
 490. See Kent Barnett, Standing for (and up to) Separation of Powers, 91 IND. L.J. 665, 676–
85 (2016). 
 491. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 484, at 438–47 (arguing that Congress is poorly 
suited to defend its institutional prerogatives from encroachment by the executive branch). 
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the individual who rises to occupy the nation’s highest office. That 
belief now appears less pervasive than at any time since the 1970s, if 
not earlier. In this state of affairs, the questions of whether and how to 
pull back from executive hegemony acquire new relevance, and their 
resolution may carry serious implications for the nature of U.S. 
engagement with the world. The foregoing analysis suggests that a 
revitalized Appointments Clause might serve as one useful mechanism 
by which to reign in the executive and restore the separation of powers. 
